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Introduction
An Interesting Consideration
Imagine that extra-terrestrial researchers land on Earth with the mission of
studying humanity. As part of their expedition they wish to sit in on one University
Degree, but are unsure of which degree to choose. So they decide to carry out a survey,
asking each individual human what it is they want in life. Based on the results, the aliens
will then study the appropriate field. After conducting the survey and processing the data,
they come to the conclusion that humans highly regard this thing called happiness.1 The
Head Researchers unanimously decide that a ‘degree in happiness’ is in order. As they
begin to search through the tertiary educational institutions of the world, they are amazed
to find that there are little to no degrees in happiness. How could this possibly be? Did
they misread the results of the survey? No. Were the humans deceiving them in their
answers? No. How is it then that there is no degree in happiness?
Of course, one can find thousands of courses about achieving happiness: there are
many self-help manuals, positive-thinking guides, ‘ten-step’ programs, but in all cases,
the word ‘happiness’ is taken for granted as understood. But should this be assumed?
Imagine a group of three friends, trying to have a discussion about happiness - one takes
‘happiness’ to mean having no obligations and restraints, another takes happiness as
being married with a family, and another takes it as meeting any goals you have. While
we may understand where each is coming from, we are also confronted with the
contradictory nature of their answers: Isn’t starting a family, the quickest way to create
more obligations? Isn’t one restraining themselves by limiting happiness to achieving
these particular goals? Is it possible to achieve one’s goals and not be happy? Wouldn’t it
be freeing to not have goals? All of these are valid questions which members of the group
could raise to each other. After minimum reflection one realises that ‘(happiness) seems
at one and the same time an assumption about what all men actually do seek and
something about which we should become clear in order to seek it.’2 In other words, what
is happiness must come before any ‘how-to’ program can be set.

1

For the sake of demonstrating the point, we will ignore the fact that as intelligent creatures, they too
would be in the pursuit of happiness.
2
Ralph McInerny, Ethica Thomistica, 26.
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The question then arises, as was the concern of our intergalactic scientists, which
field of study owns the question, ‘What is the nature of happiness,’ the very topic of the
thesis at hand. In an age such as ours where the enormous sum of human knowledge is
often splintered into isolated fields of specialisation, experts in one field tend to interpret
areas exclusively through the lens of their particular field, while it never completely finds
itself home in any of them. Since happiness is such a holistic or ultimate concept,
members from the various professions are left to define happiness in their own inadequate
terms. The physician and psychologist may define it as absence of illness or ‘positive
psychology’, the lawyer as rights or freedom and the businessman as wealth. While all
would rigorously claim their piece as a necessary component, very few if any would
describe it as the very nature of happiness.
The first hint in the search for the field in which the nature of happiness is truly
studied, is to notice the intimate relationship between goodness and happiness in the mind
of all persons. In the same way that all persons wish to be happy, they all wish for the
good. They believe they will be happy if they have what is good. This is further enforced
when one realises that the concept of the good, as opposed to concepts of health, freedom
or money, is universal or ultimate enough to match the concept of happiness itself. Since
it is the fields of metaphysics and morality which deals with the good per se, this must
also be where the nature of happiness is found. In fact, if our visitors had arrived anytime
before the past 750 years of human history, it is highly likely they would have discovered
that ethics, the study of the human good, is in fact what they wish to enrol in.3
Yet this is not self-evident to the popular mindset today. It is for this reason that a
21st century reader must be aware of at least the basic presuppositions of St Thomas
Aquinas (1225 – 1274), the person of focus in the present work. Since these points go
beyond the scope of the thesis and will be taken for granted when the nature of happiness
is discussed, it is appropriate in this introduction to contrast Thomas’ worldview with that
of a typical contemporary mindset. Without recognising these fundamentally different
views of the nature of reality and ethics, a discussion narrowly centred on happiness (or
any other topic) risks simply ending in an irreconcilable stalemate.4

3

Anthony Kenny, A New History of Western Philosophy, 449.
The following discussion is relevant not so much for the academic as it is for lay reader, to assist in
becoming aware of the general shift in approaches. Since these general paradigms shifts are not always
4
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Brief Historical Considerations
A fundamentally Aristotelian metaphysic
One of the trademark shifts from the Thomistic to modern way of thinking is the
relationship between ontology and morality. Aquinas held to an intimate relationship
between being and goodness, so that the latter is nothing other than the desirability of the
former.5 Although he was strongly influenced by Plato, Dionysius and Augustine, this
position is underpinned by the understanding of nature proposed by Aristotle. Nature
itself is essentially intelligible (through formal causes) and goal-driven (through final
causes). Therefore what constitutes the good for any esse is the achievement of its telos as
determined by its essentia. There was no tension between nature and intellect – rather
they are both grounded in the First Principle and Cause which is an Act of Understanding
Itself. Although epistemologically one slowly discovers the moral order through
experience and reflection, the moral order itself flows directly from the ontological order.
To be a good human, one must ultimately understand what it means to be human, which
is then underpinned by what it means to be.
Although much has changed between Aquinas’ time and ours, there are two
particularly (apparently) devastating blows to this metaphysic which have occurred. The
first occurred within philosophical circles slowly then more rapidly in the 14th century,
and finally reached the popular mind through the medium of the Reformation. This is the
rise of Nominalism. The second significant blow immediately affected the popular mind
and occurred with the invention and widespread adoption of the tools and methods of the
empirical sciences in the 16th century. In a relatively short period of time, the previously
predominant understanding of man and his environment seemed to be turned upside
down.6
What both of these movements encompassed was a rejection of the AristotlelianThomistic understanding of both existence and essence, and by direct consequence, the

instantiated by an individual, the emphasis is not so much on designating the approach to any one person,
in as much as speaking about a general climate of thought.
5
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, Q5, A1 (Hereafter referred to as ST).
6
Unless the term ‘male’ is used, references to ‘man’ throughout the essay will represent humanity in
general. This allows for a smoother transition between the authors own words and Thomas’. No
distinguishing between the genders is implied or desired.
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formal and final causes referred to above.7 It seemed that the universe could be explained
solely in regards to material and efficient causality, ensuring a critical attitude to the
metaphysics of their predecessors.8 According to this understanding, being (now reduced
to a univocal concept of existing) is not intrinsically good or bad, but simply provides an
arational, neutral arena of things. For thinkers such as William of Ockham, ‘it is
impossible to prove that there is in the universe an immanent teleological order.’9 Most
relevantly for the work at hand, with final causes removed, one could not simply
‘discover’ what is good – one has to make the concept of ‘goodness’ intelligible by
looking elsewhere.
Separation of Being, Good and Happiness
With the relation between being, nature and goodness severed, a new basis for
morality had to be put forward – one which did not revolve around final causality. For
those who reject an Aristotelian-Thomist metaphysic, alarms are set off at the slightest
hint of the so-called ‘naturalistic fallacy’ - one cannot appeal to the reality or nature of
something as a principle of how one ought to act.10 One’s worldview or explanation of
nature could be utterly distinguished from moral advice (or the pursuit of happiness) with
no apparent inconsistency.11 This may not seem like a problem to the modern mind, but
the question must then become, whatever moral theory is proposed as true, what is it
ultimately grounded in, if not one’s theory of being or reality?
Philosophers and theologians alike had to begin to take arbitrary or assumed
starting points for their moral theories. Principles such as always act for the greatest
happiness for the greatest number was accepted as self-evident for utilitarians.12 In this
case though, ‘happiness’ simply means pleasure.13 Others, deontologists, held that duty
and obligation should become the foundation in ethics. In this case, happiness is
contrasted with morality.14 Others held that reason or emotion alone is the source and
7

Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy: Volume 3, Part 1, 60.
Copleston, A History of Philosophy: Volume 3, Part 1, 163-6.
9
Copleston, A History of Philosophy: Volume 3, Part 1, 94.
10
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 302.
11
One of the popular examples of this way of thinking is Richard Dawkins, who believing ‘survival of the
fittest’ to be the ultimate principle of life, claims to not believe that humans should then act according to
this principle. Richard Dawkins, The Greatest Show on Earth, 62.
12
Jeremy Bentham, ‘An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation’ in Happiness: Classic and
Contemporary Readings in Philosophy, 100.
13
Bentham, ‘An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation’, 99 and 101.
14
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 677 & 679.
8
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judge of moral decision making. Those of a rationalist bent would view the emotions only
as a hindrance to both morality and freedom. Others, describable as emotivists, would see
moral decision making as a purely emotional or ‘taste’ judgment, with the reason having
no ability to persuade, resist or justify one appetite over another. Theologians (according
to this mentality) could only claim a similar arbitrariness – ‘God said so,’ or what is
properly known as divine command theory.15 One simply has the duty to obey the will of
the divine legislator as revealed in Revelation. Still to this day, many atheists, even within
academia, assume this to be the primary rationale of Christian ethics.16 What these
theories all have in common is ‘moralism, which… consists in the violent separation of
being and duty from one another and in proclaiming something as obligatory without
seeing and making visible its link to being.’17
Daniel McInerny sums up the contrast well when he says, ‘On these older ethical
views, this ‘fitness’ between our ethical relations and the world is brokered by a
teleological conception of nature. In modern moral philosophy it is brokered by a
conception of impersonal rationality.’18 In the study of ethics, with the loss of
consideration of the final cause of humanity, that which provided the overarching internal
bond, uniting one’s successive acts into one integral and intelligible whole, disappeared.
Moral philosophy began to focus on ‘moral dilemmas’ (something which Aquinas
thought were only apparent but never true19) and difficult, rare episodes, rather than the
agent’s life as a whole.20 In this context, it is easy for one to see that morality, the study of
the human good, something which would interest all people, was substituted for casuistry
which interested a few of the intellectual elite and almost none of the general public.21 In
fact, it can almost seem that if one wants to be happy, one would avoid burdening
conversations about ethics.

15

Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Volume 3, Part1, 115. Kenny, A New History of Philosophy, 465;
MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, 121-3 & Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, 163-4.
16
In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Philosophers Without Gods, of the twenty atheist authors who contribute
their reasons for being atheists, all of them associate religion with divine command theory.
17
Josef Pieper, The Christian Idea of Man, 15.
18
Daniel McInerny, The Difficult Good, 4.
19
McInerny, The Difficult Good, 137.
20
Annas, The Morality of Happiness, 11, 440 & 455.
21
That is, unless you thought it likely you would find yourself in the situation of having to choose whether
three or five people die on a railway track, or whether in the next totalitarian dictatorship you will be
asked about the refugees in your basement.
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Aquinas moves in the classical tradition where ‘ethical theories are not seen
primarily as mechanisms for answering ethical questions at all; they arise from the
reflection provoked in the intelligent person about the shape and course of his life.’22
Hence in both of Thomas’ major Summas, the ethical sections are preceded by the
metaphysical (he is not following an epistemological order, but rather an ontological), and
the first concern in his section on ethics is the nature of the final end or happiness. Both
Aristotle and Aquinas worked off the basis ‘that ethics, though an independently
grounded practical science, is in harmony with the principles of the theoretical sciences of
which metaphysics is supreme.’23 From this more holistic perspective of ethics, ‘a moral
philosophy that lacks knowledge of the true end of man is radically deficient as a science
of morals,’ hence the topic of the current work.24 ‘When humans freely choose a moral
action, their acts stem from an implicit knowledge of an ultimate end, an implicit
recognition of one’s current condition, and a reasoning process of how to get from one’s
current position to that ultimate end.’25
Yet in the typically modern view, the focus of morality is no longer concerned
with ultimate ends or final causality of humanity, beatitude or eudaimonia, but rather
concepts such as law, obligation and conscience become primary.26 Not that these
concepts were not present earlier – but rather they were seen within a teleological
framework, not as self-standing or basic concepts. But these ‘prevalent notions of
morality, as a system of rules consisting of sets of obligations and prohibitions, are
distractions from the primary business, which is that of living a good life… (and) how to
live to the nature of the being whose life is in question.’27 Herbert McCabe gives a
wonderful example, by using the metaphor of being good at a particular sport:
A game such as football imposes two different kinds of limitation on its players: they
should play the game well and they should not cheat. The first is concerned with
dispositions (skills), the second with particular acts and rules. Learning how to play

22

Annas, The Morality of Happiness, 443.
Denis J.M. Bradley, Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good, 236.
24
Bradley, Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good, 487.
25
Rziha, Perfecting Human Actions, p.257 & Porter, The Recovery of Virtue, 47.
26
Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy: Volume 2, Part 2, p.270-3. MacIntyre, A Short History of
Ethics, p.138 & Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, 155.
27
John Haldane, in his preface to Josef Pieper, The Christian Idea of Man, p.xi. Julia Annas, Intelligent
Virtue, 79 & 119.
23
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well is analogous to acquiring a virtue; cheating is not playing the game badly: it is not
playing it at all.28
To not cheat does not make one a good player. In the same way, a morality
reduced to obeying rules are not generally attractive to rational creatures, and even for
those who are so inclined, it cannot produce an integral co-operation of the aspects of the
person toward an objective good.29 In the same way that a person who doesn’t drop the
ball or step over the sideline doesn’t necessarily make a good player, so a ‘culture of
obedience’ doesn’t necessarily make for happy people.30 So then in a society which
considers ethics to consist in application of abstract principles, or obedience to rules, what
concept of happiness do they gather?
Law, Freedom & Happiness
It would be oversimplifying the matter to think that law was not a key concept for
Thomas. Rather, what should be highlighted is the shift from the Thomistic understanding
of law as the guiding wisdom of an intellect for the common good, to law becoming
predominantly viewed as simply the will of the legislator.31 With law understood as
nothing but the will of the legislator, ethics took on an authoritarian flavour, the scene
being set for a deeply entrenched clash of wills between the legislator and the people,
with freedom and law being set up as more or less mutually incompatible concepts.32
Freedom seems to be the ability to do all that wells up from within, whereas law is all that
is imposed from without. The implicit concept of happiness in this regard is that it
consists in minimising submission to impersonal (laws of nature) and personal
(legislative) laws.33
Firstly, regarding happiness and the laws of nature. Included in this tension
between law and freedom is nature, not understood in the Thomistic sense, but rather as
the impersonal ‘laws of nature.’ The new ‘scientific’ understanding of nature (a series of
blind, mechanical forces) seems to have intelligence for an enemy rather than a principle.

28

Herbert McCabe, The Good Life, 87.
John Bradshaw, Reclaiming Virtue, 33.
30
‘In general, Greek ethics asks, What am I to do if I am to fare well? Modern Ethics asks, What ought I to
do if I am to do right? And it asks this question in such a way that doing right is made something quite
independent of faring well.’ – MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, 84.
31
Kenny, A New History of Philosophy, 463.
32
Copleston, A History of Philosophy: Volume 3, Part 1, 115. Kenny, A New History of Philosophy, 466.
33
MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, 156.
29
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‘When nature is placed in opposition to progress in thought and growth in freedom,
nature becomes something to subdue and is no longer viewed as an interior rule to
follow.34 Therefore the more one can dominate and control ‘natural’ things, including the
body and its environment, the happier one will be. This is manifested in the implicit belief
that technology will bring about the happiness all desire. Whether it is the share market,
computer chip, contraception, plastic surgery, smart phones, anti-depressants, virtual
reality or the cure for cancer, one can easily begin to anticipate a time when all suffering
and evil will be artificially removed. In this environment, the need to rationally order ones
desires seems to be archaic. Rather, the only relationship between reason and happiness
seems to be that the former can technologically manipulate ones external conditions to
avoid the demands of virtue.35
Secondly, regarding happiness and legislative law. Since it is taken for granted
that nature does not reveal an intrinsic final cause discoverable through questions such as,
‘How does this essentia reveal its telos,’ the main question becomes, ‘Who are you to
attribute to myself or this thing its purpose?’ The battlefield becomes one of wills rather
than intellects. It implies that questions and claims which did not lend themselves to the
empirical method (for example, what is happiness) are relegated to the realm of subjective
opinion.36 Therefore by what right does another person make his opinion binding on
another? In this modern thought the dignity of man consists in his refusing to obey any
law he does not impose on himself. In other words, ‘a will is autonomous when it is a law
to itself as independent from all foreign causes… the will is self-ruling as determining its
own laws independent of any natural necessity, external command, external reward, or
punishment.’37 In this case, happiness is seen as the ability to achieve wants free from
religious or secular legislators. The only valid jurisdiction of the lawmaker seems to be in
protecting individuals from those around them.
The only reconciling factor left between the now competing ideas of law and
freedom becomes the individual conscience. Rather than an emphasis on the virtue of
34

Pinckaers, Morality: A Catholic View, 50.
Martin Rhonheimer, Natural Law and Practical Reason, p.114. Also Jacques Maritain, Man and the
State, p.56, which discusses the inevitable failure of a culture to externally equip itself (with technology)
to the point where it sees moral advancement as secondary (or even a hindrance) to achieving goals.
36
According to this mentality, physics, biology, astronomy and mathematics operate on the ‘factual’ side
of the epistemological chasm, while morality and religion operates on the ‘opinion’ side, based on
arbitrary and/or subjectively-adopted principles. The most ‘scientific’ or objective one could be about the
nature of happiness is mere surveys or observable patterns.
37
John Rziha, Perfecting Human Actions, 262. Darlene Fozard Weaver, Self Love and Christian Ethics, 20.
35
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prudence as that virtue by which the individual makes good decisions in particular
situations, emphasis is placed on the individual conscience, seen as an infallible and
unquestionable guide. This has led to ‘debates between majorities and authorities
replacing serious study of the principles underlying moral problems that demand
competence and experience.’38 The assumption was that as long as people act in accord
with their conscience, they must be on the path to happiness. With teleology removed
from nature,
the notion of good is changed, and instead of referring to the thing’s perfection, it
comes to mean simply that which is desired… the good becomes relative to each
individual and it is no longer possible to draw a distinction between the true good –
what is truly perfective of a person – and the apparent good – what a person simply
desires.39
Without teleology, it seems that there can be no universal statements made about
happiness for more or less all of humanity. Only the individual, via the infallible
conscience, can decide what makes them happy - the individual’s judgment about his own
happiness is beyond questioning or verifiability. The subject cannot be wrong or
mislead.40 Therefore if one finds another person (for example, a lawmaker) inhibiting
one’s ability to act in a certain way, it is in the interests of one’s happiness to challenge or
discard this authority. With the extraction of morality out of the greater metaphysical
context, ‘a necessary presupposition of this view of autonomy is that God is always
considered to be extrinsic to the creature and a threat to absolute autonomy.’41 In this
case, for the unbeliever, God can be an obstacle to be overcome to attain happiness, and
for the believer there is not a necessary correlation between happiness and the Will of
God (at least in this life).

38

Pinckaers, Morality: The Catholic View, 57.
David M. Gallagher, Person and Ethics in Thomas Aquinas, 68.
40
This demonstrates a fundamental departure from philosophy’s founding fathers, since ‘no ancient
theory thinks that the views of most people, just as they stand, form a suitable criterion for testing ethical
theories (Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness, p.432).’ In fact, Socrates was convinced that even some
of the so-called ‘experts’ were unjustly called so, let alone the average unreflective person. The idea that
whichever side in an ethical debate wins a majority in a ‘conscience vote’ must be right, could frighten the
daylight out of him, before one even considers that ‘conscience’ in this sense often means not having to
justify your position to others. This in fact did occur in his own lifetime when he refused to put the lives of
potentially innocent men in the hands of a vote. See Walter Hamilton’s Introduction in Plato, Gorgias, 1314.
41
Rziha, Perfecting Human Actions, 263.
39
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In fact, according to this radically erroneous understanding of freedom, even the
conscience can be viewed as a burden to free oneself from – after all, it may simply be a
product of a religious or authoritarian environment, or some other irrational unconscious
cause. Guilt is clearly not an aspect of happiness as defined by anybody. Whereas
previously the primary solution may have been to avoid bad behaviour, now it seems to
be to abandon the moral code causing discomfort. This can even be a ‘medical’ solution
as the moral code is seen to be a cause of psychological stress or neuroses. In summary of
all the points raised, one could say that ‘the prodigal son’ becomes the classical
contemporary example that resources and freedom seem to be the key to happiness.42 To
rid oneself of external constraints while maximising external power is the default position
on happiness in Western society.
Servais Pinckaers has highlighted that Catholics have not been immune to these
paradigm shift between Aquinas and his late medieval and modern successors, which saw
law or impersonal rationality as the pillar to ethics.43 Even for those within the Catholic
tradition, since law is now seen as the primary subject matter of morality, a phenomenally
disproportionate attention is given to Aquinas’ one explicit question on natural law, ST III, Q94, apart from its context in the Summa Theologica.44 As seen above already, the
metaphysical and anthropological groundwork is laid before the questions on Law, and
even then, it is immediately in the context of God’s Wisdom, the Eternal Law, not merely
His Will.45 Fergus Kerr, echoing the concerns of Russell Hittinger, “deplores the way that
natural law… is regarded as functioning independently of the eternal law in the mind of
God: ‘what began for the Christian theologians as a doctrine explaining how the human
mind participates in a higher order of law is turning into its opposite.”’46
The emphasis on law is further manifested through the return to the Ten
Commandments as the basic moral categories, rather than the New Testament Beatitudes,
theological virtues and Law of Love.47 It becomes understandable to see how those
42

Paul J. Waddell, Happiness and the Christian Moral Life, 6.
Servais Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics, 229-233.
44
Thomas S. Hibbs, ‘Interpretations of Aquinas’ Ethics since Vatican II’ in The Ethics of Aquinas, 412.
45
Obviously it is metaphysically absurd to separate God’s Will from His Wisdom due to the Divine
Simplicity, but it makes an enormous difference which of the two is emphasised to the lay person’s ears,
since it destroys any idea of arbitrariness in moral theology.
46
Fergus Kerr, After Aquinas, 103.
47
In fact, phrases such as the Law of the Spirit, become utterly unintelligible in the new framework. Rather
than the theological virtues seen as participation in the life of God, as well as the source of all meritorious
acts, they are reinterpreted in the context of external acts and obligations. Faith is seen as a requirement,
43
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unformed Catholics can view one of the first steps to happiness, as ‘freeing’ oneself from
the additional obligations associated with belief.
The necessity of providing context in a paper regarding happiness has hopefully
been made clear. To read Thomas Aquinas’ understanding of the nature of happiness
from the above mentioned perspective, could seem to be nothing but an interesting hobby
for a few historians. This is clearly not how Aquinas’ (or any other philosopher) would
intend their work to be read. Therefore by making clear the potential context of the reader
(even our extra-terrestrial inquirers), as well as the metaphysical assumptions which the
following work will be building on, it is hoped that the question at hand, the nature of
happiness, takes on a more relevant and significant meaning. It still remains to be
addressed though – why the thought of Aquinas on happiness, rather than another ancient
or medieval thinker?

The Thomistic Revival
Towards the end of the 19th century, Pope Leo XIII recognised the deficiencies in
contemporary modern thought. This concern lead him to publish his now famous
Encyclical, Aeterni Patris. Pope Leo’s words in hindsight seem almost prophetic. The
great moral tragedies and miseries of the twentieth century still had not occurred, yet he
could see they were all present in seed form:
If anyone look carefully at the bitterness of our times, and if, further, he consider
earnestly the cause of those things that are done in public and in private, he will
discover with certainty the fruitful root of the evils which are now overwhelming us,
and of the evils which we greatly fear. The cause he will find to consist in this – evil
teaching about things, human and divine, has come forth from the schools of

not because it is necessary as an intellectual creature to order one’s life, but because it is demanded. Gods
request for belief now looks like an egotistical need for affirmation or servile homage, rather than for the
good of the creature himself. The virtues, beatitudes, gifts and fruits of the Holy Spirit are relegated to the
realm of the ‘ascetical’ or ‘optional extras’ for the elite few in the spiritual life. Grace, rather than being
seen as the very source of Christian morality, becomes rather the concern of dogmatic and speculative
theology. With the relationship between grace and everyday life severed, the Sacraments, those very
channels of grace, are simply turned into additional obligations of the faithful.
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philosophers; it has crept into all orders of the State; and it has been received with the
common applause of very many.48
The Pope does not hesitate in pointing to the solution. In the encyclical, he
relentlessly exhorts both philosophers and theologians to return to the mind of Aquinas:
We, therefore… exhort all of you… with the greatest earnestness to restore the golden
wisdom of St Thomas, and to spread it as far as you can, for the safety and glory of the
Catholic Faith, for the good of society, and for the increase of all sciences… clearly
pointing out its solidity and excellence above all other teaching.49
This would become a familiar, consistent theme for all Popes following Leo. Even
when not explicitly mentioning Aquinas, they all point to the need to take metaphysics
into account on moral matters. For example, in Paul VI’s most controversial work,
Humanae Vitae, he warns that ‘man cannot find true happiness – towards which he
aspires with all his being – other than in respect of the laws written by God in his very
nature, laws which he must observe with intelligence and love.’50
One can confidently say, looking over the past hundred years, that the Popes’
requests may have been largely ignored. Not only did the evils spoken of escalate in the
twentieth century, but it is also not uncommon for a person to complete her Catholic
education never even having heard the name of the Universal Doctor, Thomas Aquinas.51
One does not have to speculate only from his own limited experience that the calls of Leo
XIII were largely ignored. In arguably the most significant encyclical on moral theology
in centuries, John Paul II calls the contemporary situation ‘a genuine crisis,’ stating that
‘it is no longer a matter of limited and occasional dissent, but of an overall and systematic
calling into question of traditional moral doctrine, on the basis of certain anthropological
and ethical presuppositions.’52 The particular questions which he believes to have been
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neglected are, ‘What is man? What is the purpose and meaning of life? ... What is the way
to attaining true happiness?’53
None would doubt that there is an enormously difficult task ahead for those
looking to resuscitate Thomism in popular thought, and with it, classical philosophy. One
obvious obstacle is that modern and post-modern ideas still use the same words and
language of the classics. The evolution of ideas can often take place unknowingly within
a culture, with the extreme change of views not obvious without reflection. Alasdair
MacIntyre has devoted much of his time to demonstrating how although the same words
have persevered, the meaning has been significantly lost or changed.54 In fact, he would
take the Encyclical Aeterni Patris as the ‘seminal text’ for how he believes ‘moral
enquiry’ should be carried out.55 Reflecting on MacIntyre’s life work, Jean Porter states
that he:
develops a narrative of late modernity in which Enlightenment liberalism, attempting
to construct a philosophy and a society on the basis on nonteleological reason, falls
into intellectual and especially moral incoherence. The unhappy fate of the modern
liberal, left with only therapists for comfort and bureaucrats for security.56
Another famous key figure of the twentieth century is Elizabeth Anscombe who
has ‘proposed, in effect, that the best course for philosophers in a post-Christian culture
who sought a completely secular ethics was to reconsider Plato and Aristotle.57 She states
that ‘philosophically there is a huge gap, at present unfillable as far as we are concerned,
which needs to be filled, by an account of human nature, human action, the type of
characteristic a virtue is, and above all of human “flourishing.”’58 These thoughts in fact
are not isolated to Catholic academics, as related by Julia Annas who relates that ‘in
recent years, there has been a growing sense that there is something deeply inadequate
about the view that… we are faced with… a simple choice between consequentialist and

53

John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor, 30 & 84.
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, p.1-5; A Short History of Ethics, 150.
55
MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, 2 & 72-3.
56
Jean Porter, ‘Tradition in the Recent Work of Alasdair MacIntyre,’ in Alasdair Macintyre, 38.
57
Kerr, After Aquinas, 116.
58
G.E.M. Anscombe, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, Philosophy, 33:124, 1958, 18.
54

17

deontological ways of thinking.’59 Annas sees a returning to consider the ancients as the
key to renewal.60
More recently Robert Spitzer, looking to raise awareness regarding the ground
shift of basic concepts over the past few centuries, focuses on how the concept of
‘happiness’ is the fundamental concept for nearly all areas of private and public life. He
systematically shows how one’s understanding of happiness has automatic, conscious and
subconscious effects on how one then understands ‘success’, which then influences one’s
idea of ‘quality of life’, which defines one’s idea of ‘love’ and ‘suffering,’ which then
effects the persons concept of ‘ethics’, ‘freedom’, ‘person’, ‘rights’ and ‘common
good.’61 How one understands happiness causes a ripple effect through his entire
understanding of ethics.
What all these great thinkers have in common is a concern that current
understandings of the human person, morality and (and consequently happiness) are
radically deficient. They also believe that this deficiency is not part of the nature of the
subject area, but that the current ‘stalemate’ is due to assumptions made recently in the
history of thought. It is in the spirit of re-addressing these issues from a classical
perspective that the following work is presented.

The Approach Taken By This Work
‘The credibility and force of Aquinas’ theory of goodness depends on the cogency
of his overall account of what it is for a creature to exist.’62 Yet as already mentioned, it is
beyond the scope of the present work to explain and defend the metaphysical groundwork
for Aquinas’ concept of happiness – most significantly, the fundamentally Aristotelian
link between being, nature and goodness. The second assumption which the reader may
need to be aware of is that Aquinas set his gigantic intellectual powers to constructing (or
at least laying the foundation of) a grand unifying theory of reality to which his great
intellectual predecessors, both pagan and sons of Abraham, would each contribute.63
Arguably, the three theories of happiness which Thomas is merging are those from
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Aristotle, Augustine and Boethius.64 Happiness for Aristotle is action in accordance with
virtue, and if there are a number of them, the highest one.65 For Augustine, it is ‘joy in the
truth’ and ‘fulfilment all desire.’66 Boethius defined happiness as ‘a state made perfect by
the aggregate of all good things.’67 Although not absolutely necessary to understand
Aquinas’ view, a prior knowledge of each of these theories enables the reader to better
grasp the continuity and uniqueness of the thought presented.
In Chapter One, the goal is to attain the general character or form of happiness.
That is, before one can properly attained what instantiates (or materially constitutes)
happiness, one must have the characteristics or profile of happiness, so that it can be
recognised on attainment. It also allows only apparent instantiations of happiness to be
exposed. More specifically, this will be accomplished by analysing the concept of an
ultimate good or summa bonum. In this way, there is a set criteria which any potential
candidates for happiness can be compared to. It will be demonstrated that the ultimate
good is a perfect operation which fulfils all desire, is desired for its own sake alone, selfsufficient, without defect, suitable for all persons and able to act as an entire rule of life.
In the second chapter, various apparent and true goods are compared to the criteria
of happiness established in chapter one. These are broken up into the three fundamental
categories used by Aquinas himself: external, bodily and intellectual goods. It will be
demonstrated that each of the goods proposed cannot fit the criteria of happiness in itself.
In nearly all cases, the goods mentioned are not in fact goods in themselves, or if they are,
they are still ordered toward the achievement of even greater goods. By the end of the
chapter it will be demonstrated that there remains only one activity of the person as a
possibility for fitting the criteria – the act of contemplation.
This leads the reader in the third chapter, where Aquinas’ understanding of what
materially instantiates happiness will be explored. There will be three separate approaches
which each arrive at the same conclusion: perfect happiness is contemplation of the
Divine Essence. The first approach is from the perspective of mans ultimate operation,
and continues the systematic sifting through the human operations of Chapter Two. The
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second approach is via man’s highest object of speculation. These first two approaches
combine to affirm that happiness is mans highest operation in accordance with its highest
object. The third approach is of a different style than the earlier two, although it confirms
their conclusion – this is an approach from metaphysics. Its primary purpose will be to
show that all contingent being participates Perfect Being as much as possible for a
creature of that kind, so that happiness for man would consist in that act by which he most
imitates the Divine. The chapter will then revisit the criteria from Chapter One and
explicitly show how the Beatific Vision fulfils the criteria set out. Only then can Aquinas’
understanding be shown to be internally consistent.
In Chapter Four, how Aquinas understands happiness to relate to this life is
explained. Firstly, by its very nature it is unattainable by man in his current state.
Although there are accidental reasons which account for this, for example, hunger,
ignorance and unruly emotions, it is not merely these but rather our current
epistemological and ontological limitations. These include all the uncertainty which
comes from being a contingent being, as well as the fact that our intellect is limited to
gathering knowledge from the senses. Yet this does not mean that perfect happiness has
no relation whatsoever to earthly life – rather, someone can be called happy in as much as
one begins now to participate in perfect happiness. The various degrees of imperfect
happiness is divided into three fundamental categories: any satisfaction of desire,
imperfect natural happiness and imperfect supernatural happiness, each with its particular
principles and virtues. Finally, a brief discussion is undertaken regarding how the
distinction between natural and supernatural is relevant to Aquinas’ understanding of
happiness. Although humanity by its nature as an intellectual creature has the capacity to
grasp universal being, truth and goodness, this capacity can only be fully realised or
fulfilled by Divine Grace.
Finally in Chapter Five, the antecedents, concomitants and consequences of
happiness are discussed. Although Thomas sees the essence of perfect happiness
consisting in the Beatific Vision, and the degree of imperfect happiness depending on
one’s degree of participation in this act, this is not to be taken to mean that happiness is
not presupposed, accompanied and followed by other goods. The role of non-ultimate
goods, moral virtue, the active life, friendship, pleasure and the body are each discussed
individually in relation to both imperfect and perfect happiness.
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The primary works to be studied are the Summa Theologica, Summa Contra
Gentiles and Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics. No single secondary author or
source is taken as the sole authority on Thomistic thought. Rather, the author has
endeavoured as much as the time, scope and depth of the work allows to deal with
primary sources directly, only incorporating secondary sources when it is seen to clarify
with what the author sees in Thomas’ own work. Since the work is considered primarily
philosophical, Scripture is used sparingly, and when it is, it is to enforce a point rather
than act as a principle. It is the author’s goal that the thesis may propose an understanding
of the nature of happiness consistent with the thought of St. Thomas, contributing to the
contemporary call to discuss and recover the relevance of classical moral philosophy and
theology.
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Criteria for the Ultimate Good
All people desire happiness in the most general sense of the word.68 Even if a
person were to insist that he wants to be miserable, it would be because he believes he
would be happier miserable.69 In the same way that the intellect necessarily has truth as
its object, or the will has goodness for it, the whole person desires happiness. However,
Aquinas is keenly aware that what instantiates happiness (what its material consists in) is
highly debated.70 In the name of achieving happiness, two people can carry out actions
which seem completely at odds with one another. For example, a man may insist that to
be happy he must achieve peak physical condition. On the other hand, his friend may
insist that he must sacrifice some of his physical health in order to be happy. Even within
the same individual’s life, his goals may be inconsistent or even incompatible. One may
put his happiness in different objects at different times - from Monday to Friday he may
act as if happiness lies in building maximum wealth, but on the weekend he may act as if
physical pleasure is the ultimate good. Alternatively, a man may spend years travelling
solo around the world, looking to make it as a famous actor, while also believing
happiness lies in spending time with his family back home. How is this possible, if his
most general concept of ‘happiness’ has not in fact changed through the various
circumstances?
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In order to understand this common dilemma, Aquinas explains that happiness can
be considered in two ways. The first is in the most general sense as the complete
satisfaction of the will, and the second is that in which the satisfaction itself consists in.71
This is the distinction between ‘happiness’ in the formal and material senses, and it is to
not only understanding his view on this topic, but his whole moral philosophy.72 The
formal understanding remains constant throughout all our lives, but what is changing as
we experience, learn and reassess our lives, is what we believe will instantiate this formal
concept of happiness. The desire for happiness (as complete satisfaction of the will)
remains even though on Monday I think I need to keep my car, but on Tuesday I decide
that I need to sell it. In fact, it is only because my formal concept or criteria of happiness
has remained the same, that I can judge one course of action to be intelligibly better or
more reasonable. It is my formal concept of happiness which is the rule and measure of
whether keeping or selling my car was in fact a good decision. Hence, the question of
happiness is synonymous with the question of what is the ultimate good – what is most
desirable and finally fulfilling? To unpack the nature of the ultimate good then is to
simultaneously discover the formal criteria of happiness.
The appropriate place to begin an investigation of the nature of happiness must
then be this formal criteria which all persons share. In order to objectively assess what
happiness consists in, it is necessary to have a set of criteria. If Thomas’ initial distinction
between the formal and material understanding of happiness is true, it should be found
that all people would agree on the criteria outlined in this chapter. In this sense, the work
at hand would be progressing from those ideas most agreeable, to those which are
potentially more disputable. These criteria are also put forward at the beginning so that
the reader can be sure Thomas is not simply trying to convince them that a personal
hobby he happens to enjoy should be pursued by everyone. Therefore this helps
encourage the reader that this is primarily a work of the intellect pursuing truth, not an
instance of a ‘battle of wills’ as discussed in the Introduction.
From viewing a range of Aquinas’ works, one is able to extract an objective
criteria (or in Aristotelian terms, the form or that which makes the thing intelligible) that
any possible candidates for the ultimate good must meet. These criteria are objective in
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the sense that the truth of a particular criteria does not depend on an individuals taste.
Frankness and honesty would at least require acknowledgment that all these criteria are
reasonable – in other words, something which meets the criteria would be a higher good
(and therefore more desirable) than one that does not meet the criteria.
In putting forward this criteria of happiness, Thomas is describing the formal
concept of the ultimate good as opposed to what the ultimate good materially (or
substantially) consists in, which will be addressed in the following chapters. Like all
successful hunters, only once one has worked out the nature of the prey is it wise to set
out to capture it in its material reality. It will be noticed that all the various criteria are
intrinsically linked with each other, so that in some cases there is even an overlapping of
considerations. Yet this should only help to demonstrate all the more how integrated and
complete the concept being presented is.

First Criteria: The Ultimate Good must fulfil all desire
The first and possibly most obvious criteria, is that the ‘ultimate end is that
beyond which the agent seeks nothing else.’73 This first aspect of happiness is rooted
intimately in the subject’s own nature. ‘A person has not attained his ultimate end until
natural desire comes to a rest.’74 The surest sign that a person has not reached the ultimate
good is that he is still searching; he can still apprehend a good which he is yet to possess;
there is still something that he can want. Keeping in line with St. Augustine’s remark,
‘Everyone who doesn’t have what he wants is unhappy,’ one is able to see how Thomas is
making an obvious yet radical statement.75 When giving advice on happiness, many
people will recommend being ‘happy with what you have.’ Yet this is far from what this
criteria of the ultimate good demands. Aquinas dismisses any concept of happiness which
would involve settling for something less, learning to get by without something, and even
less is he talking about diminishing one’s desires in order to feel satisfied.76 He is taking
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the extreme position that even if one could imagine better, then complete and utter
fulfilment has not been reached. Hence, happiness can also be described as the ‘last good’
since it leaves nothing else to be desired.77
The temptation at this point is to understand desire to mean any and everything a
person happens to want, and therefore conclude that the satisfaction of such would be
impossible or even anarchic - the pursuit of happiness is nothing other than the egocentric
lust of one who chases any passing whim until it is fulfilled, whatever that happens to be
at a given time. Yet Thomas continues with Augustine’s line of thought, who reflecting
the findings of common sense, realises that ‘if he wants and has good things, he is happy,
but if he wants bad things, even if he has them, he is unhappy.’78 Today more than ever,
one is aware of how ‘habituated vice, peer pressure, irrationality, mental illness, and the
like can often deform our subjective desires so that they turn us away from… what is
good for us.’79 Thomas is not giving drifters, the thoughtless, addicted and those plagued
by phobias and neuroses, some apparent ‘right’ to carry out their activities in the name of
pursuing happiness. In fact, ‘what characterises these individuals is their inability to
sustain a consistent course of activity in accordance with an overall ideal of life,’
evaluating their immediate contingent desire and acting appropriately.80 Therefore there
must be the possibility of evaluating one’s own desires, since the person who neglects to
do so may be doomed to miss happiness even if he achieves his goal.81 This reveals that
the criteria of fulfilment of all desire is inseparable from the question of whether one
desires the right things:
Happy is the man that has all he desires, or, whose every wish is fulfilled… If we
understand it simply of all that man desires by his natural appetite, thus it is true that
he who has all that he desires, is happy: since nothing satisfies man’s natural desire,
except the perfect good which is Happiness. But if we understand it of those things
that man desires according to the apprehension of the reason, thus it does not belong to
Happiness, to have certain things that man desires; rather does it belong to
therefore must be removed. One might say that where a Christian says, ‘Happiness is to achieve the
Ultimate Good,’ the Buddhist may respond, ‘Happiness is to learn not to want the Ultimate Good.’
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unhappiness, in so far as the possession of such things hinders man from having all
that he desires naturally.82
Since ‘the ultimate end is the ultimate term of desire’s natural inclination,’ the
focus shifts now to the question of what does Thomas mean by a ‘natural desire’.83
Thomas ‘does not necessarily mean something consciously desired, and by “natural” he
doesn’t mean something psychologically deep-seated, or even, necessarily, something
genetically determined. What he has in mind are rather the final causes or natural
teleology of our various capacities.’84 As discussed in the Introduction, ‘in order to
recognise anything as a true good, we must have some normative account of what it is to
be human, which will include an account of the course of a good human life.’85
All desires are not equally worthy, noble or valid. ‘Desire… does not constitute
the good… (rather) because what is good is choiceworthy and lovable, we choose it and
love it.’86 To assist this distinguishing of desires, Denis Bradley proposes that there are
three categories of desires: acquired desires, acquired habitual natural desires and natural
desires:
Acquired desires are desires for certain means; they are consequent upon reason’s
deliberations and reason judges their rectitude. Acquired habitual natural desires are
right when they are in accord with reason’s choice of means. Natural desire, however,
is for the end of human action since “the end for man is determined by nature.”87
In this first case, acquired desires are always contingent and deal with the
particular choice of means in order to achieve a good. These may not always be in fact
good, although they have a resemblance of the good. Acquired habitually natural desires
occur when a particular appetite for a given mean is in accord with reason – these may
also be describable as virtuous desires, or the desires of the virtuous man. Finally and
ultimately, there is what is referred to as natural desire – those ends or goods which are
found by nature in man as rational animal. When these are discovered through reflections
on one’s appetite and anthropology, these are always good desires.
82
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One final rebuttal to any understanding of the fulfilment of desire as essentially
egotistical behaviour is that, in contrast to much modern theory about man’s natural state,
Thomas insists that humans are social animals whose natural inclinations involve living in
community with others.88 Hence it is no surprise that ‘his desire is not satisfied in
providing for himself but he wants to be in a position to take care of others.’89 When
thinking of this first criteria then, it ought not ‘suffice merely for one man living a solitary
life but also for his parents, children, wife, friends, and fellow citizens as well.’90 The
ultimate good, happiness, must be something which transcends the mere individual’s
search for fulfilment and encompasses the natural wishes and hopes he has for his loved
ones. It must be something which does not depend on competition amongst neighbours so
that one’s happiness depends on another’s misery. Rather, the Ultimate Good ought to be
something which is shared by all, yet without detriment to any. So that if a man were
impart it to his neighbours, they too would enjoy fulfilment of their entire desire – the
first criteria of happiness.

Second Criteria: The Ultimate Good must be self-sufficient
The second criteria for the ultimate good, which is closely related to the first, is
such that ‘if it is not sufficient in some particular, it does not perfectly satisfy desire, and
so it will not be the perfect good.’91 This criteria can then be divided into two distinct
aspects. The first is related to man’s capacity to grasp universal being. The second is that
the ultimate good, if had by itself, should make life free from want. Regarding the first
aspect, since man is a rational being, he is able to comprehend universal truth and
goodness.92 His capacity to grasp reality is not limited to particular things, places or
situations. For example, I can grasp the material reality of this woman, Chloe. However,
what makes this particular being, Chloe, intelligible is her form, woman, which also
allows me to grasp the nature or concept of woman in general. Although my knowledge
begins with particular beings (in this case, various women) grasped through the senses, I
can then extract the general or universal idea (in this case, woman).93
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Since the intellect can grasp these universal realities, it means the intellect’s
appetite, the will, can desire these same super-particular realities. My will can desire a
woman, without in fact having that woman in mind.94 In the same way then, the
intellectual appetite (the will) desires the universal good, the attainment of all that is
desirable, without being limited to any particular instantiation. Since man’s desire is for
goodness per se, not just a particular good, if there is some good (for example, a
computer, car, life or friendship) which leaves another particular desire unfulfilled (for
example, health or knowledge) then it cannot be the ultimate good, since it violates the
criteria of self-sufficiency. Man has an infinite desire for the good: ‘You can’t say after a
million good things that you don’t want one more.’95
This leads onto the second aspect of the self-sufficient criteria. ‘The self-sufficient
is that which, even when had by itself, makes life desirable and free from want.’96 In
other words, if there were to be a situation where the only thing a person attained was the
Ultimate Good, it would still completely rest the will. So happiness (synonymous with
‘ultimate good’ for rational beings) must be something which, even if it is the only thing
had, leaves nothing wanting and nothing else to desire since the universal good has been
attained.97 It is a ‘goodness so very good that there is nothing in it which is not good, and
nothing outside of it which could be good.’98 For example, if one had to choose between
being happy and winning a million dollars, a reasonable person would choose happiness.
However, this state of happiness would also entail a lack of missing the million dollars. In
other words, one already has the good which he could foresee the wealth bringing about –
there is nothing to be gained by having the money. Therefore happiness, the ultimate
good, must be something which regardless of what it is contrasted against, one would
always choose it and lack nothing good as a result of his choice. The ultimate good must
be something not merely preferable to something else, but good in an absolute sense.99
Logically following from this, it can then be said that ‘the perfect good, which is
called self-sufficient, would be incapable of receiving an increase of goodness from
94
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another... Likewise, a thing taken alone, no addition being made, is said to be sufficient in
that it has everything a man absolutely needs.’100 The happy man (one who has achieved
his ultimate end) cannot gain anything by addition – if this were the case, he would still
lie in potential to the attainment of that end, and therefore, would not have achieved his
ultimate end. The true ultimate good must not need anything outside of it in order for it to
be perfect. This would even include the need of moderation by an appropriate virtue.101 It
is impossible to add anything to it which it is either lacking in itself, or could make it
better than it currently is. Regarding an object, a car may be better if it had a new coat of
paint, a bigger engine, different suspension or leather seats. A tree may be better if it
could produce bigger or juicier fruit with more fertiliser. In regards to the acting person, a
body can be better if it were healthier or stronger, or an intellect could be better if it had
more knowledge or wisdom. Thomas’ point here is that the ultimate good would have to
be something which could not be made better in any way. Once again, building on the
first criteria, the radical nature of happiness for Thomas is exemplified.

Third Criteria: The Ultimate Good must be able to act as an entire
rule of life
The third criteria is deeply rooted in Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy, which
holds that all things which act move towards an end (whether this be knowingly or
unknowingly).102 In regards to the human act, it begins with the apprehension of the end
to be achieved.103 Since it is the intellect which provides the object for the will, and the
first thing apprehended by the intellect is being itself, this has an implication for the will
which ties neatly into the above criteria thus far.104 Since being in general is the first thing
apprehended by the intellect, the first movement of the intellectual appetite is the good in
general. ‘In this primary act of willing (velle), the will is unconditionally inclined to or
desires the good that practical intellect apprehends in the act of simple insight.’105 This
unconditional desire for good is nothing other than the desire for happiness, without
which there would be nothing to move the appetite.106 ‘Particular beings can only become
100
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objects of the will in the measure in which they participate in the universal reason of
good.’107 Therefore all of the wills particular inclinations and ends are undergirded (and
initiated) by this ultimate desire for the perfect good, otherwise known as happiness.
Since the ultimate or final end is the first thing desired by the intellect, there
cannot be an infinite number of ends, but rather agents must have an ultimate end.108
‘There must be some end that is not desired on account of another.’109 ‘An end-tree for a
fully rational human action cannot be infinitely long; if it were, no end in the tree could
explain the movement of will resulting in the action.’110 In other words there would be no
ultimate reason for one choice of action over another. ‘Without an ultimate term of
motion, an absolutely ultimate end, the motion of the other parts of the order cannot ever
be fully explained.’111 The practical reason must see this particular act or object as
participating in goodness itself and therefore contributing in someway to one’s happiness.
An objection could arise at this point. A person might ask, ‘I can recognise that
various goods do exist. I recognise various inclinations that I have, each of which are
intelligible and have corresponding goods in which the appetite can rest. But why must
they meet in one ultimate good? Why can’t I have several goods which I am trying to
achieve in my life, but which have no inherent relation to each other so as to be called
one?’ Germain Grisez states a similar point when he says ‘it is not true that at any one
time a person’s will must have a single ultimate end in willing whatever it wills...
People’s wills can simultaneously have two or more ultimate ends, since sometimes they
do.’112 Without critical reflection, a person can believe he is trying to achieve a plurality
of goods with no inherent relation to each other. So one must delve deeper to find what is
common to these various goods. In the same way that it would be a mistake for the
speculative intellect to remain at the plurality of individual supposedly unrelated truths, it
is a mistake for the practical reason to remain at a plurality of unrelated goods.
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‘If at this point many goods arise to which the different ends of different arts are
ordered, our reason will have to inquire beyond this number until it arrives at this one
thing… there must be, indeed, one ultimate end for man precisely as man because of the
unity of human nature.’113 Thomas roots the necessity of the unity of goods in the single
will of the human person. A person does not have a number of wills, one allocated to each
particular good, which operate independently of each other. It is the one will seeking the
universal good. Since these human capacities are all essentially united in the one being,
so the various goods must be essentially related to form one ultimate good for the whole
human being. This one ultimate good we refer to as happiness, and from it man takes ‘his
entire rule of life… therefore it is impossible for one man to have several last ends not
ordained to one another.’114
Human nature is no exception to the rule that ‘nature tends to one thing only.’115
To take the simple example of plant nature, one can see that a plant performs a number of
various non-ultimate ends: photosynthesis in the leaves converting carbon dioxide to
oxygen, absorption of water and nutrients through the roots and possibly growth of
defence mechanisms such as thorns. However, these all contribute in some way to the
final fruit or flowering appropriate to that kind of plant. Even though in the case of
animals, and then rational animals, the situation becomes less obvious due to the
increased number and complexity of the operations performed, they too must reach a
pinnacle – ‘a single final end is what is required to make sense of a single life as a
whole.’116 If these particular goods actually did not have an intrinsic relationship to each
other, ‘there would be no logical reason even to call them by the same name (basic human
goods)… (but) they are of course all human goods by virtue of the same ratio boni: the
good of the human being as a whole.’117 One can then say that a person desires the car,
education and any other particular goods for the same ultimate reason – they are seen as
‘tending to the perfect good’ in the formal sense as fulfilment of all desire.118 It is the
ultimate end which is sought in all acts.119 ‘Every man naturally wills happiness: and all
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other desires are caused by this natural desire; since whatever a man wills he wills on
account of the end.’120
This objection raised above by Grisez is appropriate if one forgets that at this
stage in the argument, Thomas is talking about the formal (or structural) concept of the
ultimate end, not what it’s material instantiation (or content) consists in.121 Nor is Thomas
disputing that the unreflective person can have irreconcilable goals in life. To present
empirical data that there are some people who do not direct all their actions to a single
ultimate end does not prove Aquinas wrong, but only proves that some (or most) people
act only semi-intelligibly.122 But in regards to the formal concept of ultimate end,
everyone’s ultimate end cannot help but be identical – a state of complete satisfaction of
the will. This ‘is compatible with the denial that all human beings in fact share some
strong material ultimate end... (since it) is not the false empirical generalisation that all
human beings desire the same objects, activities or kinds of lives.’123 Aquinas is
unpacking ‘what must be at work in practical reason for the agent to make every choice
he makes. The Ultimate End taken formally is thus what makes practical reasoning
possible.124 Thomas is well aware that people consider happiness to be instantiated in
different things. He is simply demonstrating the common concept of happiness that all
persons must have.
In fact, it is the formal ultimate good which allows various ideas of the material
ultimate goods to be evaluated. ‘The ultimate end… is the formality under which
whatever is chosen is chosen; it is the conception of that which is fully and completely
perfective of the kind of agent we are.’125 It gives the individual, and any other parties,
the ability to analyse what they currently believe happiness lies in. How else does
someone come to realise that a life committed to maximum profit, or maximising sexual
encounters, is not the ultimate good, if it is not the realisation that it does not meet the
formal criteria of happiness? Without the formal concept, it would be impossible to
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evaluate whether wealth or virtue is the ultimate good. Hence the true ultimate good must
be able to act as an entire rule of life.
This criteria of happiness also demands that it makes all true non-ultimate ends to
be made intelligible. As a person critiques his overall life plan (identified primarily by
what he believe happiness to instantiated in), it might occur to him ‘to abandon some
ends, adopt some other ends not previously desired… (in order to have) a coherent overall
plan intended to realise the best life.’126 The ultimate good also allows one to evaluate his
desires as more or less rational, in as much as they guide him toward his ultimate end. ‘To
the degree that her actions are fully rational, they will admit of explanation in terms of her
beliefs about happiness.’127 A persons action’s will increase in reasonableness in as much
as he incorporates in his practical reason as broad a range of desires and ends as
possible.128 ‘In order for an action to be fully intelligible… it must be directed toward the
attainment or preservation of that good toward which the agent has directed his whole
life, which he takes to be the object of his happiness.’129 If a person were to encounter
demonstrable proof that this particular car or this particular degree would not in fact lead
him to happiness, he would immediately avoid it.130 If they didn’t, we would describe
their behaviour as irrational. Whether that is due to moral or mental pathologies would be
a different question – the main point is one would recognise that something is wrong.
‘Man must, of necessity, desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last end.’131
These secondary objects, whether they be purely means (for example, the car) or ends (for
example, knowledge) only move the appetite in as much as the person recognises them as
ordained to the last end, happiness. The most extreme yet therefore clarifying example of
this is the good of life itself. Life itself is recognised by the vast majority of people as
good and desirable. In other words, they apprehend life as a necessary precursor to
happiness. Yet when the reality of life is severed from the reality of happiness in the mind
of the acting person, even it loses its desirability, and the thought enters the mind of the
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person that the only way he can be happy is to take his life.132 Yet as long as the good of
life is seen in its relationship to happiness, he could not wish the end of his life.133
Even though the ultimate good acts as an entire rule of life for the person, it is not
necessary that he always consciously have it in mind whenever he acts.134 ‘One need not
always be thinking of the last end, whenever one desires or does something: but the virtue
of the first intention, which was in respect of the last end, remains in every desire directed
to any object whatever, even though one’s thoughts be not actually directed to the last
end.’135 Since the very first movement of the will is toward to the universal good, the
complete satisfaction of desire or happiness, it remains through the various particular
movements.
The significance of the capacity for the Ultimate Good to be an entire rule of life
has been demonstrated. ‘Man’s whole life ought to be ordered to the supreme and
ultimate end of human life.’136 The ultimate good must be something which provides an
order and reference point to all other activities carried out in one’s life. ‘For only the
supreme good is good without limitations, and only its pursuit if necessarily
commanded.’137 If something were to be proposed as the ultimate good, yet would be
insufficient or inappropriate for dedicating all of one’s activities towards attaining, then it
could not be the ultimate good.
This criteria demonstrates just how significant the concept of happiness is for any
complete study of ethics. ‘Thomistic moral science begins… with an examination of the
nature of an ultimate end in general.’138 ‘Since the end relates to actions as a principle
does to speculative (truths), there is not able to be, in the strict sense, a true science if it
lacks the right estimation of the first indemonstrable principle.’139 As referred to in the
Introduction, if one gets this concept wrong, it has a chain-reaction to all concepts under
132
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the umbrella of ethics. ‘A moral philosophy that lacks knowledge of the true end of man
is radically deficient as a science of morals.’140

Fourth Criteria: The Ultimate Good must be that which is desired
for its own sake alone
The ultimate end, otherwise known as happiness, must by it very nature be desired
‘for its own sake alone.’ It mustn’t be something which can be intelligibly approached as
a means or non-ultimate end. ‘Only the Ultimate End, happiness, is never a means to
some further end; other ends are also basic but if considered in relationship to happiness,
they are, in this context, “penultimate” ends.’141 There is no contradiction in having ‘the
same act… ordained to but one proximate end… (and) ordained to several remote ends,
of which one is the end of the other.’142 Yet the ultimate end, happiness, must never be
sought for the sake of anything else.
In regards to the material cause of the ultimate end, it is possible (and common)
for someone with an incorrect idea and therefore approach a greater good as a means to a
lesser. For example, a person may say, ‘I want to be close to God because then I will be
healthy.’ Or, ‘I want to be virtuous because then I will get some respect around here.’
However, as long as we keep to happiness in Aquinas’ general and formal sense, it is
impossible for it to be regarded as a means. ‘The most perfect good is that which is so
desired for its own sake that it is never desired for the sake of anything else.’143 To use
the same examples just mentioned, the persons quoted regard health and respect as
material constituents of happiness. Therefore, regardless of what one supposes happiness
to consist in materially, even if one has a disordered appetite, it must always be desired
for its own sake formally. ‘Human happiness is incapable of being ordered to a further
end, if it is ultimate.’144
For Thomas then, like Aristotle, we clearly see that there is a hierarchy of ends
divided into three kinds.145 The first category are those which are not desirable in
themselves, but never the less are desirable as useful. These are goods or ends which may
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be necessary in order to bring about other goods, but are not desirable in themselves. An
example of such would be medicine in both its preventative and curative forms. Even
though I may be required to take a multivitamin in order to function properly, it would be
incorrect to then include multivitamins in the substance of happiness itself. Since if it
were to be included as a part of happiness itself, taking multivitamins would have to be
desired for nothing other than itself. In other words, I would still take them even if my
diet was sufficient and my health perfect. I would also encourage those who do not take
them to do so in order to achieve their own fulfilment.146 However, the reality is that I
take these tablets as ‘productive or preservative of goods in themselves.’ In this case,
production or preservation of health. ‘The category of means includes all things, whether
natural or artificial, that are not persons.’147 ‘Those things that are productive or
preservative of goods in themselves, or restrictive of contraries, are called good because
they are useful, and the nature of absolute good does not belong to the merely useful.’148
The next category of goods consists in those which are both desirable in
themselves and useful for attaining something else. These ‘are worthy choices in
themselves because, even if no further benefit might come from them they have a
characteristic desirability in themselves.’149 ‘We do choose honor, pleasure, knowledge,
and virtue for themselves. We would choose them or have a desire for them even if no
other good would come to us through them.’150 But none the less, people can also desire
these goods as a means to something else, for example, people may wish to stay alive and
healthy to care for loved ones. In this category, there clearly is a plurality of more basic
ends (in the sense that there are things desirable in themselves, not merely useful, and
proximate goals of acting), without denying the single ultimate end of the human person
as a whole (which as described above is necessarily one). Yet it is the next and last
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category which truly deserves the term ultimate, since ‘it is impossible to desire the good
of the whole for the sake of the part.’151
The final and most perfect category is that good which is desirable in itself and
never for the sake of something else. This as we have discussed is happiness, and it is
fundamentally separated from non-ultimate ends by this and the other criteria of
happiness discussed in this chapter: once attained, nothing else is desired and hence it is
the last, final or ultimate good.152 It cannot be excessively pursued and is that which
ultimately unifies and makes intelligible all other goods. ‘Whenever an end is such that
we wish other things because of it, and we wish it for itself and not because of something
else, then that end is not only a good end but a supreme one.’153
For Thomas, all of these goods are in an ontological and practical relationship to
each other, with the ‘merely useful’ always ordered to the ‘desirable in itself and useful’,
which is always ordered to the Ultimate Good. ‘Something is called good, falls under the
ratio boni, either because it is the ultimate end or is ordered to the ultimate end’ – there
can be no other way.154 It would be a misrepresentation of Thomas to suppose that he is
implicitly degrading any of man’s operations not in the third category (Ultimate End),
making them somehow irrelevant. Yet eating is not any less enjoyable or even degrading
because it is viewed in the context of sustaining my body. In fact, as analysed above, once
I attempt to understand or enjoy eating apart from this context, it ceases to be intelligible
(Why are you eating? What should you eat? How much should you eat), and pleasurable
(pains associated with under or overeating). Each higher category of goods are
architectonic to the category below it, meaning that ‘lower goods are for the sake of
higher goods, which in turn dictate whether and how the lower goods are to be
pursued.’155 Therefore man’s ultimate good is that which is most architectonic, as seen
above when it is able to act as an entire rule of life.
All of these goods then ‘have an ordered relation to one another and to a single
end.’156 This two-fold relationship which all goods have to each other, and the ultimate
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good, is known as the duplex ordo.157 Following from this, it is the moral philosopher’s
task ‘to consider human actions insofar as they are ordered to each other and to their
end.’158 ‘With respect to the whole, all the different goods are of course
commensurable… they are parts of it… through the specific role they play with respect to
the (qualitatively different) end… as a whole.’159 In other words, all non-ultimate goods
are commensurable against the ultimate good, in the same way that the ‘ordered complex
of “personal goods”… serve the “good of the person.”’160 This is what allows the acting
person to use prudence in order to decide how exactly, given his current situation, to
approach the Ultimate Good. ‘Choosing particular goods in view of the ultimate end is
like choosing, in view of the good overall condition of a car, whether this is the best time
to change the tires or check the oil.’161 The example demonstrates well that while nonultimate goods are commensurable in regard to the Ultimate End, each of the goods of
the car have an incommensurability in regard to each other. This latter relationship of
goods is the other aspect of the duplex ordo. If the car is short on oil, then no amount of
water can make up for the absence of oil. Yet what ultimately decides whether water or
oil is needed, how much and why one should get some, is the ultimate end of the car –
getting from A to B. In the same way then with the acting person: if one is dying of thirst,
no amount of friendship or knowledge can quench his thirst. Prudence would demand that
one pursue the good of nutrition. Yet the ultimate rationale for the good of nutrition, its
intelligibility in one’s life plan and whether one should pursue this rather than friendship
or knowledge at the moment is all in light of the Ultimate End.
Phrases such as greater good or hierarchy of goods can never mean ‘all goods are
quantitatively or quasi-quantitatively measured in terms of greater and less. Rather, it is
meant to indicate the order that exists between goods when one is recognised to be for the
sake of the other.’162 If it were a pseudo-quantitative ‘greater than’, then it would open
itself up to all the arguments against the various forms of consequentialism. So in the case
of the goods of knowledge and nutrition, the term ‘greater’ does not imply the other is not
necessary, always merely a means, or that there are never situations where prudence
would demand making an end of nutrition.
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Another way to express clearly Thomas’ relationship of the goods to each other
and avoid confusion is the distinction between order of necessity and order of nobility.163
‘Frequently there are fruitless disputes about what happiness consists in, because some
treat as parts of happiness what are really necessary conditions for it; hence we must
scrutinise any account of happiness to see whether it is counting a necessary condition as
a part.’164 ‘It often happens in the case of active powers ordained to one another, that it
belongs to the highest power to reach the last end, while the lower powers contribute to
the attainment of that last end, by causing a disposition thereto.’165 Hence it is important
to be able distinguish those things which are necessary for the person to perfect its own
operation, and that which is most noble which the whole person is ordered towards.
It is here, in the need for prudence to select amongst possible goods to attain the
ultimate good, that the possibility of freedom and immorality arises. Freedom, because
man’s universal appetite is not necessarily attracted to finite goods. Immorality, because
since the goods are in a natural order (the duplex ordo), to choose a lesser good to the
detriment of a greater one is to act immorally.166 ‘Those who sin turn away from that in
which the notion of ultimate end is truly found but not from the intention itself of the
ultimate end, which they falsely seek in other things.’167 This is perfectly consistent with
the anthropological conclusions drawn earlier about the necessary pursuit of happiness.
Sin occurs when ‘we desire what is only relatively good for us, in opposition to what is
absolutely good.’168 Therefore another way in which the relationship of non-ultimate
goods to the Ultimate Good can be understood, is that non-ultimate goods are never
unconditionally pursued. They are not to be approached from a ‘more is better’ mentality,
but rather viewed in light of the Ultimate Good, which is the only good that can be
unconditionally pursued at every moment.
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Fifth Criteria: The Ultimate Good contains no defect
‘Since happiness is the perfect and sufficient good, it must… exclude every
evil.’169 In Aquinas’ philosophy, ‘all things are good in as much as they have being.’170
Therefore it is impossible that the Ultimate Good be lacking in being since this is the very
definition of evil.171 This statement includes both moral and metaphysical evil. The
former being any deviation in the will of a rational creature and the latter being the
negation of something a being ought to have. From the perspective of the acting person,
to possess the true ultimate good must mean one is lacking nothing appropriate to one’s
nature. It must not be possible for an immoral man or even an imperfect person (through
no fault of their own) to possess the ultimate good. In the case of the imperfect yet moral
person, the case of blindness can illustrate Thomas’ point. Since the ultimate good is the
fulfilment of all desires and the perfection of all human capacities, the blind man still has
a desire or capacity left unfulfilled. Here again, the point is highlighted that mere
satisfaction with what one has is not the happiness being spoken about. The blind man
can become accustomed to his situation, grateful to God for the life he has, while
inspiring others by his lack of despair and misery due to his handicap. However, as
mentioned above, the criteria for the ultimate good demand that a reasonable person
(apart from specific circumstances) would prefer to have the criteria met than not met.172
‘Happiness excludes misery.’173 Besides the obvious situation of a present
tragedy, included in this statement is also the possibility of misery. Even though there
may not be illness or other goods absent at the present moment, it is still possible for the
intellectual creature to foresee and imagine such a situation. ‘Continuity and perpetuity, to
some extent… are naturally desired by the appetite of a person endowed with reason, who
apprehends not a particular being, as our senses do, but also being in itself… It follows
then that… man apprehending being in itself desires it always as existing.’174 The intellect
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then, which is able to transcend the particulars beheld by the senses, contains a double
edged sword. Since man is able to see beyond the mere present temporality of finite
creatures, he desires endless being. Therefore, the ultimate good must be ‘something
permanent… otherwise it would not satisfy the natural desire. For everyone naturally
desires to remain secure in the good he possesses.’175
In this criteria of the ultimate good, Aquinas follows St. Augustine, holding fear
of loss of the good incompatible with perfect happiness.176 ‘Man naturally desires to hold
to the good that he has, and to have the surety of his holding: else he must of necessity be
troubled with the fear of losing it, or with the sorrow of knowing that he will lose it.’177
Whether it is time spent with the family on the rare occasion they are all gathered, or the
last days of a wonderful holiday, one is always aware of the impending conclusion of the
good times. One’s health and skills are constantly deteriorating so that even the most
luxurious life must be one whose close is ever approaching. This is not to mention the
constant threat of external foes both near and far. ‘All good things must come to an end’
is an unfortunate saying which has entered into the common pool of contemporary
sophistry. But it does contain elements of truth. From the moment that the person is aware
of the nearness of the end, it is almost as if the end is present now, and it affects ones
ability to enjoy the moment. ‘Can anyone be free from fear if he can lose what he
loves?’178 Therefore that which is the ultimate good must be something which once
attained, has no accompanying fear of loss.

Sixth Criteria: The Ultimate Good must consist in perfect operation
This criteria is the positive form of the previous one which described the ultimate
good as free from all defect and error. The trademark influence of Aristotle on Aquinas’
theory of happiness is that ‘man’s felicity is activity according to perfect virtue.’179 To
arrive at this point however, one must consider that mans acts are ordered towards the
perfection of something outside of him, or to the perfection of the agent himself.180 Since
happiness is not something outside the happy person, happiness must necessarily be an
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act perfecting the very person themselves. ‘Happiness is by nature an activity whose
effects work inward. This cannot be otherwise, for only in such an activity does the acting
person actualise himself. Action which reaches outward perfects the work rather than the
person who acts.’181
‘Perfection is… the fullest possible development and expression of a creature’s
dispositions and capacities, in accordance with the inclinations proper to the specific kind
of thing it is.’182 As seen briefly in the Introduction, the Aristotelian-Thomist metaphysic
holds an intimate relationship between form, being and act as its very foundation.
‘Actuality is the fundamental characteristic of any kind of existence – every actually
existing thing is in act, and can be said to be perfect insofar as it is fully in act.’183
Happiness then must be an act in which all of man’s capacities are exercised, which
perfects his very humanity. The perfect operation of man… cannot involve any defects or
errors.184
Since happiness is an activity, it then is not enough that a man simply be
potentially happy. In order to have attained his highest good, it is necessarily ‘based on
what is actual and not simply on what is potential, for potency perfected by act has the
essential character of the good.’185 Simply being disposed to this activity by being in
potential to it is a kind of imperfection.186 There can be no potential remaining in the
activity of happiness.187 The happy man is literally the perfect man, being everything he
can be. It is because of this required transition from potency to act, that human happiness
must be an activity.188
Since happiness is the perfect operation of man qua man, it must be a good proper
him.189 In other words, it is appropriate to his particular essence as rational animal.
Therefore the search for man’s happiness is also the search for his unique function which
he does not share with non-rational animals or other physical substances. ‘Some operation
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proper to man as a whole exists.’190 ‘If man’s happiness is an operation, it must needs be
man’s highest operation… (that is) his highest power in respect of its highest object.’191
Therefore the ultimate good must be something proper to the whole being of man to
which all of his faculties are leading.

Seventh Criteria: The Ultimate Good must be achievable and
suitable to all men
‘Felicity is the end of the human species, since all men naturally desire it. So,
felicity is a definite common good, capable of accruing to all men, unless an impediment
occurs.’192 Happiness must be something which it is possible for all humans to attain
without accidental interference. Since this ultimate good is necessarily bound to the
essence of the creature, it cannot be possible that a member of the species be a priori
excluded from its achievement. To say that even without impediment a creature’s perfect
operation cannot be attained is a contradiction in itself. It is equivalent to saying that even
if a plant had no internal defects and all the required nutrients it still could not grow. In
that case, its classification as a plant would necessarily be questioned. If it were
impossible for someone to achieve happiness apart from any consideration of his acts or
circumstances, this would be to question their membership in the human family.
This however is different to stating that all members of the species will attain
happiness. Impediments or interferences can be external (as in the cases of involuntary
loss of external or bodily goods) or internal (in the case of moral defects). Happiness,
since it is the perfect operation of man, cannot be something reserved for an elite few in
society, or something which most people can never hope to have. Once again the radical
nature of Thomas’ theory is shown. ‘Felicity is a definite common good, which many
people can attain unless they are defective… this is true of every natural end in any
species, that the members of this species do attain it, in most cases.’193
‘It is not possible for the felicity of man to be placed in something that man cannot
achieve. Otherwise, it would follow that man is a futile being, and his natural desire
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would be incapable of fulfilment which is impossible.’194 Aquinas takes it for granted that
due to the intelligible foundation of reality, all natural desires must correlate with
something else in reality. In this sense, the experience of hunger is only explainable by
the clear existence of food and its co-naturalness with the human body. In the same way
then, the fulfilment of man’s desires in general must be achievable, regardless of how
difficult or unlikely one may consider it to be.

Conclusion
It has now been demonstrated that the formal concept of happiness consists of
seven criteria according to Thomas. Although all interrelated, they could be distinguished
so that happiness could be described as a perfection operation of man, free from all
defect, desired for its own sake, in which all his desires are fulfilled, providing an entire
rule for his whole life. This general concept of happiness is necessarily held (consciously
or unconsciously) by all people as they carry out their daily activities, making their
individual choices intelligible, even though they may disagree drastically about what such
a state would consist in, or even whether it is possible. However, since the pursuit of the
ultimate good is also the pursuit of that which is most desirable, all reasonable persons
would acknowledge it is preferable to meet each criteria than not.
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WHAT THE ULTIMATE END IS NOT
All want to be happy in as much as they know they want complete satisfaction of
the will, but not all desire happiness in the sense that they do not know what that
materially consists in. In light of this distinction, not all people could be said to be
actually pursuing happiness in their lives, ‘because they know not in what thing the
general notion of happiness is found.’195
This disparity between desire for the ultimate good and knowledge of what it
consists in is a consequence of the rational nature of man, who must intellectually
apprehend a good in order to pursue and obtain it. ‘Man’s whole life ought to be ordered
to the supreme and ultimate end of human life. It is necessary, therefore, to have
knowledge of this end of human life.’196 In non-rational creatures, there is not this gap
between the desire for fulfilment and the knowledge of what will bring it about. The
natural or sensitive appetites unfailingly incline them to their true good.197 The bird
unfailingly pursues its fulfilment in nourishment and reproduction; it does not mistakenly
pursue an upgrade in its nest when in fact it should be concentrating on feeding.198 Since
they do not have to intellectually apprehend the good in order to pursue it, they suffer
neither from faulty ideas of their ultimate good and/or poor choice of the means to it.199
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Yet this is the blessing (or curse) of the rational animal: since he has an appetite for the
universal good, he is able to perceive the benefits and disadvantages of particular goods,
meaning his will is not necessarily moved to one particular thing. It is this
anthropological fact which makes possible the confusion, debate and discussion over
what happiness materially consists in. For rational man, to be unqualifiedly described as
pursuing happiness requires understanding exactly what happiness materially lies in.200
For those who mistakenly pursue the wrong object, they can be, in a qualified sense,
described as not desiring happiness.
A phraseology which may help modern readers to understand this distinction is
Jean Porter’s use of the terms subjective and objective final ends.201 ‘Each person aims at
some final end, identified by the agent with his or her ultimate happiness, and every
human action is ultimately directed toward the individual’s subjective end.’202 However,
the person’s subjective or personal goals may not coincide with the objective final end of
human life, which ‘they mistakenly seek in other things.’203 This rupture between the
objective end of human life and the subjective understanding of that end is the key point
addressed in the current chapter.
Although all people share the objective end of human life in its formal sense (as
discussed in Chapter One), disagreement reigns in regard to the subjective understanding
of what the ultimate good materially consists in. One distinction which can be made
between the various views is whether the Ultimate Good is monolithic (exclusive) or an
aggregate (inclusive). In the former view, all the various ends a fully rational agent purses
lead to a single object or act.204 For example, pleasure or an act of contemplation. In the
latter view, all the various ends a fully rational agent pursue unite to constitute the
ultimate end itself.205 For example, a person who holds happiness to be pleasure and
wealth. Therefore, it is possible for people to view the various goods addressed in this
chapter as either solely or partially constituting the Ultimate Good itself. Thomas’
rebuttals focus primarily on proving they cannot be the exclusive substance of happiness.
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Whether he believes they can partially constitute the true Ultimate Good will be
addressed in later chapters.
By the time he addresses these rebuttals in both of his major works, Aquinas has
already laid the metaphysical and theological foundations of his theory, possibly making
this task seem a needless exercise.206 Nevertheless, from his pastoral (and from one’s
own) experience, it is obvious that for various reasons, one can easily find themselves
drawn towards these particular goods in a way detrimental to one’s happiness. It is
therefore necessary, even for the most saintly, to constantly remind himself of these
truths, lest he unwittingly find himself victim to lust or avarice.

External Goods
The first category of goods which Thomas addresses are known as external goods
or goods of fortune. These consists of all things in the world which are external to the
person, including honour, fame, wealth and power. According to the three tier order of
goods explained in the previous chapter, these consist of goods which are always a
means, and should not be ends in themselves. Exactly why or how this is so, is the
immediate subject of discussion.
Praise, Honour and Glory
As a social animal, humans experience within themselves the desire for
affirmation from others in their community. Can a person truly experience being a
member of a society if he is not to some extent accepted by it? It seems hardly possible.
From the moment a young boy is introduced into the new environment at Kindergarten,
he desires the approval of his peers. In secondary education, ‘peer pressure’ is something
which is often spoken about. The adolescent can often find themselves carrying out
activities against his better judgment in order to win the approval of so-called friends.
Even throughout one’s life, it seems that a successful career in one’s field of work
depends on receiving accolades, awards and recognition from others in the industry. Is it
not possible that the ultimate good can lie here, in receiving the highest honours from
one’s peers?
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Thomas makes a distinction between praise, honour and glory. The first two are
given ‘on account of some excellence’ but differ in degree.207 Praise is the lower degree
of honour, involving only words given to a person who has done well in something
particular. Honour on the other hand, ‘signifies testimony manifesting a person’s
excellence either by word or deed,’ involving an excellence of the whole person. Glory is
defined as ‘a widely recognised reputation.’208 This is the equivalent of our modern
understanding of fame, which is still intimately linked with honour, since honour may the
reason one seeks fame.209 Thomas sees the belief that happiness consists in these as a
particular attraction for those involved in the public or active life.210
The first argument which Thomas brings out against glory being the ultimate
good, is that happiness is the perfect operation of the person themselves, but honour is the
operation of another.211 It is something external to the person receiving it. Since
happiness is in the happy man, whereas honour or glory is an act performed outside the
person (even when he is receiving it), it cannot be the ultimate good.
Since happiness is an operation, it ought to be something attainable or within the
power of the person. Honour though, is completely dependant on the judgment of another
person. ‘Gaining honour is not within the power of any man; rather it is in the power of
the one who gives honour.’212 If a person accomplishes a magnificent act of courage such
as saving another’s life, does the goodness (and therefore happiness) of that act depend on
someone giving him a reward? This is certainly not the case. There is a proper joy and
good which comes from fulfilling one’s nature, which precedes the receiving of any
praise or honour. It may also be the case that the man who does many good works is
surrounded by the proud, envious or ‘politically correct,’ who will not give him his due
honour. For example, a student may achieve top grades in an assessment, or a man may
receive a promotion, but they happen to be surrounded by those who refuse to
congratulate them. It does not make sense then that a good man should depend on the evil
man for happiness. This would be the ridiculous result if honour were the ultimate good.

207

Commentary on N.E., 214.
SCG III, C29, 1.
209
SCG III, C29, 2.
210
Commentary on N.E., 62.
211
ST I-II, Q2, A2.
212
SCG III, C28, 4.
208

48

This also contradicts the virtue of courage, which would at times require the good to be
pursued in the face of receiving insults and humiliation.
The flipside of the same situation is that it is possible for evil men to receive
honour and glory if surrounded by the right (or wrong) persons. This violates another
criteria of the ultimate good, since the ultimate good must be incompatible with evil - one
cannot simultaneously possess the highest good and be evil.213 Yet this could easily
happen as people are honoured mistakenly or accidently, and not because of a true good
within them. On that basis then, a person does not desire honour from a fool, but from the
wise.214 The degree and worthwhileness of true honour comes from the quality of the
judgment of the one giving the honour. It is much more worthwhile to receive a pat on the
back from a great Philosophy Professor, than a gold watch and Ferrari from the local drug
dealer. Yet if honour were happiness itself, one should not have reason to prefer receiving
it from one person rather than another.
So it can be confidently said ‘it is better to become worthy of honour than to be
honoured.’215 Honour is a sign of already existing excellence, not the cause of the
excellence itself.216 To believe honour is the ultimate good is to confuse the cause with
the effect. It is ‘one’s possession of goods that arouse the respect and envy of others.’217
One is already a successful mother, student or sportsman, before the recognition is given.
Honour is only desirable in as far as it is the recognition of a true good already attained.
Since ‘praiseworthy habits are called virtues,’ one can conclude that because the virtues
make men truly deserving of honour, yet honour cannot make men virtuous, virtue is a
greater good than honour.218 Therefore the good ‘for whose sake honour is sought, is a
better thing than honour.’219 Yet ‘that which is good and desirable on account of
something else is not the ultimate end.’220 One must already have attained the good in
order to be worthy of honour, which is impossible if honour or glory itself is the ultimate
good.
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In the case of God, who receives more world-wide honour and glory than anyone
or thing, one can ask, ‘Does the honour God receives make Him honourable, good, or
divine? Or is the honour paid to Him because He is first of all honourable, good, or
divine?’221 It is obvious in this case that God clearly receives honour because of His
inherent Goodness. It would be an absurd conclusion that if no one was to worship God,
His very nature would then be altered. If this is the case with God who is perfect
Beatitude, how much more should those seeking beatitude avoid the idea that honour is
goodness itself.
The thin-ice which all those seeking fame and glory tread on is especially exposed
when considering ‘human glory… is possessed with the greatest uncertainty and error.’222
Yet it belongs to the nature of the ultimate good to be ‘what is most enduring… for an
endless duration of the good is naturally desired.’223 The person pursuing fame is at the
whim of the wavering opinions and moods of the populace. The pop culture is constantly
getting bored with fads and moving on. For example, the person who believed he would
win the hearts of the people by inventing the best spinning Yo-Yo, would have been
shocked to find that in only a couple of years, Yo-Yo’s were out of fashion. Or a person
may purchase the latest model BMW to impress his friends, only to find that next year it
will not be the latest. The person who then believes fame to be the ultimate good is left
with two options: Either re-invent himself (or his possessions) to suit the masses, or
decide that the consistency and quality of his character is more important than being on
the front pages.224
Another demonstration of the uncertainty and error which accompanies the
popular judgment is that it can even be unjustly taken away by false claims.225 Human
opinions are formed and destroyed so easily that if a lie becomes well-known enough,
people will consider it to be true without any further thought. By the time a person
establishes a defence of his reputation it may be too late – the media in the meantime
have moved onto more interesting stories. This is why Thomas ultimately describes fame
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as a good of fortune – it is very much out of the control of the famous person as to
whether he maintains his wide repute. Therefore it is possible (or even likely) that the
fame will be taken against his will, and this does not befit the nature of the ultimate good.
In contemporary society, the temptation to believe fame to be the ultimate good
has taken on new proportions. With the rapid spread of the internet and smart phones,
through programs such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and personal blogs, individuals
can become instantly famous for the most trivial reasons. This is exemplified well is
today’s society where undue attention is given to those who have even excelled in
immoral activities. For example, ‘celebrities’ have launched a public persona through
involvement in pornography (the Paris Hilton phenomena), crime (The Underbelly TV
series) or simply shocking other people through self-inflicted harm (The Jack-Ass Series
and Movies). There seems to be a desire to be known at any cost, regardless of whether in
a positive or negative light. Historians may well look back at this embryonic period of
globalised, easily-accessible media, and characterise the desire to be seen at any cost (or
get the most ‘likes’) as peculiar to our time.
The individual who believes that honour or fame are the ultimate good, forgets
that ‘to know is more noble than to be known; only the more noble things know, but the
lowest things are known.’226 In man’s intellect he has the capacity to understand universal
truth, goodness and beauty. This is his great calling. In as much as anything has being it is
knowable – therefore to be widely known is no great dignity. However, to be the knower,
to perfect the intellect which can becomes all things, is truly the dignity of a rational
creature. In as much as one simply wishes to be known, he takes on a goal which is
accomplished by even the least noble creatures such as rocks or plants. But to be the
knower is to share an activity with the most noble of beings.
In summary, when analysing the deficiencies of honour and fame, several criteria
of the ultimate good have been violated. These goods fail to meet that fact that happiness
is a perfect activity proper to the happy man himself and not another, and it is a thing
belonging pre-eminently to him and taken from him with only with difficulty.’227 Finally,
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the ultimate good, happiness, cannot be sought for the sake of something else, or received
on account of another good.228
Wealth and Power
Aquinas divides material possessions or wealth into two categories: natural and
artificial wealth. ‘Natural wealth is that which serves man as a remedy for his natural
wants.’229 These include food, water, shelter, clothing and some basics tools for leisure.
On the other hand, artificial wealth (money), is invented by man for the purpose of
exchange to obtain natural wealth.
Money obviously cannot be man’s happiness since it is simply a means for
obtaining natural wealth. Yet neither can natural wealth be happiness since it finds its
purpose in supporting human nature.230 So in both cases, ‘riches are only desired for the
sake of something else.’231 This contradicts the very nature of the ultimate end since it is
not desired for anything other than itself. Even putting this point aside, if natural wealth
was the ultimate end, Josef Pieper asks, ‘Is it not patently absurd to say that the meaning
of life consists in securing the means of livelihood?’232
Aquinas’ exposition of the inadequacy of wealth as the ultimate good continues as
he explains: ‘Man’s highest good cannot lie in the possession or keeping of things that
chiefly benefit man through being spent.’233 That is, happiness is something which the
person possesses. Happiness cannot lie in something which must be given away, if by its
nature it is something which must be had within. Due to the corporeal nature of money it
must be divided (or lost completely) in order to be of any benefit. This is in contrast to
spiritual things which multiply without division. For example, knowledge is imparted to
the student without a loss to the teacher. Laughter is not reduced as more people find a
joke funny, but in fact it can increase the intensity of the enjoyment for all involved.
Therefore, since happiness is every person’s ultimate end, it cannot be that it must be only
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attained by some at the cost of others. However, this would be the case if the ultimate
good was material possessions in itself.234
Another argument against wealth being the ultimate good is that there is a virtue
associated with moderating its possession. But the ultimate good is not something which
needs moderating – since it is ultimate, it impossible to possess it to an excess. The
virtues of ‘liberality and magnificence… are more praiseworthy in a situation where
money is spent than in one in which it is saved.’235 Therefore a person is more perfected
in his appetite and operation the more he is able to dispense with material wealth. Without
the accompanying virtues, material wealth gained does not make a man better, but in fact
the opposite. The true ultimate good however, does not need the addition of something
else to perfect it – as seen by the second criteria, it is self-sufficient. Therefore since
riches require the addition of virtue to moderate their possession, they cannot be the
ultimate good.
Anthony and Charles Kenny have recently explored empirical data on the
relationship between wealth and happiness. It has been found that ‘diseases of the rich’
are just as serious a problem as ‘diseases of the poor.’ High blood pressure, high
cholesterol, obesity, physical inactivity, tobacco, alcohol and illicit drug consumption,
excessive television or computer use, social isolation, resentment from peers, richbashing from society, betrayal or exploitation by friends, unrealistic expectations from
family and society and unequal financial status in marriage are all risks increasingly
associated with those having much expendable income.236 In layman’s terms, it could
seem that Aquinas’ understanding of artificial wealth serving natural wealth, has two
benefits which empirical studies are only now revealing.237 Firstly, avoidance of
excessive wealth reduces risks associated particularly with the wealthy. ‘The amount of
income required to purchase the most cost-effective technologies that have driven the
morbidity revolution is very small.’238 Secondly, it provides a stable measure which
allows someone to be satisfied with an income which meets his true necessities. ‘Today,
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more than half of Americans say that they cannot afford everything they really need…
this is because the impression of what people “really need” has been expanding.’239
Considering that ‘for most of history, the average Western European has lived on an
income which is less than one tenth the average income of the poorest ten percent of US
citizens in 2000’, this warped understanding of what is necessary for living is a grave
concern.240
‘That object in whose attainment man’s highest good lies must be better than
man.’241 As man strives to perfect his being, it must involve a striving towards realities
which are greater than his current state encompasses. For example, striving after
understanding or charity involve an attempt to know, encounter and make one’s own,
those realities which surpass any individual humans existence. This principle cannot be
applied to wealth. Since man is an intellectual substance, he uses material objects to
achieve his own ends. In other words, because of his intellectual nature, man himself is
the end of non-personal objects.242 Therefore it is impossible that a physical object be the
ultimate end of an intellectual substance.
The acquisition of wealth can occur in many ways. Common ways can include
family inheritance, winning a lotto or even more accidental forms such as living next to a
gold mine. In fact, ‘of the world’s 691 billionaires Forbes claims over 42 percent largely
inherited their wealth.’243 Our day to day experience proves that people are not born
happy or perfect, yet many are born or inherit vast amounts of material wealth. All are
aware also that ‘riches may accrue to evil men who fail to achieve the highest good.’244
As with all the other goods of fortune, since they can be gained in an involuntary manner
(without rational effort), they also ‘are lost in an involuntary manner.’245 Whether it is
through stock-market changes, health, coercion or the immorality of others, people find
themselves having to part with material wealth against their will. In contrast to this,
‘man’s highest good cannot be subject to fortune, for things subject to fortune come about
independent of rational effort… it must be through reason that man will achieve his
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proper end.’246 Since it has been shown that happiness is man’s perfect operation, is
incompatible with evil and cannot be involuntarily lost, it cannot consist in wealth.
When the ultimate good has been attained, it means that the will is completely at
rest and joy. On the contrary, in regards to material objects, Thomas notes that when ‘we
already possess them, we despise them, and seek others… The reason of this is that we
realise more their insufficiency when we possess them.’247 The possessors of material
wealth and other temporal goods do not find their appetite completely satisfied. This is
explained by the fact that particular finite goods can never satisfy a universal appetite.
Those who hold wealth to be the ultimate good are never satisfied with their current
house, car, phone or bank account. As the latest model comes out, or as their salary comes
up for review, they continue to set themselves monetary goals which go well beyond the
demands of natural wealth. The avaricious person in his current state believes that his
current dissatisfaction is due to the inadequacy of his current model or bank account. He
confuses the inferior quality of material goods with inferior quantity - yet no quantity can
change the nature of these goods. ‘The provisional happiness we might attain through
(material goods) is always accompanied by a deepening appreciation of their
insufficiency.’248
Thomas in his next argument asks us to observe that a man is ‘not called good or
bad simply because he has power.’249 The wealthy or politically powerful are not referred
to as good human beings, simply because they have wealth or power. The reason for this
is that the good (as mentioned earlier) has the nature of an end, whereas power has the
nature of a principle, therefore it cannot be man’s end.250 Power and money provide
potential or means to achieve ends. A millionaire is not said to be good because he could
give a lot to charity, but because he has or does. In the same way, a politician is not said
to be good because she can act in the interest of the common good, but because she
does.251 This obviously disqualifies power itself from being the ultimate good, since it can
either be not used at all or even used for evil. But ‘something is better which cannot be
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used in a bad way’, therefore the ultimate good, would be that which has no potential for
evil.252
‘All power is relative to something else, but the highest good is not relative to
something else.’253 By relative, Thomas means that a person may be considered powerful
in his household, but relative to the state, he is powerless. Then again, a person may be
the most powerful person in Australia because of his corporate ties, yet powerless to
change parliamentary laws. Power is specified to a particular area. The ultimate good is
that which is not lessened by being compared to other goods, nor is it simply highest by
comparison to lower goods. Rather it is the complete good by its very nature. The
ultimate good is not isolated to particular areas, as is proved by the criteria of selfsufficiency.
‘Human power is most imperfect since it is rooted in the will and opinions of men,
in which there is the greatest inconsistency.’254 As seen with the arguments against the
other goods of fortune, honour and fame, anything which depends on popular opinion
does not stand on certain ground. Even if one were to point out the most powerful
dictatorships, where power did not lie with majority opinion, it is not long before dictators
can still be involuntarily removed from power. History has shown that whether the hands
are foreign or domestic, sometimes it only required one who was close enough to bring
their downfall, while in other times it required ten or ten million. But in all cases, it is
utterly beyond prevention by the so-called powerful. Since one of the criteria of the
ultimate good is that it is free from all defect, man’s ultimate good cannot lie in a life of
bowing to opinion polls, fear of backstabbing or assassination and widespread hatred.
In our contemporary society, the form of power which people often believe will
bring about happiness is that which is possessed through technology, and the ability to
manipulate nature. For many, it is the place where both wealth and power meet so that
one can be alternatively used to gain the other in a vicious cycle. All the above arguments
then against wealth and power being the ultimate good can be applied to technology. One
worth reiterating is the irreplaceable role which virtue plays in perfecting the human
operation. No amount of technology can make temperance and prudence irrelevant. In
fact, as the ease of access increases (through laptops and smart phones), without the
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accompanying virtue, it is much easier for a person to be drawn into an addictive spiral,
until he is unable to distinguish reality from fiction. ‘The opportunity to adopt new
identities in cyberspace renews the mind/body split. The more time one spends in virtual
spaces the more real those spaces seem to be.’255 Without the perpetual wisdom involved
in discerning true happiness, it seems that our society has gained ‘a much faster and more
powerful vehicle just at the time when it has thrown away all the road maps.’256

Goods of the Body
It has been shown above that external goods or goods of fortune, always find their
end in the person themselves, vindicating the claim that these are the lowest form of
goods, those which cannot be ends in themselves. It is now appropriate to address the
second category of goods – those which are both means and desirable in themselves.
These will be distinguished into goods of the body and goods of the soul.
Thomas views bodily goods as a further extension of that category of goods which
find their end in the person. ‘Factors which preserve a thing in its species, such as health
and the nutritive power, though perfectants of the animal, are not the end of the animal;
rather the opposite is true.’257 That is, any operation whose end is simply to maintain the
person, cannot be the end of the whole person, since the good of a part depends on and
finds its good in that of the whole.258 The reason that these goods are not merely means is
that they are appropriate to the very nature of man as a physical creature and therefore
have desirability in themselves. As should be expected, since these goods relate more
directly to human nature, they become greater attractions to those who may seem to have
surpassed the illusionary grandeur of wealth, honour or power. Therefore it remains to
demonstrate clearly why each of these goods, though desirable in themselves, cannot be
the ultimate good or happiness.
Health, Beauty and Strength
In a society where materialism dominates both popular and academic
anthropology, it is easy for people to believe that health and happiness are the same thing.
In that case, the ultimate good is seen as having unimpaired and efficient bodily function.
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However, as seen above in one of Aquinas’ arguments against wealth, those who have
health tend not to be fully satisfied with all aspects of their life – an indication of not
having achieved the ultimate good. Often those who are privileged enough to have a
healthy, fully functioning body, begin to turn their time and attention towards beauty or
extraordinary physical performance. These are all areas which have taken primary roles in
marketing and consumerism in its various forms.
Many arguments which were used above regarding external goods, also apply to
the goods of health, beauty and strength.259 Of these, first and foremost, one should
consider that these are possessed both by the good and the bad, something which is
incompatible with the ultimate good. One is not a good man because of his health or
strength, but rather we see that many vicious men carry out their evil exactly because of
their physical attributes. Secondly, as with the external goods, it too is very much
unstable and not subject to the will of the person. One cannot will away disease which is
hereditary or caused by other factors out of control of the individual. In many cases,
where people have made health or beauty their aim, other factors such as accidents or
environmental changes can instantly undo years of work. All of these are incompatible
with the ultimate good, which cannot be taken from a person against his will.
Due to the goods of the body being more intimately tied to the perfection of the
human person, there are a new set of arguments which Aquinas employs. The first of
these is that a things ‘last end cannot consist in the preservation of its being.’260 Thomas
uses the analogy of a captain and his ship to speak about the relationship between the
will, reason and body.261 The intellect is seen as the body’s captain in the sense that it
uses the body to achieve its purpose – in this case, the good and true. Just as a captain’s
intention is not simply to preserve a ship, the intellect intention cannot be merely to
maintain the body. If this were the case, health would be in fact be the ultimate good, and
other factors such as truth and goodness would exist only to serve it. The goods of
friendship, knowledge and fortitude would only be good in as much as they preserve
one’s existence. In a way, this is to reverse the hierarchical nature of being and put the
vegetative life (or even mere existence) as the ultimate good.262 To follow the argument
further, it would mean that anyone who is fully physically functional is automatically
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achieving the ultimate good. This would mean that everyone who is healthy is perfect
which is clearly not true.
To carry Thomas’ analogy further and into his next argument, we can say that just
as the human captain is superior to his inanimate ship by nature, he is also superior in that
a ship cannot achieve its purpose (say, carrying cargo) apart from the captain’s direction.
‘The soul is better than the body, which is not alive, and which does not possess these
goods except by means of the soul.’263 Just as the body is unable to maintain its
constitution (and therefore existence) without the soul, so too is it unable to attain other
goods without the soul. Although health, beauty and strength are physical traits, they
depend on the soul for their existence. However, the intellectual aspect of the soul does
not depend on the body for its existence or operation.264 ‘So, a good of the soul, like
understanding, is better than a good of the body.’265 This is proven both because the body
depends on the good of the soul (e.g., knowledge) to find its good, and because the body
is directed and put to use to fulfil the goods of the soul (e.g., knowledge). The good of the
soul is both what makes the bodily goods possible, and is at the same time that to which
the bodily goods are directed.266 Therefore bodily goods cannot be the ultimate good,
since the ultimate good cannot (even logically) be approached as a means.
If the intellectual goods were not greater than bodily goods, for example, food and
sexual activity, then the ultimate good would lie in these areas, but once again this is
clearly wrong.267 To be not-hungry, is not to be perfected as a human being. To reproduce
abundantly is not to be a perfect human being. Or to phrase it negatively, to not be
sexually dissatisfied, does not mean one is a perfect human being. This can only be
explained if ‘the good of the intellect is better than the good of the senses.’268 The
intellectual appetite for universal truth and goodness is not exhausted by bodily goods,
therefore bodily goods cannot be the ultimate good of the whole being.
Happiness is the term which denotes the ultimate good particular to rational
beings.269 This means that happiness is something proper to rational beings and not found
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in non-rational creatures. ‘If, then, man’s highest good lay in these (bodily) things, man
would not be the most excellent of animals which is obviously false.’270 In many bodily
traits man is surpassed by the non-rational animals. Whether it be in speed, strength,
stamina, fertility or longevity of life, there are animals which go beyond human
capabilities.271 Therefore if the ultimate good were to lie in these goods, non-rational
animals would surpass humans in ‘happiness.’
Pleasures of the flesh
One of the arguments which Aquinas puts forward against physical pleasure being
man’s ultimate good is rooted in his epistemology. This is the fact that in the realm of the
senses it is strictly the particular which is apprehended. Therefore it contains an inherent
limitation – the senses are unable to directly perceive universals. This can cause issues
since as had been discussed earlier, the object of the intellect and will is universal truth
and goodness respectively. Bodily pleasure ‘results from a good apprehended by sense,
which is a power of the soul, which power makes use of the body.’272 Therefore all
pleasures of the body are associated with particular goods. Since the senses can only
apprehend singulars, their associated delight, ‘which is nothing else than the appetite’s
rest in the good’, is extremely limited.’273 Since this capacity of the body does not match
the capacity of the intellect, physical pleasures cannot be man’s ultimate good. He will
always be left dissatisfied, directly violating the first criteria of the ultimate good.
‘In the order of nature pleasure depends on operation, and not the converse.’274
Activities which are properly ordered achieve a good, and it is at the achievement of this
good that a concomitant pleasure or delight occurs.275 For example, there are associated
pleasures on achieving the good of the nutritional or reproductive faculties. Unless the
good of the faculty is achieved, such as satisfaction of hunger or completion of the sexual
act, then the associated pleasure does not pertain. This is otherwise known as the
‘hedonistic paradox.’ In order to experience the accompanying physical pleasure, ‘an
agent must “aim” at the mode of activity itself’ rather than the expected accompanying
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pleasure.276 So Aquinas puts forward the argument that pleasure is a proper accident of
achieving the good rather than the substance of the good itself. Since it has already been
shown above that these bodily operations cannot be the ultimate good, it is impossible for
their concomitant pleasures to be the ultimate end.277
Epicurus and the fathers of utilitarianism identify happiness with pleasure, or its
negative form of freedom from pain.278 The logic of this position is that pleasure is the
ultimate reason for doing anything. In other words, ‘if you could get the experience some
other more convenient way you would not bother with the activity.’279 This means that
there are not activities intrinsically worthwhile in themselves apart from the pleasure one
receives doing them. Acts of kindness or honesty (even though they ought to be
pleasurable to the kind or honest person) have no objective goodness to them. A
convincing argument against this was put forward by Robert Nozick who invented a
thought experiment called ‘the experience machine.’280 His conclusions can be summed
up by his statement that ‘perhaps what we desire is to live (an active verb) ourselves, in
contact with reality.’281 ‘It is not the satisfying but the satisfactory life we really want…
the life which in actual fact is fulfilled.’282 This highlights the criteria of happiness being
a proper activity, rather than a side-effect of an activity.283 Therefore pleasure cannot be
the ultimate good.
It is also possible that ‘one can feel moments of genuine pleasure… in the middle
of a long period of misery... (or) no matter what went before or followed that instant…
abstracted from any preceding or subsequent context.’284 However, happiness, the
ultimate good, must also be an enduring state as several of the criteria demand. It is
276
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deeply rooted in the reality of the person, including his character, life plan and the full
spectrum of his desires. It cannot be isolated into mere episodes – yet physical pleasure
can. Therefore it is impossible that pleasure is the ultimate good.
Aquinas also takes issue with the fact that ‘these pleasures are common to men
and brutes’, because as per the criteria, the ultimate end must lie in something proper to
the substance.285 In this case, it is a rational substance. Yet there is nothing inherent in the
pleasure associated with achieving the good of the sensitive appetite which is proper to
man. Since then the ultimate end must be ‘the noblest appurtenance of a thing’, and an
intellectual power such as understanding is much more nobler than the sense capacity,
physical pleasure cannot be man’s ultimate good.286
It is significant to point out at this stage that even if a person were to insist that the
intellect has a role in satisfying the sensitive appetite in humans, as long as it is only a
supporting role, or a role of service to pleasure (even though it may be a crucial one), it
still does not escape the above criticism. An example is that ‘for Epicurus the mind does
play an important part in the happy life: but its function is only to anticipate and recollect
the pleasures of the senses.’287 Even if Epicurus’ (and Hume288) make the intellect a
means to achieving pleasure, it does not make pleasure a good proper to man as a rational
creature.
An argument which Thomas applies in regard to wealth, also reappears when
addressing physical pleasure. ‘The highest perfection of man cannot lie in a union with
things inferior to himself, but, rather in a union with some reality of a higher character,
for the end is better than that which is for the sake of the end.’289 When the good is
possessed, a true union between the subject and object occurs. After all, it is this very
union itself which is the cause of pleasure. But to experience pleasures of the flesh, man,
who is a rational animal, unites with another object via the senses. This means that it is an
exclusively (or predominantly) physical union, and one which does not necessarily
achieve an intellectual union. Therefore the object of union is inferior by nature to the
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man himself, and his ultimate good cannot lie in something which is below his overall
capacity.290
One of the criteria for the ultimate good is that of self-sufficiency. ‘Something
which is not good unless it be moderated is not good of itself; rather it receives goodness
from the sources of moderation.’291 Aquinas here is pointing out the crucial role of the
cardinal virtue of temperance in regard to physical pleasures. Physical pleasures depend
on this virtue for their goodness, since intemperate pleasures are evil. ‘The pleasure
proper to a virtuous activity is good, and the pleasure proper to a vicious activity is
bad.’292 For example, a man may enjoy the concomitant pleasure of engaging in the
marital act with his wife. However, the exact same physical pleasure enjoyed at the hands
of his mistress would be considered evil. But it is impossible for the ultimate good to be
mingled with evil. Temperance at times even involves necessarily abstaining completely
from some bodily pleasures which in itself is proof that it cannot be the ultimate good.293
Even if one were to ignore the role of temperance in applying reason to the
attainment of physical pleasures, ‘excessive enjoyment of them is considered vicious, and
is also harmful to the body, and it prevents enjoyment of similar pleasures.’294 Since the
body has a way of becoming de-sensitised to repeated intense bodily pleasures, people
often find themselves having to pursue more extreme activities, leading to the point of
even disabling themselves from achieving any pleasure in the particular faculties. In the
same way in which a person has to increase the temperature of the water during a shower,
people who indulge their sexual appetites need to look to more frequent or extreme
avenues to experience the same pleasure. Often the very bodily faculties themselves can
eventually begin to fail before the person’s appetite is satisfied.295 Unfortunately this is
290
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the sad state of affairs whenever a person attempts to fill a universal desire with a
particular good.296 It is the same way in which ‘the desire for artificial wealth is infinite,
for it is the servant of disordered concupiscence.’297 Once a physical pleasure is
disassociated from its proper operation and end, the desire becomes unsatisfiable. These
associated ails that come with excessive pursuit of physical pleasure are another proof
that they cannot be the ultimate good.
Those who plunge themselves into pursuing physical pleasures also hinder their
capacity for the enjoyment of finer intellectual delights. More specifically the enjoyment
of contemplation is directly affected, since being plunged into sensible objects distracts
one from intellectual objects.298 The person who is used to immediate, intense pleasures
becomes easily impatient and frustrated by delights which are slow and more difficult to
achieve. One’s own internal radar which measures the success or worthwhile of activity
decides that reading, meditation or prayer is ‘not working.’ A person may decide spiritual
activity is objectively pointless or that it is simply ‘not for me.’ The vices of sloth and
despair can easily take hold on an individual used to immediate gratification. This
reduced capacity to appreciate intellectual endeavour is a sign of a hedonistic culture.299
Since physical pleasure can interfere with mans pursuit of other true goods, it cannot be
the ultimate good.
For St Thomas, this explains why ‘there are more people who seek sensual
pleasures… because things that are external stand out as better known, since human
knowledge starts from sensible objects.’300 Physical pleasure is more obvious in that one
does not need years of character refinement in order to experience satisfaction of a
particular sensible appetite. One does not need to exercise the various virtues involved to
realise its worth, in contrast to other goods such as contemplation or worship. We should
therefore expect physical pleasure to be something the majority of people pursue. Even

296

‘Thou hast formed us for Thyself, and our hearts are restless till they find rest in Thee’ – Augustine,
Confessions, Book 1, 1.
297
ST I-II, Q2, R2.
298
SCG III, C27, 10.
299
In a famous incident of Thomas’ life, he drove out a prostitute who had been locked in his room as part
of a plan to prevent him joining the Dominican Order. One can only wonder: if Aquinas had given into
temptation, would we still have the quantity and quality of the corpus of work he left us? Thomas, echoing
the thoughts of Pope St Gregory the Great, would seem to answer ‘no’, since they see lust as a particular
cause of ‘blindness of mind (ST II-II, Q15, A3).’ This does however leave unanswered what possibilities still
remained after repentance.
300
SCG III, C26, 20. Commentary on N.E., 57.

64

for those attempting to develop the virtue of temperance, often the intensity, proximity
and knowableness of sensual objects makes them hard to ignore. Many assaults on
intellectual goods occur ‘from the fact that most men live on the sense level, because
sensory objects are better known to us, and they are more effective motives in the domain
of particular things where action goes on.’301 This too is proof that physical pleasure
cannot be identical to the person’s ultimate end, since if it were, it would be impossible
for pleasure to lead one away from it.302

Goods of the Soul
It has been demonstrated that happiness cannot consist in achieving the
bodily goods of health, beauty or pleasure. When each is analysed in light of the formal
criteria, they are found wanting. It was shown that physical goods ‘are limited goods, that
is, good only to the extent that they promote the good of the soul.’303 Hence, in the search
for the ultimate good one must move to the next order of goods – those proper to man as
an intellectual creature. ‘These (goods of the soul) are the chief goods, for external things
are for the sake of the body, and the body for the sake of the soul.’304
These goods are in the second category of goods mentioned above – those which
are a means and desirable in themselves. Once again, as the search gets closer to what the
ultimate good actually encompass, these goods become more tempting to believe as being
happiness itself. Many persons consciously trying to live the good life, may have avoided
the pitfalls in pursuing ultimately money, power, and now even bodily health and
pleasure. It remains now to evaluate the goods of the soul in relation to the formal criteria.
Acts of the will
There are three kinds of acts that the intellectual appetite (will) can perform;
desiring, loving or enjoying.305 It is impossible for the first act, that of desiring, to be the
ultimate good since the being wants what it does not possess. The object of one’s will is
the end.306 It would be absurd to say that one’s desire is satisfied (the good is made
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present) by the act of desiring - this is to confuse the object of the will and the act of the
will as the same thing.307 In actual fact, in all acts of the will, it is an object, not an act,
which is the first thing willed.308 In the case of humans, it is the ultimate good or
happiness which is the first and fundamental thing desired.309 Obviously, the desire for
happiness does not make one happy, otherwise it would be impossible to be unhappy.
The second act of the will which Thomas mentions is that of loving. If the act of
desiring only occurs when the good is not present, the act of loving includes both the
presence and absence of the good. Even when the object of one’s love is absent, one can
still imperfectly love the object.310 For example, a lonely woman may remember her
husband who is at war and will his good, or a hungry man may imagine a fresh burger,
willing a union of digestion with it - but in neither case does the loving itself cause
substantial union. Therefore simply loving the good cannot be the ultimate good – there
must be an attainment of it since ‘it is a different thing to possess a good which is the end,
and to love it.’311 This act of possessing the good must then occur via an act other than the
will.312 Therefore the act of loving cannot be the ultimate good.
Another reason that the act of loving cannot be happiness is that in the order of
nature the intellect moves the will. Since the intellect provides the will with its object,
‘we cannot will what we do not understand.’313 The will only moves the intellect
accidently, that is, in as far as it is good for the intellect to understand, the will moves it to
do so. However, ‘even in this act, the intellect precedes the will, for the will would never
desire the act of understanding unless, first of all, the intellect were to apprehend the act
of understanding as a good.’314 So then, ‘the intellect apprehends the good before the will
does: yet motion towards the end begins in the will.’315 ‘Love ranks above knowledge in
moving, but knowledge precedes love in attaining.’316 Since the cause is greater than the
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effect, ‘the intellect is higher than the will.’317 Therefore since the ultimate good is mans
highest act, an act of the will cannot be happiness.
The third act of the will Thomas mentions is that of delight. This act ‘is nothing
else than the appetite’s rest in good.’318 One might recognise here a similar definition to
that given of pleasure. This is not accidental: pleasure can be used to denote the particular
satisfaction of the sensitive appetite, while delight can be used to refer to the satisfaction
of the intellectual appetite. In that case, all the arguments used above against pleasure
being the ultimate good also apply to whether delight in the ultimate good. The most
significant of these is that ‘delight comes to the will from the end being present.’319
Therefore, since delight implies the good is already present it, the act of delight cannot be
the ultimate good. ‘Love… gives rise to desire when the loved object is not possessed,
and to joy when the object is possessed. None of these acts, however, actually brings
about the possession of the object.’320 Whatever act actually involves possessing the
ultimate good would be greater than the act of delight then.321 Therefore happiness cannot
consist in an act of the will.
Whether the will is desiring, loving or enjoying, it relates in the same way to the
object whether it be an actual or apparent good. ‘In relation to the will, true happiness
does not differ from false happiness.’322 The will depends on the intellect to distinguish
true from false goods. The wrathful man rejoices in getting revenge, the coward in
avoiding dangers, the avaricious in stealing millions and the adulterer in sleeping with
another mans wife.323 The delight (or lack thereof) one derives from a certain activity
depends on an individual’s character.324 While it is true that enjoyment requires the
subject to perceive the object as good, the act of enjoying something does not make it
good. Rather, as with physical pleasure, it is the goodness of the act which determines the
goodness of the delight, not vice versa.325 Delight which accompanies a truly good object
is desirable, but the delight which accompanies union with a merely apparently good
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object is repulsive.326 However, as mentioned in the formal criteria, the ultimate good is
incompatible with evil and involves perfect operation. Therefore, delight in itself cannot
be the ultimate good.
It is obvious here that any denial of the intellect’s ability to obtain reality has a
devastating effect on theories of happiness. Where it is denied that one can objectively
identify good and evil, the will necessarily takes the leading role as the essence of
happiness. With the inability of the intellect to critique desires as ordered or disordered,
all desires seem equally legitimate. This is displayed the most clearly in popular
contemporary societies approach to sexual morality. The assumption which acts as a
pillar for the ‘pro-homosexual’ lobbyists is that all satisfaction of sexual desire,
regardless of its object, is equally fulfilling and flourishing for the person.327 With this
subjectivist approach, happiness necessarily becomes ‘satisfaction’ of the will, with
nothing to gauge the true goodness of the object of desire.328
With the same focus on the will as the key to happiness, law is no longer viewed
as a promulgated act of reason for the common good, but rather as simply the imposition
of another’s will (as discussed in the Introduction). Any attempt to reprove or teach
someone about the nature of happiness can only be seen as a battle of wills. The ‘ProChoice’ movement is the most explicit declaration that an act of the will is the ultimate
good.329 ‘Desire in secular academic arguments and in Western culture has become
increasingly privatised and immunised… exempt from moral or social criticism… (due
to) modernity’s separation of fact and value.’330 Rather than engage in intellectual
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discussion about the metaphysical and moral act itself, often protests, propaganda,
surveys and popular opinion are used to convince those in charge of the common good
that there is a communal will they must bow to. The current abuse of ‘rights talk’ apart
from discussion about the nature of goodness and freedom, enforces in the minds of the
hearer that happiness is nothing other than the ability to exercise your will.
Sexual morality is not the only thing affected when acts of the will (particularly
enjoyment) are seen as the ultimate good. Taken to its most extreme form, people even
begin to view religion and God as realities which ought to serve the unevaluated will of a
person, rather than challenge them to new and greater realities. The result is ‘church
shopping’ or ‘smorgasbord Christianity’, where persons search not for true religion but
rather one which gives them delight. The subjective experience of delight is then seen as
the true indicator of one’s objective union with God.331 By extension, Julia Annas’
example can be applied to that of religion: ‘Any parent would be disconcerted to find that
her child had grown up to regard her life as happy because of the enjoyment she got from,
say, helping others, but would unhesitatingly drop helping others the minute she ceased
enjoying it.’332 If the ultimate good is delight, then even goods such as truth and
generosity must be pursued only in as much as they bring one delight. Since this is not the
case, the ultimate good cannot be an act of the will.
Not in Acts of Moral Virtue
The reasonable life is that which is proper to man. ‘Now the rational has two
parts. One is rational by participation insofar as it is obedient to and is regulated by
reason. The other is rational by nature as it can of itself reason and understand.’333 Moral
virtue comes under the first category since it is their function to regulate mans powers in
order to execute their proper movements.334 More particularly, they allow man to
infiltrate and order his interior passions and external things to reason. Yet as proved
above, ‘it is not possible for such a measuring of passions, or of external things, to be the
ultimate end of human life, since these passions and exterior things are capable of being
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ordered to something else.’335 Also, ‘happiness is a good which resides in reason itself,
not something produced by reason.336 This is necessarily the case, since it is not possible
that the purpose of a higher power is simply to serve lower ones – in fact, this is the
opposite of their true relationship.337 Hence, reason’s secondary activity, moral virtue,
cannot be happiness.
As was proved in the criteria in Chapter One, it is not possible that the ultimate
good be approached as useful to a further end. ‘But the act of the practical intellect is not
sought for its own sake but for the sake of action: and these very actions are ordained to
some end.’338 In the same place, Thomas uses the examples of fortitude as ordered toward
victory and peace, and justice as ordered toward preservation of peace. Other examples
might include a person pursuing temperance because it will allow him to be faithful to his
spouse. In this case, fidelity and marriage are seen as goods that moral virtue is ordered
towards. Since the ultimate good cannot be viewed as a means to anything else, moral
virtue cannot itself be the ultimate good.
The example used in the above paragraph also exhibits how another criteria of the
ultimate good is not met – that of self-sufficiency and perfect operation. If moral virtue
was synonymous with happiness, a person who has achieved the moral virtues would be
considered to have the ultimate end. However, clearly those who have the moral virtues
continue to order their lives to something other than simply maintaining temperance or
courage. For example, a chaste person may desire to marry, a brave man desire to defend
the needy or the prudent woman may wish to contemplate. In each of these situations, the
person perceives a good which he has not achieved. However, one cannot have achieved
the ultimate good, yet gain from the addition of other good. Therefore if moral virtue was
happiness itself, the man must not be able to gain any good by meeting a spouse,
correcting injustice or contemplating. Also, as seen in the criteria, happiness is a perfect
operation, whereas the moral virtues, as habits, are simply dispositions to act well.
Therefore moral virtue cannot be the ultimate good.
One of the criteria for the ultimate good was that it be an operation proper to man.
Aquinas point out however that some animals share somewhat in liberality, fortitude or
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prudence, but an animal does not carry out any intellectual action.339 For example, when a
lion’s sensitive appetite may be geared towards defending his cubs from the attack of
predators. Although it does not have an intellectual principle to order this reaction, nature
has provided for the passions ordering already. Therefore in being consistent with
happiness as the proper good of rational substances, it cannot lie in moral virtue.
Although they participate somewhat in moral virtue, irrational animals do not participate
in happiness. Therefore moral virtue cannot be man’s ultimate good.

Conclusion
External and bodily good, as well as the moral virtues, could all be considered as
necessary or appropriate to help man attain happiness, yet they cannot be the ultimate end
of man, rather, the opposite is so – all of these things find their end in him.340 Although
playing roles of varying significance, the best that they can offer the person is the
providing a disposition to achieve whatever happiness is actually materially instantiated
in.341
The current chapter just systematically worked through nearly all the various
particular goods and acts that one encounters, coming to the conclusion that none of them
can be the ultimate good. ‘If one of these finite basic goods is pursued as if it were itself
the ultimate end it can finally yield only despair.’342 One will realise, whether it be
tomorrow or in years, that what in fact one was pursuing or attained is not perfect
happiness.
There remains one act of man which has not been addressed, yet was touched on
in the section on moral virtue. That is, those pure acts of reasons which are not ordered
toward the regulation of the passions or external goods; the intellectual virtues which
have truth itself as their good. This has been reserved for the next Chapter because it is
this particular activity which Thomas sees as the only potential candidate for fulfilling the
formal criteria of happiness. It is appropriate then that it is addressed in the next chapter,
‘The Essence of Happiness.’
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The Essence of Happiness
In Chapter One, the formal criteria of happiness was explored so that it was
defined as a perfect operation which fulfils all desire, is desired for its own sake alone,
self-sufficient, without defect, suitable for all persons and able to act as an entire rule of
life. In Chapter Two, Aquinas eliminated apparent instantiations of happiness. The
following chapter will unpack Thomas’ understanding of what happiness materially
consists in. Only if what Thomas proposes as the material of happiness meets this formal
criteria, can one say that he has presented a consistent and complete understanding. If he
has in fact done this, then one must acknowledge that he set the highest possible
benchmark for what happiness consists in and achieved it.
The first crucial distinction regarding what happiness materially consists in
merging the views of Aristotle and Boethius.343 Boethius defined happiness as ‘a state
made perfect by the aggregate of all good things.’344 We see here an emphasis on
happiness as possession of good objects. For Aristotle on the other hand, it is ‘action
conformable to the best and most perfect’ virtue.’345 This highlights the subjective aspect,
the individual’s act, of attaining happiness.
For Thomas then, all ends are to be understood under two aspects – the act of
attainment (subjective) and that which is obtained (objective). ‘The end is two-fold; the
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end for which and the end by which; the thing itself in which is found the aspect of good,
and the use or acquisition of that thing.’346 Take the example of a person setting
themselves the end of being in a romantic relationship. This end is a unity of the
subjective act of loving another (willing their good), combined with the person whose
good you will. To simply will the good of an unspecified other or, on the other hand, to
have someone by your side at a dinner table, is not to have achieved the end of a romantic
relationship. If the nature of ends are such, then the Ultimate End is no exception:
‘Happiness implies two things, to wit, the last end itself, i.e., the Sovereign Good; and the
attainment or enjoyment of that same Good.’347
‘Happiness itself, since it is a perfection of the soul, is an inherent good of the
soul; but that which constitutes happiness, viz., which makes man happy, is something
outside his soul.’348 It is very clear then that happiness for St Thomas has a two fold
sense. It is not enough to simply fulfil one’s capacities, and it is not enough to simply
acknowledge the Ultimate Good as out there. Happiness is a two-fold reality. It is easy to
fall into this trap of neglecting the two-fold nature of happiness. A person may be
intelligent, healthy, funny and wealthy, yet not happy. At the same time, the person who
is in good relationship with God, spouse or work (or whatever he considers the ultimate
good to be), may wonder why he too is not happy when he has some sense of the ultimate
good in his life. Both characters are failing to see that not only must one actualise their
capacities, but it must also be in regard to the Highest Good.
Therefore felicity lies in man’s ultimate operation in relationship to the ultimate
good external to him.349 In order to clarify what exactly what this particular act and object
is, the chapter will be broken up into four approaches, each arriving at the same
conclusion: happiness is an act of contemplation, whose object is the Divine Essence.

Approaching via Man’s Ultimate Operation
It was demanded by the criteria that happiness lie in the perfect execution of
man’s proper and ultimate act. In the second chapter, false candidates for that operation
were eliminated. It must be an operation of man which is carried out for no other purpose
346
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than itself. In this section, the search for this proper operation will be continued and its
final conclusion discovered.
Since the order of ends follows the order of agents, so that the end of the first
mover is the ultimate end for all, by analysing the principle of human actions, one arrives
at the good of the whole person.350 In man the order of movers is: the intellect moves the
will by providing its object, the will moves the sensory appetites, then with consent of the
will the sensual appetite moves the body.351 So the end of the intellect, as first mover for
all human acts, is the ultimate end of the whole human person. Since the end of the
intellect is the truth, it must mean that truth is the ultimate end of the human person. This
has a corresponding appetite, the will, which then approaches truth as desirable and
good.352 Since the intellects goal is universal truth (and the corresponding appetite is
universal goodness), happiness is the attainment of this perfect truth and goodness.353
‘We are left with the conclusion that the ultimate felicity of man lies in the
contemplation of truth.’354 Happiness will be more properly found in the life of thought
than in a life of activity, and in an act of reason itself rather than in an act of the appetitive
power controlled by reason.’355 That is, that action of the intellect which has no other end
than the truth itself. Therefore in the deepest understanding, the true and good are the
same for man: that act of attaining the ultimate truth is his ultimate good. ‘It is the
“perfective” that adds to “being” the rationes of “good”, “desirable” and “end.”’356 This
parallels ‘the fundamental way reality is constituted: good presupposes truth, and truth
presupposes being.’357 This point however will be addressed further in the below section,
‘The Approach via Metaphysics.’
Yet it is not just any pursuit of truth which is being spoken of. The speculative
intellect, ‘that part of the soul which considers necessary things that cannot be otherwise
than they are’, has three virtues which perfect its operation.358 These are the intellectual
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virtues of science, wisdom and understanding.359 The person who possesses the virtue of
science, habitually reasons from principles to conclusions well. Science however is
ordered toward wisdom, which is knowledge of causes, especially the highest causes.360
Finally, wisdom serves understanding, or intellectus. Understanding stands apart from the
other two intellectual virtues in that it does not involve any ‘thinking’ as such.361 It is this
particular act of the speculative intellect, that which the others are ordered toward, which
is finally ordered to nothing else.
To understand (otherwise known as contemplate) is to already have arrived at the
goal which science and wisdom are trying to achieve. It is the perfect form of knowing.
The person who contemplates ‘sees’ an intellectual reality in the way in the eyes see
physical objects. ‘In understanding, a whole multitude of truths are seen in the first
unified and simple truth.’362 This is in contrast once again with science or wisdom whose
intellectual activities seek to arrive at a reality which is not yet present to the individual
mind. Therefore the intellect, beginning with what is present to the mind, attempts to
‘work out’ the rest. In contrast, contemplation occurs when the person ‘already rests in
(the truth)… The person who knows by intuition has already found what the thinker is
seeking; what he knows is present “before his eyes.”’363 Josef Pieper rather poetically
contrasts contemplation with the other intellectual virtues by pointing out how it is
ultimately grounded beyond the temporal or contingent. ‘The simple insightful gaze of
intellectus is related to the “discursive” movements of the ratio as the eternal to the
temporal… time flies by. In happiness as in contemplation, man takes a step out of
time.’364
One may immediately think however, ‘I desire more than to simply know
something – isn’t this a bit shallow? Is Thomas not undermining the non-intellectual
desires I have?’ This could be a complaint one is magnetically drawn back to, when one
forgets the role that the intellect plays in human life. To understand how contemplation
can fulfil all desire it is necessary once again to analyse the true depths of the reality of
desire. In order to model this, one may analyse the sensitive appetite. The sensitive
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appetite encompasses those desires or capacities which are intrinsically related to
animality. What is it to have an animal desire? It must be an inclination experienced by a
being in which the good to be attained or made present is essentially physical. In this
case, food, drink, bodily pleasure, offspring, rest, etc. This is simple enough to
understand, and is likely what the questioner has in mind. With this as a basis, one can
now relate it to the intellectual appetite, which humanity has in addition to the sensitive.
These are such desires and capacities in which spiritual or intellectual goods are yearned
for. But what exactly does this mean? How can an intellectual good be present or attained
in the same way a physical good can? The obvious answer is that it cannot be. However,
since the terms ‘desire’, ‘good’ and ‘appetite’ cannot be understood univocally, one
should not immediately assume an equivocal relationship.
It has already been established that truth is the goal of the intellect. The intellect
attains its good by being informed by the truth. To use a sensitive analogy, like the
digestive system encompasses the good of food and drink, breaks it down and transforms
it in the substance of the body itself, so does the intellect receive ideas, analyse or break
them down to their basic components, then make it one’s own. This ‘making it one’s
own’ is a making present of the reality to the individual’s mind. It is no longer simply a
good, in this case, truth, which is ‘out there’ either for no one or for someone else; it is a
good attained by that very individual. This analogy to physical consumption is quite
effective, since ‘in this fashion the pleasure of contemplation of wisdom and the
assumption of the intelligible truth into our intellect is customarily indicated in sacred
Scripture as the use of food.’365
The clearest way in which the intellectual appetite manifests itself is through the
human desire to experience persons, events and places. What is the basis of this strong
desire to experience that humans have? It is this very desire to grasp reality - to make it
their own. ‘The delight we take in our senses is an implicit desire to know the ultimate
reason for things… All other knowledge contains the seeds of contemplation.’366 From
the youngest members of the human race desiring to see, touch and even taste the objects
around them, we see this desire to know the reality which surrounds them. On
encountering being, the young mind desires to know what it is. The more developed
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mind, on expanding its view of the enormity of being, then desires to make its own other
experiences – the experience of being in love and loved, seeing other countries, excelling
in a field of work, having children – the list is endless. However, notice that the last of the
realities on this short list, also coincides with a desire of the sensitive appetite. Hence
although rational animals too desire to procreate, they pursue this in a way appropriate to
the reality of the intellectual creature. This means we have arrived at something which is
distinctly human, even within the realm of the sensitive appetite – the questioner’s
original concern. That even the pursuit of sensitive goods as a rational creature is never
isolated from truth or reason – what underpins them all is the belief that reality is good,
and the more one can experience or know it, the happier one is.
Another way of understanding is to notice that non-rational animals are only able
to encounter food and drink as satisfying the sensitive appetite, not that of the intellectual
appetite. There is something distinctly human about realising the goodness of a thing
beyond its mere ability to satisfy physical hunger.367 Even when we play, ‘we do not play
as other animals do, but we play contemplating rationally our relevant experience and
enjoying it exactly at this rational-contemplative level.’368
Daniel McInerny explains this well when he states:
Truth, in other words, as a higher good, is not hermetically sealed and placed in some
separate realm apart from the practice of family life. Rather, as a higher good, truth
informs the activities of family life, becomes bound up with them, so that the
education of children is ordered to truth, conversation between the spouses is directed
to truth, and the spouses’ temperance manifests the truth about human sexuality.369
To take another example, imagine a man who sees his wife in the most intimate
way on his wedding night. He beholds the naked truth about the human person, marriage,
life-long commitment and, overwhelmed by the beauty of it all, he whispers to his
beloved, ‘You are beautiful.’ It is easy in this statement to focus on the term ‘you’, or
likewise on the universal, ‘beautiful.’ This focus is understandable, as each term reflects a
truth. However, the key word, and what gets taken for granted in this sentence, is in fact
the ‘are.’ This is the term which ultimately denotes the husband’s apprehension (or
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subjective act) of the reality (goodness of the object) before him. In truth, this is beautiful,
and it is the realisation of this that is his happiness. It is the realisation that inspires love,
poetry, music and even Scripture. Being informed of this truth then influences the
husbands practical intellect about how he will and ought to treat her. ‘The fulfilment of
existence takes place in the manner in which we become aware of reality; the whole
energy of our being is ultimately directed toward attainment of insight.’370
To reinforce the point that Thomas has not lost touch with the ‘everyday’ person,
throughout his work he refers to these sensible goods sometimes when least expected. In
one section, he explains that, ‘Anyone who refrained from wine to such an extent that he
severely tried nature would in some measure incur guilt.’371 Elsewhere he suggests the
remedial effect of ‘a glass of wine, a bath and a nap’ for those who are feeling a bit flat.372
When a person enjoys a nice glass of wine, what is this other than enjoying the truth that,
‘This is good wine.’ The person delights in realising this truth. Their statement is in fact a
metaphysical one – it cannot be reduced to biology or physics. Although the taste buds
can be analysed, the material cause of fine wine studied, this is an altogether different
thing to the realisation this is good wine. To have a hot relaxing bath and a nap is not
merely to wash or sleep, but also so that afterwards the intellect is more inclined to see
things as they are. Hence the ethical difference in that advice in comparison to
recommending a bottle of scotch and eight hours of mind-blowing sound. In that case the
goal is distraction and disturbance of the intellects capacity to grasp reality, not recreation
ordered toward the faculties refreshment.
An example of misery may assist in demonstrating Thomas’ point as well. In all
the evils and tragedies which one encounters in his own life and the lives of others, what
are these other than the remembrance, realisation or foreseeing of a personal encounter
with being which will not occur. When a child is lost at a young age, the mourning parent
foresees the future of the child and his relationship with him which will not occur.
Phrases such as, ‘I will never see him again’, ‘He never got to experience more of life’
and, ‘I had imagined watching him play Saturday morning sport,’ all reveal that the
person is mourning due to missed personal encounters with being, which he may not even
be able to regain. This is not to say that the mourning is egotistical, since they also mourn
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that the child themselves will never be able to realise the truth, goodness and beauty of
reality.373 Whether it’s the sadness of dropping an ice cream, paying a parking fine, being
diagnosed with cancer or even the depths of Hell, the very source of unhappiness is the
apprehension that to some degree, one will not know being. In other words, the awareness
that some good has escaped myself or others, whether temporarily or permanently, is to
encounter evil.374
For Aquinas then, ‘Perfect happiness consists in the activity of contemplative
virtue.’375 This is the proper act of man which is desired in itself for no other reason. This
act does not end when reality is grasped, but is also a ‘reflection on the truth already
discovered and known.’376 Therefore although it involves a ‘purely receptive approach to
reality… (it) still involves interest, participation, attention, purposiveness.’377
Contemplation, the highest act of man, is not to be seen as limited to any particular areas
of life, but rather what makes enjoyment of any true good possible for the rational animal.

Approaching via the Highest Object of Speculation
Yet, in application of the act-object distinction mentioned above, it is not
contemplation of any truth which mans happiness consists in. Since the Ultimate Good,
happiness, lies (at least partly) outside of the person, ‘the theoretical intellect can neither
guarantee nor cause true human perfection (or completion).’378 Thomas therefore begins
to eliminate that knowledge which happiness cannot consist in.
First are those forms of science in which action is their goal. ‘All practical
sciences, arts, and powers are objects of love only because they are means to something
else, for their purpose is not knowledge but operation.’379 Examples of practical sciences
are fields of study such as medicine (which is knowledge ordered toward causing health),
economics (knowledge ordered towards financial management), art (knowledge ordered
373
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toward making) and law (knowledge ordered toward a just society). In each of these
cases, and there are many more, the purpose of study is to practice in the particular field.
Therefore the knowledge gained from them is not for the sake of itself.380 ‘All practical
activity, from practice of the ethical virtues to gaining the means of livelihood, serves
something other than itself.’381 Since ‘the practical arts are ordered to the speculative
ones’, it is not possible that they are the ultimate end.382
Keeping with his logical progression, Thomas then asks whether it is the pursuit
of the speculative sciences that happiness lies. Examples of these may include speculative
sciences such as biology, physics, astronomy, geology, metaphysics and theology, where
knowledge is desired for its own sake.383 Yet not just any of these are sufficient for
happiness, since ‘the consideration of a speculative science does not extend beyond the
scope of the principles of that science.’384 Therefore any science which consists merely in
knowledge of the natural world cannot be man’s happiness since he is greater than all
sensible objects.385 Secondly, fields of knowledge which do not go beyond sensible
realities do not fulfil mans desires. Etienne Gilson says that,
To minds tormented by the divine thirst, it is useless to offer the most certain
knowledge of the laws of numbers and the arrangement of the universe.
Straining… they endeavour to lift a corner of the veil, only too happy to
perceive… glimmerings of the eternal light. The slightest knowledge touching the
highest realities is far more desirable than the most absolute certitude touching
minor objects.386
Knowledge of the mating habits of ants pales, in terms of desirability, pales in
comparison to knowing the smallest truths about man or the universe. Therefore not just
any of the speculative sciences can be the ultimate good, since the Ultimate Good must be
that which satisfies all desire.
One then can ask, ‘What about knowledge in which the object known is greater
than man?’ This in fact is the question Thomas wishes to lead the reader to. Man’s natural
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desire to know is manifested through the experience of wonder. The earliest recorded
history of philosophising, both in the eastern and western tradition, revolves around the
search for the unseen causes of those things seen.387 The intellect is spurred along through
recognising effects, which bring one to wonder, which leads to inquiry. This movement
from wonder to enquiry even occurs with created effects as a whole.388 Man desires to see
past the veil of the seeming and behold the foundations of reality. ‘Knowledge is higher
to the degree that it is more unified and extends to more things.’389 Hence man knows
more perfectly when he knows the highest causes, since to grasp these would, in a way, to
be grasping everything.390 This then, must be the highest object of the speculative
intellect.391
Monotheists have always understood this first cause as God. Keeping in mind that
it was proven all of man’s capacities are ordered toward contemplation (an act of the
speculative intellect), Thomas can then state that ‘the ultimate end of the whole man, and
of all his operations and desires, is to know the first truth, which is God.’392 By doing so,
man will be exercising his highest capacity in regard to its highest object. ‘Man’s highest
operation is that of his highest power in respect of its highest object: and his highest
power is the intellect, whose highest object is the Divine Good.’393
This may seem like a religious truism, shallow even to the believer who considers
his own life. Aren’t there people who have dedicated their lives to God who still are not
happy? In order to properly understand Thomas’ conclusion, he highlights two points.
The first is that one ‘is not perfectly happy, so long as something remains for him to
desire and seek: secondly, that the nature of any power is determined by the nature of it’s
object.’394 In the first point, Thomas is making it very clear that he has not abandoned the
formal criteria discussed in Chapter 1, but rather will draw them out to their logical
conclusion.395 In regard to the second point, ‘the object of the intellect is what a thing is,
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i.e., the essence of a thing.’396 It is not mere knowledge of a things effect, or knowledge
of its accidents which is required. Neither is it the kind of knowledge which results from
demonstration. It is to apprehend or ‘see’ the essence of a reality. Therefore, for perfect
happiness, the intellect cannot rest until it ‘sees’ the very Essence of the First Cause,
God.397
To understand the significance of this statement, one is required to know a key
aspect of Aristotelian-Thomistic epistemology. Within this framework, knowledge is not
merely impersonal, disinterested, ‘factual’ information about an object. To know an
object is to have its very form reside in the intellect – a true, substantial union occurs
between the immaterial intellect (which can become all things) and the thing itself.398 In
other words, ‘what is known by the knower is in some way in the knower.’399 Therefore
to know the Essence of God is not to have the equivalent of numerous theology
doctorates, but rather to have a substantial union with God Himself. To know the Divine
Essence is not to have information about, but rather to be literally in-formed by the Divine
Nature, to have a substantial union with this immaterial Being. It is a most intimate union,
one so personal and communicative that even the marital act is but a mere symbol.400
Thomas’ use of the word ‘seeing’ to describe that relationship to God is not so
foreign to our everyday life. Even within our own language, there is
‘basically only one word to describe what actually happens when we “realise” the
presence of another person. That word is “seeing.”... All other words are either spatial
metaphors (nearness, closeness) or derive from the sense of touch (tangibility, being at
hand, being in contact). That is to say, they refer to externalities.’401
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From this description, we begin to see that ‘contemplation is not merely an intellectual
act: rather, as the union with the loved person, it is the fulfilment of personal love.’402
Although philosophy sees a union between the knower and the thing known, it is
Revelation which confirms that the Unconditional Reality the intellect is moving towards
is truly personal and Eternal Communion. ‘In (a Biblical) context, the verb “to know” has
a more profound and intimate meaning than consciousness of existence. It expresses a
personal relationship more intimate than simply intellectual knowledge.’403 Key examples
include Adam knowing Eve (Gen 4:1 & 27), God knowing Israel (Amos 3:2) and Jesus
knowing his disciples (John 15:15).
The point could be demonstrated by contrasting it with its opposite – that is,
failing relationships. There is an intrinsic link between ‘seeing’, knowledge and love
known by all humans.404 A common complaint from a lover could be, ‘You don’t know
me’, or ‘I don’t see you.’ Both phrases are synonymous in meaning the person feels the
very essence of their union has been threatened. Loneliness is something which goes
beyond a simple physical absence of another, and enters into the intellectual realm where
one feels unknown by another. The ‘loving knowledge’ which occurs then between the
person and the ‘I Am’, is not merely one of disinterested facts, but rather the realisation
(the making present to the individual) that he is intimately known, affirmed and loved by
the very source of his being. It is the complete fulfilment of all desire, attained by a
knowledge of the goodness of Being which is utterly irreplaceable by knowledge of any
(or all) contingent beings. One who contemplates the Divine Essence ‘steps away from
the here and now to utterly tranquil contemplation of the ground of existence; to
happiness, as in absorption in beloved eyes.’405 This ‘act of contemplation is not at all
impersonal: rather it is the fulfilment of a personal relationship, the affective relationship
between two persons.’406
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Approaching via Metaphysics
There remains one other approach used by St Thomas. This one takes the broadest
possible scope in dimension and approaches human happiness from a purely metaphysical
perspective. ‘The credibility and force of Aquinas’ theory of goodness depends on the
cogency of his overall account of what it is for a creature to exist.’407 This approach
highlights the essential relationship between Unconditioned, Infinite and Uncreated
Reality and conditional, finite and created reality. This area deserves a much more proper
treatment which goes beyond the scope of this work, but it is nevertheless necessary to
mention it in order to understand the depth and consistency of Thomas’ genius.
It can be a neglected point that in both of Thomas’ Summas, mans happiness is
discussed in the sections on Providence. For Aquinas, man’s search for happiness is
explicitly and intimately tied into God’s governance of creation, in bringing it to its
ultimate end as a whole. This ultimate end can be none other than Himself: ‘Order among
ends is a consequence of order among agents… Whatever the Supreme Agent does, He
does for the sake of His end… There is no other end for His Will than His goodness,
which is Himself. Therefore, all things… are ordered to God as to their end.’408 He is the
Ultimate End of all created being since He is it’s Ultimate Cause.409
‘That which is supreme in any genus is the cause of all the members that belong in
that genus. The highest good which is God is the cause of the goodness in all things.’410
As the Final Cause par excellence, all things receive their goodness in due measure by
participating in God’s goodness; not only because of a common final cause (Himself), but
also sharing in His efficient causality (through their acting in the universe) and His ratio
(through their form).411 ‘It is from this First Good which flow all other goods.412 It is
impossible for there to be a true good which does not participate in the Ultimate Good
Himself. To nuance the point with a slight change in terminology, all true final causes are
ordered toward the Ultimate Final Cause. ‘That which is the highest good is the end of all
things.’413
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We have now reached a point where Thomas’ act/object distinction regarding
happiness specifically emerges. Regarding the object aspect of happiness, St Thomas tells
us: ‘If one thing has another thing as its external end, then the operation whereby the first
thing primarily attains the second will be called the ultimate end of the first thing.’414
Regarding the act aspect of happiness then, the proper operation of a thing is its
secondary end. Therefore the act/object distinction also reveals a secondary/primary end
distinction.
What particularly distinguishes the metaphysical approach, from the other
act/object approaches mentioned, is that according to this approach, there is an automatic
moving toward the object of happiness (God) simultaneously as the agent achieves its
own telos. In other words, all created realities attain God (their primary end), by
achieving a likeness to the Divine Substance which is appropriate to its own nature (their
secondary end).415 On reflection, this makes perfect sense: anything can only have
act/being, inasmuch as it imitates, reflects or participates in Pure Act/Being itself.416 ‘This
ordering towards God as end can be analysed in terms of the resemblance to God that
depends, at bottom, on the doctrine of participation of being.’417 It is impossible for it to
be any other way. In as much as things display attributes which are opposite to that of
Being, it is rather non-being they are participating in, otherwise known as nothingness.418
Therefore in as much as a thing fails to participate in the divine likeness it is nothing.
Created things imitate God by three main avenues: by ‘naturally desiring to be’419,
as mover or causer of another420 (e.g., causing beings in their own likeness) and as
achieving its end.421 This means that all acts, whether it be a rock sitting on the floor, a
single-cell life replicating or a human being writing (or reading) a thesis, all are imitating
(analogously) the divine act to some degree. This is necessarily the case because, as
mentioned above, in as much their activity fails to participate/imitate the divine act, it has
no act and therefore no being. Since there is then such an intimate link between a things
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own telos and its divine likeness, insofar as all things intend their own good, they also
intend the divine likeness as their ultimate end.422
However, as is obvious by the examples of a rock, single-cell organism and thesis
writing, not all things participate to an equal extent in Being.423 For example, something
which is living (a single-cell organism) participates more fully than something which
simply exists (a rock). Something which has intellectual faculties (a human being)
participates more fully than something with sensitive faculties only (an ant). The reason
one participates more than the other is that one has all the likenesses to divine being as
the other, plus an extra capacity to grasp reality.424 The difference of level on the ladder
then is defined by a thing’s essence, which is particularly manifested through their esse.
Beings are more closely united with God to the extent they attain to His very substance in
some manner.425
One can combine these various aspects of Final Cause and Being so that it could
be said, ‘since the end corresponds to the beginning… the last end is the beginning of
being, in Whom every perfection of being is: Whose likeness, according to their
proportion’ all things desire.’426 All the perfections of being are found in Being itself,
which is finite reality’s efficient and final cause.427 So then the question about man’s
happiness, or achievement of his ultimate end, then becomes a question of how can he
most perfectly imitate Perfect Being according to his nature.428 At the risk of it sounding
like a cliché: how can man be all that he can be?
Since intellectual activity is that which is proper to man who is an intellectual
animal, his participation in Being and his imitation of the Divine Act occurs most fully in
his acts of understanding. These are his highest operation since in contemplating truth,
man has something in common with greater substances than him, whereas in his other
activities he has something in common with lower animals.429 ‘Intelligent creatures must
attain their end in a manner peculiar to them, that is, by the operation proper to them as
422
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intelligent creatures. They must know it. It is immediately evident, then, that the last end
of an intelligent creature is to know God.’430 This is further highlighted by the nature of
the Divine Intellect, which has Itself as It’s object of contemplation. Therefore when man
contemplates God, he in fact is carrying out the same activity which God Himself does.
That being said, it is impossible for the activity of any created being to resemble God
further than by contemplating God Himself, since He understands all things in the act of
understanding Himself.431 Both God and man will share the object of their speculative
intellect – the Divine Essence Itself.432
Sertillanges sums up all three approaches to mans happiness when he says, ‘The
surest metaphysic tells us that at the summit of things, the true and the good are not only
connected, but are identical… (All) ends are related. They all depend on one ultimate end.
It is this ultimate end which links up with the true and is one with it.’433

Fulfilling the Criteria of Happiness
It remains then, to demonstrate how the Beatific Vision can fulfil the formal
criteria for perfect happiness outlined in Chapter one. Since many of these points have
been addressed already, the following will simply highlight or remind the reader of key
points pertaining to each criteria.
The Beatific Vision Is Fulfilment Of All Desire
The first criteria of happiness outlined the need for the fulfilment of all desire. The
knowledge which the perfectly happy have, is a ‘knowledge of God which, when
acquired, leaves no knowledge of a knowable object to be desired.’434 How is this
possible? How can one know all things, by knowing One Thing?
One can immediately begin to see that Thomas is talking of a knowledge, vision
or awareness which is unlike our day to day experience.435 It is a perfect, uninterrupted
actualising of the intellect which leaves no room for potential and is therefore the perfect
430
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fulfilment of the intellectual appetite. To try and comprehend the magnificence of this act,
one must once again visit the nature of our current limitations, and contrast this with
seeing the Divine Essence.436 Firstly, the intellect is in potency to all intelligible objects –
it can know anything which is knowable. Secondly, two intelligible objects can exist
simultaneously in the possible intellect – in other words, since we have accumulated
knowledge about a number of things in our lives, we can have knowledge of more than
one thing. Thirdly, and this is the key point, we cannot consider two separate intelligible
objects at the same time - it is not possible for me to consciously concentrate on more
than one thing at a time. ‘Our intellect cannot be actually informed by many diverse ideas
at the same time, so as to understand them; as one body cannot bear different shapes
simultaneously.’437 I must constantly select aspects to focus on from amongst my current
knowledge, visual view or ideas. This means that in practice, I am always potentially
thinking about something else. In fact, it is necessary for me to change the object of my
thoughts quite frequently, since I do not perfectly grasp that which may be the unity of all
these intelligible species. Therefore it seems that in my day to day workings, it is
impossible for me to achieve perfect operation (complete actualising) of the intellect.
This poses an unacceptable problem for Aquinas. The fifth criteria for happiness
demanded that it be a perfect operation, free from all defect, leaving nothing to desire. To
achieve happiness, the ultimate end, the entire potential of the intellect must be reduced to
act at one time.438 This means that a) the intellect completely fulfils its capacity to know,
and b) considers all of these intelligible species in one single conscious act. How is this
possible? Through the single act of understanding that which unifies and causes all of
created, conditional, finite reality. To understand this Reality, is to understand all reality.
Since God is the First Cause and Principal of created being, He is that which both unifies
and makes intelligible created being. ‘The ultimate completion of human perfection is in
understanding the most perfect intelligible, which is the divine essence.’439
By beholding the perfect unity of the Uncreated, all the diversity of created reality
is known simultaneously.440 ‘With St Gregory, Thomas asks what would not be seen by
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those who see God?’441 In this perfect state of happiness, man’s mind will be united to
God by one, continual, everlasting act of contemplation.442 ‘Through the vision of the
First Truth, all that the intellect naturally desires to know becomes known to it.’443 Perfect
happiness then, which is to realise the ultimate truth, goodness and beauty of ultimate
reality, is then the fulfilment of all desires which a person can have.
The Beatific Vision is Self-Sufficient
The Beatific Vision is able to meet the second criteria of happiness, that of selfsufficiency. This criteria demanded the ultimate good not be deficient in any particular
good, and secondly, that if it is the only thing had, it would still make life free from want.
The act of attaining the Divine Essence satisfies both of these aspects. ‘As an additional
part is not greater than the whole since the part itself is included in the whole, so too any
good added whatsoever to God does not increase His Goodness because the addition is
good only by participating in the divine goodness.’444 Denis Bradley explains how
Thomas’ metaphysics,
surmounts, in advance as it were, the contemporary exegetical dilemma about
Aristotelian man’s ultimate end, whether it should be regarded as exclusive or inclusive
of all other goods. The latter question cannot be sustained against the back of Aquinas’
doctrine of participation. God, in the Thomistic metaphysical context, is an inclusive
good.445
By this single act and ‘object’, which is the source and form of all that is good, all
that a person could ever desire or imagine is fulfilled. ‘None of the Blessed lacks any
desirable good’ since in this vision of the divine substance, he experiences the full
sufficiency and accumulation of all goods.446 All goods not simply that they personally
could want or imagine, but that are possible, since they are united to the Source of all
goodness.’447
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The perfection of this happiness can be further appreciated by revisiting those
least of the non-ultimate goods – external goods. It can be demonstrated that those who
have perfect happiness have in fact obtained all of these.448 The good of honour is
completely fulfilled through union with God who is the highest, most honourable object.
Since honour is received from outside the person, receiving it from other creatures made
it vulnerable to error or corruption. However honour from God and the Saints, who
cannot be mistaken or corrupted, is the greatest and most worthy to receive.449 The desire
for fame and glory is fulfilled, since the blessed are both known and know all others
perfectly.450 This is because their knowledge of the other goes beyond the limitations of
the senses which man otherwise encounters. This is only possible because each sees the
other through the eyes of God so that rather than their knowledge being directly caused by
the object or person in question, they receive it through God whose knowledge is in fact
‘the cause of the things known.’451 Therefore each person is known more intimately by all
than even the most perfect marital relationships.
The desire for wealth is utterly fulfilled as there ‘is a plenitude of all goods,
inasmuch as the blessed come to enjoy Him Who contains the perfection of all things.452
Material wealth, which is nothing but a means to purchasing other goods like sustenance
and security, is made utterly void as all of these things are inexhaustibly already present.
External and bodily goods, which are normally the direct objects of one’s spending are
nowise necessary for perfect happiness, which consists in seeing God ‘either in the soul
separated from the body, or in the soul united to the body then no longer animal but
spiritual.’453 To have a ‘spiritual body’ does not mean that it is non-physical, but rather
that it is perfectly formed and acted upon by of the soul.454
One has to keep in mind though, it is not having these non-ultimate goods which
makes happiness perfect. All of these things are appealing (and ought to be), but without
the Beatific Vision, it is easy to imagine that after millennia has gone by, one would begin
to wonder what else is there, or what is the point of it all? It is because one knows the
answer to that question, that even non-ultimate goods such as the ones mentioned, which
448
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have an inherently limited desirability, can remain eternally intelligibly desirable.
Without this, the wonder which is the beginning of philosophy would once again rear its
head.455
The Beatific Vision Is An Entire Rule O f Life
Contemplation of the Divine Essence meets the third criteria since it can be
provide an entire rule of life. To demonstrate the truth of this is obviously beyond the
scope of this work whose focus is the nature of happiness, but nevertheless it demands
some attention.456
‘All other human operations seem to be ordered to this one as to an end.’457 To
expand and deepen one’s participation of being, through the apprehension of its truth,
goodness and beauty, is the principal and end of all truly human activities. It is this
ultimate and final activity which is the very source of all moral rights, and the goal of all
virtues which a human sets out to acquire. ‘Everything depends upon the Supreme Value
in accordance with which all these rights will be ordered and will mutually limit each
other.’458
By once again dividing up happiness into its act and object components, one is
provided with two pillars of morality which should always be pursued and never attacked
or neglected, regardless of circumstances. The first of these is that one should always
adhere to reason, and never act unreasonably. One can never act unreasonably, since it is
the rule of all human acts, and it is a summit of the intellectual act, contemplation, which
all of man is ordered towards. The second is that one should always pursue God, and
never attack or neglect what one understands attainment of Him to consist in. This is the
rule of charity. One should always love oneself, one’s neighbour and God in all his
actions. This is because the love of being, both the created and Uncreated kind, is what
man’s happiness consists in. ‘Wherefore every human act is good which attains reason or
God Himself.’459 Pope Benedict XVI echoes Thomas’ thought well when he states, ‘That
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which is prior to us and constitutes us – subsistent Love and Truth – shows us what
goodness is, and in what our true happiness consists. It shows us the road to true
development.’460
Yet even though a person knows that happiness consists in contemplation of
universal Truth and Goodness Himself, this does not absolve the need for prudence, but
rather highlights it. Since man’s first mover, the intellect, has a universal end and
accompanying desire, there is a complexity to everyday human choices and acts. In the
body, man’s ‘intention is always directed to some particular good, if action is to result, for
universals cause no movement, but particular things do since action goes on in their
area.’461 In other words, since all actions are of a particular kind, a universal desire in
abstract apart from any context, does not cause any action. One can liken it to giving
someone a master key when there are no locks in existence. Although it falls short like all
analogies, this example highlights that for man, a universal desire/capacity (or a master
key), is of no use and is unintelligible apart from particular goods to be attained (or
particular locks to be unlocked). Therefore, because human actions always happen in the
realm of particulars (since they need an object, intention and circumstances), they require
prudence to choose amongst the particular goods brought to ones attention at any one
time.
In this regard then the Beatific Vision can meet the third criteria of happiness, act
as an entire rule of life, since it is able to both make intelligible and order all pursuit of
non-ultimate goods. Since happiness consists in the apprehension of the goodness of
being, each human act should reflect the desire to become what we are not, to attain ‘the
being that we do not yet have.’462 Each act should seek to enlarge one’s own, or another’s,
capacity for experiencing goodness which they do not yet have.463 All of man’s natural
inclinations and the objects of his particular acts, should be acted on is as much as they
refer to the human person, in his unified totality, and his ultimate end as a human
being.464 In contrast then to some moral theories discussed in the Introduction, ‘the only
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obligation that the ethics of Thomism knows for man is that he be wholly a man, for by
that fact he is sure that he is what God wishes him to be.’465
The Beatific Vision Is Desired For Its Own Sake Alone
From the perspective of the acting person, the Beatific Vision meets the fourth
criteria in that it cannot be ordered to anything else. Since ‘we do not find any action in
human affairs, except speculative thought, that is not directed to some other end,’ it is
impossible that contemplation of the highest object be a mean.466 Even though
apprehending the goodness of Reality has its associated benefits, for example, delight and
good practical activity, it is not sought for these things, but primarily for its own sake.467
From the perspective of the object attained, ‘God who is goodness itself, is the
only object that can exhaust the formality under which we desire and act.’468 For this very
reason, Thomas can say that perfect happiness is so perfect, it is impossible to turn away
from it once attained.469 How can the person who has attained the ultimate end of all
being, the universal true and good, possibly order it to something else? There is no true or
good thing apart from it to order it towards. Since then, there can be nothing desirable
outside of the apprehension of the Ultimate Good itself, it cannot be neither logically or
ontologically regarded as a means.
For those who have the Beatific Vision, they are unable to turn away from it since
freedom is perfectly fulfilled in the attainment of the Perfect Good. Yet for those who
treat it as a means to something else, they may be sure of not attaining it in the first place,
since that which they would consider it ordered towards is mistakenly thought to be the
ultimate good.
The Beatific Vision Is Without Defect
It has already been discussed above how both the act and object of the Beatific
Vision are free from all defect and evil. Yet one aspect which is still to be revisited is the
fear of loss which was prominent in Augustine’s thought. ‘The Divine power… raises
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man to the participation of eternity which transcends all change.’470 In this case the
person rests in the utter comfort and peace that his happiness cannot be lost.
The person completely rests in the perfection he has attained knowing that God
would not take it away from him and it cannot be taken from him by another agent.471
Since the person has attained the Final Cause of all contingent reality, the very reason
God brought and sustains them in existence, it is impossible that God, who wills the good
of His creature, would take the Beatific Vision from the perfectly happy. There is also no
fear of loss due to the actions of a third party, since it is not within their power to affect
this perfect union of truth and love. Finally, the person does not suffer from that defect of
the intellectual appetite called temptation, since knowing he has attained the ultimate
good, he cannot even imagine a reason to turn away.
The Beatific Vision Is Man’s Perfect Operation
Contemplation of the Divine Essence meets the sixth criteria of perfect operation
of man. In regards to it be the full actualisation of man’s proper capacities, this has been
explained above in dealing with the first criteria. Yet it also meets another aspect of the
criteria since it is the only operation proper to man which he doesn’t share with the
animals.472 The act of understanding is that which is unique and proper to intellectual
animals: ‘Since the supreme, proper operation of man is to know, it is necessary to assign
human beatitude to this operation when it will be perfect.’473 Since the moral virtues are
ordered by and toward the intellectual virtues, and since science and wisdom are ordered
toward understanding or contemplation, this criteria is perfectly fulfilled.
The Beatific Vision Is Suitable To All Men
Thomas’ understanding of happiness satisfies the seventh criteria of being
achievable and suitable to all men. No member of the human species is a priori ruled out
from attaining the Beatific Vision. In an unparalleled and most radical way it is available
to all. Regardless of ones the material wealth, social status, bodily beauty or strength,
physical or mental handicap which one is born into, this perfection is possible. The reason
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that this is so, is the very same reason many find it to be an impossibility – it ultimately
depends on God’s gratuitous action rather than one of human performance. In strictly
natural terms, it is no more possible for a Padre Pio or Einstein to make or earn the
Beatific Vision than it is for a Nero or young boy with Downs Syndrome. It necessarily
depends on the gracious divine act of sustaining a contingent creature in being, as well as
uniting Himself to it in such a way as to allow it to participate in His Inner Life.
However, this need not be understood as implying that earthly character and
actions have no bearing on whether or not perfect happiness in attained. This will be the
point of discussion in the next chapter, ‘Imperfect Happiness.’

Conclusion
It has been demonstrated in this chapter that what materially constitutes happiness
is the Beatific Vision. That perfect act of contemplation in which the person beholds the
essence of Perfect Being. It was first approached by showing that contemplation is mans
ultimate act – that which is proper to him as rational animal, and that which is not ordered
to anything else. The second stage was to then show that the highest object of
contemplation is the First Truth Himself, who by contemplating man definitively comes
to know the truth, goodness and beauty of being. The final approach was via metaphysics
in which each being attempts to imitate or participate in Perfect Being, by perfecting the
operation appropriate to its essence. The activity of contemplation or understanding the
Divine Essence is both that which is proper to man, and most like the activity of God
which is possible for a creature. The second half of the chapter consisted in revisiting the
formal criteria of happiness as drawn from Aquinas’ work. It was shown that the Beatific
Vision can provide the unique and perfective situation demanded by the universal appetite
of man in all its splendour.
It remains however to be discussed how Thomas understands the everyday life of
man to relate to perfect happiness. Is it possible in this life? If it is not, does one merely
wait to be happy, or is there a kind of sub-perfect happiness appropriate to earthly life? If
so, what does he understand that to consist in? These will be the key questions addressed
in the next chapter.
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Imperfect Happiness
In the first chapter, it was demonstrated that St. Thomas Aquinas sets the highest
possible bar in defining the formal nature of happiness. He spares nothing when analysing
the depths of human desire and the depths of being, both created and Uncreated. It was
then discussed in the previous chapter that he sees this criteria of happiness instantiated in
nothing other than the Beatific Vision – that perfect act of contemplating the Divine
Essence.
Yet what is now to be discussed is the ‘flipside’ of that coin. The Beatific Vision
seems for most people to be far away; not just into the future, but also from their day to
day activities. It belongs to this chapter now to discuss how exactly Thomas sees perfect
happiness relating to the everyday life of the human person. Is it possible to attain in this
life? If not, how can we call someone happy in this life? Is it a true happiness people
seem to glimpse, or only an illusion? Finally, if it is so far from man’s natural capacities,
how can it be called the ultimate end of human nature? The questions will be addressed in
that order.

Perfect Happiness Is Not Possible In This Life
It was demonstrated in chapter two that all the particular goods encountered in this
life cannot satisfy a universal appetite. This is not simply a quantitative judgment, but
also a qualitative one. A person can have unlimited food, drink, money and all finite
goods, yet still experience a yearning in the intellectual appetite. Man’s blessing is
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potentially his greatest curse – that is, the good to which he is open (as an object of his
intellect and will) is infinite. ‘In other words, our understanding and desire are quite
literally without limits, never ending, in-finite… we always desire more even though we
have attained what we previously desired.’474 The one way to escape this apparently
useless search for happiness was for man, through a particular act, to attain a universal
object. It was found that this particular act is that of contemplation, and the universal
good is God. Since the object of man’s will is the universal good, nothing is able to
entirely put his will to rest apart from the universal good.475
Yet by man’s natural principles, he has an inherent limitation in acquiring
knowledge of God since ‘the human mind does not go beyond the type of knowledge that
is derived from sensible things… so throughout this life God can be known in no higher
way than that whereby a cause is known through it’s effect.’476 Since ‘the mode of
knowledge follows the mode of the nature of the knower’, all knowledge for man begins
in the senses, and from these sensible objects, phantasms (or images) are used by the
mind to extract ideas.477 Without being able to form these images, it is impossible for man
to begin to contemplate something.478
Thomas however held that humanity would not be forever bound to this
epistemological limitation. In keeping with what he believed to be consistent with
Revelation and Aristotelian principles, he explains that ‘when the soul will have been
separated from this body, the possible intellect will be able to understand things that are
intelligible in themselves.’479 It was strictly only in this extra-sensory way that the mind
could see the Divine Substance, and Thomas foresaw only two avenues for this occurring
- ‘death or by ecstasy.’480 Aquinas concludes therefore that, according to the criteria
mentioned in Chapter One, ‘perfect happiness cannot be had in this life.’481
Since perfect apprehension of the truth, goodness and beauty of Perfect Being
cannot be attained, fulfilment of all our desires cannot occur in this life ‘since the more a
474
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person understands, the more is the desire to understand increased in him.’482 It must be
reinforced that this is not due to merely coincidental, accidental or moral circumstances of
any ones life, but rather essential to the current human condition.
Even the act of contemplation, mans highest operation which most resembles
perfect happiness, can neither be carried out continually or uninterrupted and must always
start anew.483 Not only that, but also it constantly remains under risk due to other
involuntary factors such as forgetfulness or the vast array of decaying mental illnesses. It
is subject to voluntary factors such as for those burdened by hard manual labour in order
to put bread on the table. The consumerist and materialist attitude droned into many
young people has them prepared for decades of work where they do not expect to find any
intrinsic reward for their time and effort. Many would say their pay is the single biggest
motivation for their activities. Eventually one has worked for so long and so hard, that he
does not know what he would do even if he had more leisure time. In this case, his work
then morphs to become the solution to the very problem it caused in the first place – lack
of reflection. It becomes a distraction from having to face deeper existential issues about
happiness and success ‘on the outside.’484 This will become a particular problem as the
‘iGeneration’ continue through life: the constant availability of smart phones and other
mobile devices presents the possibility of such a continuous stream of mindless games,
music and video clips, that one may never have to reflect on the internal and external
challenges confronting them.
Another reason perfect happiness cannot be attained in this life is that the
conversion to vice from virtue, ‘in whose act that happiness principally consists,’ is
always a constant possibility.485 The possibility of sin always remains in this life since we
have only an imperfect knowledge of God, the Ultimate Good, and ‘even when we
recognise that God is indeed the fulfilment of all our desires, we can nonetheless treat
Him as one good among others and prefer lesser goods to Him.’486 To consciously or
subconsciously make a non-ultimate good the end of one’s life is a constant temptation
482
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through the decades of earthly life. As one’s circumstances change, the vices of envy,
wrath, avarice or pride can easily slip in so slowly over time that the person can be almost
unaware of his changed character.
Even if one does not fall into vice, the loss of external goods and other factors,
such as friendships, can hinder his virtuous operations. Aquinas emphatically rejects the
Stoic view that the virtuous man ought not to be saddened by the loss of external
goods.487 Even though in these cases ‘there still remains an act of virtue, whereby man
bears these trials in a praiseworthy manner,’ this is very far from happiness as fulfilment
of all desire.488 That being said, to reach a stage in one’s character where one can sustain
significant loss of external goods and loved ones is unlikely until a long time has elapsed
– a length of time which many do not even live to learn these lessons.489 Many people do
not even live to become middle aged, and even those who do may not have had the
formation to be able to face evil in such a way.
In summary, there are many corporeal and intellectual evils to contend with in this
life. Corporeal deficiencies such as hunger, sleep, weather, and intellectual deficiencies
such as unruly passions, mistakes in calculations, ignorance and uncertainty, all provide
involuntary or voluntary opportunities for misery. ‘As long as we are journeying in exile
over this earth, our peace and happiness will be imperfect. For such peace is not
completely untroubled and serene; it is active, not calm and motionless. In short, this is a
peace that is ever at war.’490 ‘For the edge of that longing for happiness… is whetted even
more and more by the experience of deceitfulness of earthly goods, by the unjust violence
of wicked men, and by all those other afflictions to which mind and body are subject.’491
Thus in the present state of life, perfect happiness cannot be attained by man.’492
Yet even if man is fortunate enough to have a good lot in this life, regarding
nearly all the things he holds dear he must ‘be troubled with the fear of losing it, or with
the sorrow of knowing that he will lose it.’493 In the very end at least, even if a person
were to have all manners of worldly security, ‘man naturally shrinks from death, and is
487
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sorrowful at its prospect.’494 In a society in which the enduring, necessary and ultimate
good is neglected, one can only expect to eventually see the apparent irrationality or
absurdity of life mindlessly embraced. The common phrase among the youth, ‘YOLO’
(You Only Live Once), is one of growing popularity. Although the phrase could be taken
to imply one needs to be extremely careful and conservative with his life, it is often used
to justify irrational or risk-taking behaviour. In one sense it can be described as nihilism
in a popular form for the non-academic.
Bradley explains that Aquinas has led us to ‘a disturbing philosophical
conclusion: since perfect human happiness must be uninterrupted and unchanging, it
cannot be found in this world.’495 That is, it requires an activity, contemplation of the
Divine Essence, which is impossible in this life. Does this mean that we should refer to all
men as miserable in this life? Should this life be described as nothing other than a waiting
period for the believer, and as something even worse for the non-believer? Schopenhauer,
describing man, says:
the object of his desires continually delude, waver, and fall, and accordingly bring
more misery than joy, till at last the whole foundation upon which they all stand gives
way, in that his life itself is destroyed and so he receives the last proof that all his
striving and wishing was a perversity… Our existence is most happy when we
perceive it least, from which it follows that it would be better not to have it.496
Yet Thomas does not agree with this extreme conclusion for many reasons.
Relevant for the work at hand is that although he ‘judges the happiness of this life to be
imperfect… it is happiness in no merely equivocal sense.’497 ‘Our happiness in this world
is real… because, like the perfect happiness of heaven, it comes from sharing the in the
love and goodness of God.’498 It remains to be demonstrated how this is so.
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Degrees of Imperfect Happiness
Aquinas definitively rejects that no happiness can be had in this life, because a
real participation in this perfect happiness is still possible.499 ‘We do not deny… that
some participation of beatitude in this life is possible, primarily, insofar as man is perfect
in the goods of speculative reason and, secondarily, in (the goods of) practical reason.’500
Aquinas interpreted Aristotle to be predominantly dealing (although probably
unwittingly) with imperfect happiness in his discussions on happiness.501 Why is Aristotle
not referring to perfect happiness? Although reason alone can arrive at the formal criteria
of happiness in Chapter One, Thomas believes that to know the possibility of
contemplating the divine essence in eternity requires Revelation, hence it was something
which his beloved predecessor was unaware of.502 Since Revelation provides the ultimate
context for understanding perfect happiness, it also allows one to review in a new way the
concept of imperfect happiness. Thomas’ understanding of the Eternal Law provides the
best hermeneutic key to do this.
‘The rule of human actions is the human reason and the eternal law.’503 ‘The
eternal law is nothing else that the type of Divine Wisdom, as directing all actions and
movements.’504 It can be described as the ‘blue-print’ of creation in which through God’s
providence, all things are ordered to their proper end.505 In the particular case of
humanity, it has already been demonstrated that his ultimate end is perfect happiness
realised in the beatific vision.506 Since the eternal law is nothing other than the Divine
Wisdom, it is nothing other than the Divine Essence Itself, as God is perfectly simple.507
Therefore, to know the Eternal Law perfectly would be to see God in His essence, which
is the very definition of perfect happiness.508 For earthly man then, to the extent that he
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participates in this life in the eternal law, is the extent to which he can be described as
happy.509
‘There are two ways in which a thing is subject to the eternal law… first, by
partaking of the eternal law by way of knowledge; secondly, by way of act and passion,
i.e., by partaking of the eternal law by way of an inward motive principle: and in this
second way, irrational creatures are subject to the eternal law.’510 In other words, all
creatures act out or achieve the eternal law by rational and/or natural participation. Due to
man’s rational nature, he participates in both ways – as a cognitive self-mover and as a
being governed and moved by God. Blessed Pope John Paul II explains that ‘God’s
wisdom is providence, a love which cares… cares for man not “from without”, through
the laws of physical nature, but “from within”, through reason, which by its natural
knowledge of God’s eternal law, is… able to manifest to him the requirements and the
promptings of eternal wisdom.’511 ‘As a created instrument… reason participates in the
Eternal Law and… has God as its efficient cause and… its exemplar and final cause.’512
To the extent then that man perfects his rational nature through the apprehension of truth
(i.e., the intellectual virtues) and his appetitive nature (i.e., the moral virtues), he can be
described as imperfectly happy. This then will provide the framework for Thomas’
imperfect happiness.
Aquinas sees four modes of participation in the eternal law, each with ascending
degrees of happiness. These four modes can be divided into the three categories of nature,
grace and glory.513 St John of the Cross sums up the three categories when he says, ‘since
He both gives the soul natural being through his essential presence and perfects her
through His presence by grace, she begs him to glorify her also with his manifest
glory.’514 Since the final stage of glory refers to man’s perfect happiness, we need only
concern ourselves in this section with the imperfect degrees of happiness.515 The three
degrees of imperfection can be described as ‘that of the wicked whose natural inclinations
are corrupted, that of the good who act according to their natural inclinations, and that of
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the good who act according to supernatural inclinations.’516 Since man’s happiness lies in
his most perfect operation in regards to the most perfect object, each of these stages can
also be seen as greater levels of virtue.

Lowest Level of Imperfect Happiness: Any Satisfaction Of The Will
This is the very lowest degree of imperfect happiness, since ‘this kind of
happiness, unlike the others, can include not only limited and imperfect but downright
false kinds of happiness.’517 In this regard, one might hesitate to apply the term happiness
at all. However, these people still participate, although in the most imperfect degree, in
the eternal law, since they still have synderesis, the very first principles of speculative and
practical reason.518 This most basic orientation toward truth and goodness in the natural
order is still the work of God.519 In this case however, the eternal law is ultimately to their
frustration, since they are working against achieving their ultimate end, which God is
trying to bring them to.
Yet this first category is significant since it emphasises the most basic degree of
goodness which all beings attain - the very act of existing itself. Thomas describes this as
the first perfection of all beings, since in it is their most basic and foundational
participation in the Being of God.520 All further perfections, including virtue and grace,
will be in addition to this initial substantial act and therefore described as accidental
perfections.521
The virtue displayed at this level is ‘imperfect in every respect’ since it is not
accompanied by prudence or right reason.522 It is described as natural virtue since it is
simply the involuntary inclinations which people have from either hereditary or nurture,
and varies from individual to individual.523 For example a person may seem ‘naturally’
courageous or temperate, although this is only a psychological or physiological
disposition of his since it lacks right practical reason. When the person exercises this
natural ‘talent’ he still gains some sense of achievement. However over the life of the
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same individual, since his base character lacks the stability and firmness necessary, his
inconsistencies are eventually exposed. Although he seems to be naturally able and gifted
(and possibly is), ‘his sensitive and rational appetites push in opposite directions, thus
causing the same disharmony in the soul that is present in the incontinent or weakwilled.’524
Even at this lowest level of imperfect happiness, Thomas holds that ‘there is a
common and confused knowledge of God which is found practically in all men; this is
due… to the fact… man can immediately reach some sort of knowledge of God by
natural reason’, but this is not the knowledge of God in which happiness consists in.525
The kind of knowledge he is referring to as universal and almost independent of one’s
character is that of some kind of Creator or Orderer, since it is obvious to all that ‘things
in nature run according to a definite order.’526 This level of knowledge contains many
defects since some people hold the Creator/Orderer to be multiple gods, material,
impersonal or even evil. Hence it is possible for such erroneous conceptions to lead to
atheism in some. In contrast, the knowledge which happiness consists in must be that of
God’s actual qualities.527 Therefore knowing no more of God than that He is, does not
perfect the intellect since there still remains the natural desire to know more about God.528

Second Level of Imperfect Happiness: That Which Is Proportionate To
Natural Powers
The next degree of imperfect happiness, and one which truly deserves the name
(as opposed to the lowest degree), is when man exercises and perfects his natural powers
through the acquired virtues.529 Since the reason is that which is proper to man, man
distinguishes good from evil ‘above all thanks to the light of natural reason… which
inclines them towards their right action and end… (and) is none other than the eternal
reason of the Creator and Ruler of the Universe.’530 For Thomas, ‘the light of natural
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reason itself is a participation of the divine light.’531 Therefore the need for right reason in
both speculative and practical matters, ‘is not an empty formula or an end in itself, since
its ethical character rests on the fact that reason is ordered to God: it is the means by
which man orders his acts, and therefore himself, to God.’532
This degree of participation in the eternal law is through the natural faculties and
inclinations, guided and perfected by the natural law and acquired virtues. ‘These virtues
are perfect in a respect: in relation to the human good… but not absolutely speaking,
since they do not attain the first standard that is our ultimate end.’533 In this respect once
again, one sees that Aquinas holds Aristotle’s works to be dealing with imperfect, but
nonetheless true, happiness. Yet since man cannot attain God simply by the natural
virtues, they are described as not absolutely perfect.534 Nevertheless, it should not be
assumed that since this involves man’s natural capacities, it is a level of happiness all men
achieve: ‘Being fully virtuous does seem to be an ideal that we aspire towards but can
never achieve.’535 Ralph McInerny warns that since human nature has ‘fallen’, man’s:
ability to achieve his natural end is also affected, with respect to his knowledge of it
and, far more, with respect to his appetitive orientation to it... Just as there are certainly
naturally knowable truths concerning God that we are nonetheless unlikely to achieve,
so there is an imperfect happiness possible of attainment in this life but one
nevertheless that few men are likely to attain.536
In both the intellectual and moral realm of human capacity, not many perfect or
actualise completely their own powers. Since the virtues can be broken up into the
intellectual and moral, with the moral being ordered by and to the intellectual, it is wise to
begin by analysing the intellectual.
Intellectual Virtue & Imperfect Natural Happiness
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The most similar thing in this life to ultimate beatitude is the lifestyle of those
who explicitly spend their time in contemplation of truth, otherwise known as the
contemplative life.537 Thomas gives three reasons as to why this is so:
First, because it is about incorruptible and unchangeable things; secondly, because it
has no contrary, for there is nothing contrary to the pleasure of contemplation... (also)
it is continuous both because it is competent to us in respect of the incorruptible part of
the soul, namely the intellect, wherefore it can endure after this life, - and (thirdly)
because… we work not with our bodies so that we are more able to persevere in the
works thereof.538
In his first reason, Thomas explains that true contemplation does not regard
temporary things. Since then it is not concerned with that which decays with time, one
can draw the conclusion that time in contemplation is never time ‘wasted’ as
circumstances change or develop. One cannot regret time dedicated to understanding the
truth, goodness and beauty of being. Tying in with this is the second reason, that
contemplation of truth is the very same activity which ‘reaches its climax in the future;
whereas the active and civic life does not go beyond the limits of this life.’539 Time spent
participating in the eternal, can never be defective.540 Also, as opposed to goods of the
sensitive appetite, there is no accompanying pain which comes from a lack of
contemplation. If in a given circumstance, a person is unable to explicitly engage in
contemplation, then there is no pain as a result.
Finally, because contemplation itself requires only a minimum (or zero) bodily
functioning, it is not something which necessarily deteriorates with age. As a person gets
older, the depth or agility of his mind may be affected, yet he is never completely
disabled from some apprehension of reality. In fact, we often see that due to increased life
experience and reflection, often age is a great contributor to wisdom.541 In that case,
contemplation is an activity which, for one who is so inclined, can be expected to
gradually increase as life goes on, with an accompanying increase in happiness. Since the
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activity of contemplation is so rooted in the goodness of being itself, it is never able to be
utterly negated. As will be analysed further below, ‘contemplation does not ignore the
“historical Gethsemane,” does not ignore the mystery of evil.’542 Even in the most trying
circumstances, when one is confronted with loss of other bodily or external goods, one is
able to, if his grasp of reality is true and deep enough, to transcend the otherwise
devastating effects of evil.
In contemplation, man is ‘most self-sufficient, since he needs fewer things for that
purpose.’543 This is demonstrated by the endless line of philosophers and theologians
through history, all with varying amounts of external goods (including computers), who
were nonetheless able to wonder and contemplate the goodness of being. In many cases
these thinkers went on to provide reflections which would still be used millennia later.
‘How many experiences life offers us everyday! We let them pass, but a deep thinker
gathers them up and makes his treasure of them; they will gradually fill out the
framework of his thought.’544 Truth is in fact everywhere, revealing itself to us as we
encounter new experiences, exposing the depth and grandeur of being, regardless of the
external goods in our possession.
Yet, as seen in Chapter Three, contemplation of all objects is not equal - the
greater the truths or objects which the intellect is able to contemplate in this life, the
greater they participate in perfect happiness. A further distinction can be made since it is
not only the object which determines the level of happiness, but also the degree to which
the object is grasped by the individual. When the act of contemplation, intellectus, is
distinguished from other discursive modes of thinking, ratio, the more the intellect ‘sees’
the truth, the more it participates in perfect beatitude. In other words, just as there is an
act-object distinction in perfect happiness, so there is for imperfect happiness.
Thomas describes six ascending steps of contemplation, each which gradually
involves a greater act or object than the previous:545
a) Mere consideration of sensible objects
b) Going from sensible to intelligible objects
c) To judge of sensible objects according to intelligible things
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d) The absolute consideration of the intelligible objects attained from sensible
objects
e) The contemplation of those intelligible objects that are unattainable by means of
sensibles, but which reason is able to grasp
f) The consideration of such intelligible things as the reason can neither discover nor
grasp, which pertains to the sublime contemplation of divine truth (Properly part
of the next level of happiness: imperfect supernatural happiness)
Each subsequent step in the ladder sees a progression from what is more sensible
to what is more intelligible and therefore closer to the First Cause and Principal, until one
eventually arrives at contemplation of truths unobtainable without Revelation. Even
though ‘God alone is truth by His Essence, and contemplation of Him makes man
perfectly happy, there is no reason why we should not admit a certain imperfect
happiness… in the consideration of speculative science.’546 This participation in
happiness through contemplation of created realities ultimately hinges on the analogy of
being, a key metaphysical teaching in Thomas’ corpus: ‘Since all beings participate in
truth and goodness to the extent they have esse, all beings can bring happiness to humans
to the extent the intellect knows them and the will delights in them.’547 Since there is a
likeness between created and Uncreated Being, even by apprehending and loving these
most base realities, one is also getting the most minimal taste of true happiness.
Therefore another distinction could be made within the category of those who
contemplate created truths. This distinction would be between those who have fostered
the intellectual virtue of science, but not the greater virtue of wisdom. For example, take
two biologists, Albert and Richard, both studying the same data, in this case, the societal
habits of ants. Albert, on seeing the activity and efficiency of the ants, links his
discoveries with the Author of life, and marvels at the capacity of the Author to instil in
non-intelligent natures the pursuit of intelligible ends. He experiences a greater delight
due to his more perfect wisdom. However, his fellow scientist, Richard, although working
with same data, fails to make the link to First Causes and Principals, and therefore his
intellectual operation is less perfect than Alberts, although he still achieves some degree
of imperfect happiness.

546
547

ST I-II, Q3, A7.
Rziha, Perfecting Human Actions, 95.

108

The difficulty experienced in trying to understand divine things is not that they are
unintelligible, but rather too intelligible for us. For example, is one was to contemplate
the question, ‘What is love,’ his mind may be able to immediately conjure up examples of
previous experiences he has had. Yet these are just that – merely examples, not the
definition or essence of love. So the person begins to pursue what each of these
experiences has in common, transcending the merely physical components of his own
best friend’s hand or his spouse’s lips. He has begun to pursue the intelligible species of
love. The tonnes of ink which has been spilled to answer this question is not because love
is unintelligible, but rather it is inexhaustibly intelligible. However, humanity is limited in
this life to the same starting point – that of sense experience. If we are not able to
understand purely intelligible species, or even separate substances in this life, how much
less could we see the divine essence which transcends all separate substances?548
When considering imperfect happiness regarding the performance of the
intellectual virtues, it is significant to note that the highest act of understanding for a
particular person may not be the absolutely best object, and therefore his highest
imperfect happiness will consist in understanding the highest thing it can. The crux of this
point depends on drawing attention to the wide range of intellectual capacities amongst
individuals in the human species.549 ‘However small the amount of divine knowledge that
the intellect may be able to grasp, that will be for the intellect, in regard to its ultimate
end, much more than the perfect knowledge of lower objects of understanding.’550 This
remark is significant since it addresses the potential happiness of the young, mentally
disabled, those restricted by time and other circumstances. The wisdom of Thomas is
demonstrated here as he shows there is an element of imperfect happiness which is
subjective, yet never conflicting with the objective order. For each individual then, the
contemplation of the highest truth they are personally capable of is more perfect and
delightful than other operations.’551 For some, this means the contemplation of the truth
that they are loved by their parents, or that there is a warm caring touch from someone
they cannot recognise, while for others it may be the realisation they are willed into
existence from all eternity. In all cases though, there is the need to apprehend the greatest
truths one is able to.
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The level of knowledge of God appropriate to this level is that which is obtained
by the intellectual virtues and is gathered through demonstration. In particular, that God is
immutable, eternal, one and perfect.552 This level of knowledge is an improvement on the
base level of happiness since it rules out erroneous concepts of God, and also comes with
a certainty that the general conception doesn’t. However, since all the sensible effects of
God are not equal to His power, one cannot move from knowledge of them to knowledge
of the divine essence. It is only through the analogy of being, or through knowledge of
causes, that man can maximise the natural knowledge he has of God and its
accompanying imperfect happiness.553
Still, even for those who do acquire knowledge of God via demonstration, it
leaves much to be known. Many who have learned truths about God by way of
demonstration, follow their own opinions on areas where demonstration remains quiet
and have fallen into error.’554 As historically shown by those who have tried to acquire
knowledge of God through reason alone, many uncertainties arise as proven by the
diversity among those who have tried to acquire it. Thomas clearly has in mind the great
Pagan philosophers as well as those from the non-Christian monotheistic traditions. This
falls short of the requirements of perfect operation, since ‘certainty is required for perfect
knowledge; for this reason we cannot be said to know unless we learn something that
cannot be otherwise.555
Moral Virtue & Imperfect Natural Happiness
‘Rectitude of the will is necessary for happiness… to desire nothing amiss is… a
necessary disposition.’556 The inability of a man to regulate his concupiscible and
irascible passions through the use of reason is detrimental to imperfect happiness. If one
allows the sensitive appetite, which has only immediate and particular goods within its
radar, to drive away greater goods through pleasure or fear, it affects one’s ability to
guide his life in any consistent way. ‘Rectitude of the will consists in being duly ordered
to the last end… (and) nothing gains an end, except it be duly ordained thereto.’557
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Since it has already been discussed that the intellect is at the core of human
happiness, it is appropriate that ‘a kind of secondary happiness arises from the activity of
the moral virtues… as he lives by prudence, which directs all the moral virtues.’558 That
is, the intellectual virtue of prudence allows external goods, bodily goods and passions of
the soul to participate in reason.559 In fact, in the order of generation, these ‘moral virtues
are habits or dispositions necessary for attaining intellectual virtue.’560 This is because
good intellectual activity, which is truly an act of the whole man, ‘requires the
purification of all the imperfections, rebellions, and imperfect habits of the lower part,
which… is surrendered and made subject to the higher part.’561
In a particularly concise section, Aquinas explains the significance of both the
intellect and appetite for achieving virtue:
Two things are needed in a work of virtue. One is that a man has a right intention for
the end, which moral virtue provides in inclining the appetitive faculty to a proper end.
The other is to be well disposed towards the means. This is done by prudence, which
gives good advice, judges and orders the means to the end… prudence perfecting the
part rational by essence, and moral virtue perfecting the appetitive part, rational by
participation.562
Without this correct appetite for the end, it is impossible for the person to pursue the true
good. It is obvious to all who have encountered a wide range of characters that ‘the
supreme good is not apparent except to the good or virtuous man who has the proper
evaluation of the end, since moral virtue rectifies the conception of the end.’563 It has
been mentioned above on several occasions that what materially instantiates happiness is
a source of disagreement – the moral character of those involved is no small cause of this.
The avaricious man perceives external goods as happiness, the intemperate man considers
pleasure as happiness and the just man considers justice as happiness. In all cases, the
way a person views happiness is intimately related to his character. Therefore the
challenge is to form one’s character, both in its essentially rational aspects (via the
intellectual virtues) and those aspects which are rational by participation (the passions).
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Without this awareness and conscious effort, any ‘habituated vice, peer pressure,
irrationality, mental illness, and the like can often deform our subjective desires so that
they turn us away from… what is good for us.’564
The moral virtues belong to the contemplative life as providing disposition, since
the act of contemplation is ‘hindered both by the impetuosity of the passions which
withdraw the soul’s intention from intelligible to sensible things, and by outward
disturbances.’565 This interior freedom to pursue greater goods is provided by the moral
virtues, whose role is one of service rather than command.566 Once again, we see Thomas
contradicting our often dualistic understandings of what exactly intellectual work consists
in. It is the whole man who performs intellectual activity, not some kind of mind-in-avacuum: ‘Vices relax attention, scatters it, leads it astray; and they injure the judgment in
roundabout ways… The man who engages in the work must not be the creature of
passion, vanity, ambition, or vain desire to please.’567 Therefore the moral virtues are not
only crucial in order to contemplate, but are ‘traits of character that persons must possess
if they are able to sustain (any) course of activity.’568 Any long term project ultimately
requires the capacity of the person involved to regulate short, often intense, inclinations in
order to persist. It should be noted however that the ability to resist these temptations, say
with continence, is only a lower form of moral virtue, since the truly moral character will
not experience these disturbing movements in the first place, contributing even further to
his happiness in this life.569
It is here that we would be able to find the cause of what we might imagine is
many people’s disdain for contemplative activities. Although contemplation is an act of
the intellect, in regards to its ‘motive cause’ it requires an act of the will: ‘The appetitive
power moves one to observe things either with the senses or with the intellect, sometimes
for love of the thing seen… (or) love of the very knowledge that one acquires…’570 In
either case, love is a key element in attracting one to act. Therefore the character who
resists moments of reflection and thought must not hold these as ultimate goods in his life
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for one reason or another. It is possible he experiences boredom very easily, cannot stop
thinking about what is coming up for dinner, his next pay day, previous or future sexual
encounters or even a relationship conflict. In all these cases, it is the person’s inability to
regulate his passions which reflect a strong attachment or love elsewhere. Therefore for
Thomas, a properly ordered appetite and emotional life is ‘requisite for the contemplative
life.’571

Third Level of Imperfect Happiness: That Which Is Proportionate To
Grace
As has already been discussed, ‘on earth, the greatest natural happiness comes
from contemplating God as known through created effects and delighting in Him as loved
more than any other good’, what remains now is to show how ‘the greatest supernatural
happiness on earth comes from contemplating and delighting in God as known through
faith and loved through charity.’572
In light of Revelation, more specifically the everlasting covenant centred around
the incarnation, death and resurrection of Christ, there is a greater participation in the
eternal law available to humanity. This further participation amounts to the next level of
imperfect happiness one can attain in this life. Therefore on top of (rather than instead of)
the already mentioned natural principles, habits and laws, supernatural participation
includes grace, the divine law, the theological virtues, infused moral virtues, gifts of the
Holy Spirit and beatitudes. These enhance mans continued ‘discernment of good from
evil which he himself carries out by his reason, in particular by his reason enlightened by
Divine Revelation and by faith.’573
‘It is necessary for man to receive from God some additional principles, whereby
he may be directed to supernatural happiness, even as he is directed to his connatural end,
by means of his natural principles.’574 Grace is that very supernatural principle, which ‘is
not a term of movement, as happiness is; rather it is the principle of the movement that
tends towards happiness.’575 Therefore the receiving of grace is the most basic
supernatural accidental change to the human, and the necessary beginning to any
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operations which could merit the ultimate good. All of the habits then which will allow
grace-principled acts to take place, are referred to as infused rather than acquired, since
one must receive the supernatural principle, grace, as a gift.576 All one can hope to do in
the natural order is predispose themselves to receive this gift. However, once this
principle of grace is received, just as one increases and affirms his habits through
repeated activity stemming from a natural principle, he can do so from a supernatural.577
Since the natural virtues, building on mans natural principles fall short, there must
be another order of virtues which build on grace.578 These are the theological virtues of
faith, hope and love, which ‘are conceived by Aquinas as stages in a process reaching its
fulfilment in friendship with God.’579 The reason this set of virtues can direct man toward
perfect happiness is that they have God for their object.580
‘First, as regards the intellect, man receives certain supernatural principles which
are held by means of a Divine light: these are the articles of faith.’581 As was seen above
when looking at imperfect natural happiness, there were both inherent limitations to
humanity as a species as well as specific individual limitations, regarding ones ability to
contemplate ultimate truths. All knowledge which natural reason obtains occurs through
two things: ‘images derived from the sensible objects; and the natural intelligible light,
enabling us to abstract from them intelligible conceptions.’582 Since grace does not
destroy nature, but rather perfects it, one should expect to find that the supernatural virtue
of faith works through both of these avenues.583 This is in fact what is found since
Revelation is exposed to the senses, and the intellect’s natural light is strengthened by
grace in order to believe what is being heard or read. Revelation allows the person to
‘know some things through faith which, because of their sublimity, demonstrative reason
cannot attain.’584 Aquinas has in mind here the Christian mysteries, which include the
Trinity, incarnation, salvation history and the sacraments. It is therefore a progression on
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natural imperfect happiness since once can ‘know Him more fully according as many and
more excellent of His effects are demonstrated to us.’585
‘In order that activities be directed to an end without error it is necessary for the
end to be known.’586 Knowledge of mans supernatural vocation, as well as the means to
achieving it, is provided by faith. Without this faith, a person would not have this ‘kind of
knowledge about… the opportunities and resources that are out there’ in order to achieve
perfect happiness.587
Yet, as with imperfect natural happiness, mere knowledge of the good is not
enough. ‘One could accept all the truths of faith and still despair.’588 The good itself must
be approached by the individual. This is where the second theological virtue, hope, plays
its role, since by it ‘the will is directed to this end… which tends to that end as something
attainable.’589 This builds further onto imperfect supernatural happiness since ‘some are
said to be happy in his life... on account of the hope of obtaining Happiness in the life to
come… or on account of a certain participation of Happiness, by reason of a kind of
enjoyment of the Sovereign Good.’590 Hence, although the person with the theological
virtue of hope is imperfect since they still have not attained God Himself, ‘he is perfect,
in so far as he already attains his proper rule, God, on whose help he leans.’591 This hope
which a person has, rooted in the goodness of God, causes a joy proper to it.592
However faith and hope are still not sufficient to attain the end, since one can act
against such knowledge, as if another good was in fact the Ultimate.593 Therefore, the
theological virtue of charity becomes the necessary component for attaining the Ultimate
End, since it informs all the other actions of the person, ordering them to perfect
happiness. It is by charity that ‘a certain spiritual union’ occurs.594 It is by the theological
virtue of charity that the person loves God for who He is in Himself, and not merely for
what good He can provide the person.
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Since charity, like all the supernatural virtues, is an intellectual virtue, ‘it cannot
be exercised without the moral virtues.’595 Therefore to express themselves in the
practical realm, they are also accompanied by the infused cardinal virtues, enabling a
person to counsel, judge and command his actions toward perfect happiness. Like their
natural counterparts, these infused virtues also seek the mean, but unlike them they seek it
not only in regard to the natural law, but also ‘on the basis of considerations belonging to
the divine law, considerations we accept from their bearing on the ultimate end.’596 ‘Since
a greater understanding of the end changes the means that are chosen’, the person will
often carry out actions or lifestyles not contradictory to, but rather surpassing what is
normally demanded.597 For example, the mean amount of food to be consumed during the
period of lent, would differ for the Christian in contrast to the non-Christian. Other
aspects of virtuous acts such as a life committed to celibacy, or love of one’s enemies also
surpass what the natural virtues would require, but would be enabled (or required) by the
infused moral and intellectual virtues. Finally, in contrast to the natural virtues, that which
flows from these infused virtues makes ‘a person’s activity good absolutely speaking,
since they enable it to reach even the ultimate end.’598 Therefore for Aquinas, ‘the actual
presence of the ultimate end in the intention of the agent emerges as the ultimate ethical
truth of human action.’599
As seen above in imperfect natural happiness, it is the rectitude of the will which
was a significantly determining factor as to whether one could enjoy the act of
contemplation, and therefore maximise his happiness. Aquinas particularly highlights the
act of contemplating God as necessarily requiring charity in the appetite.600 Without
charity, the person will find it impossible (or even torturous if coerced) to think about the
divine mysteries.
In a similar way, once again showcasing the continuity between the natural and
supernatural, Aquinas explains that although ‘the manner of contemplation is not the
same here as in heaven: yet the contemplative life is said to remain by reason of charity,
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wherein it has both its beginning and end.’601 Therefore the supernatural virtue of charity
is the most continual act or habit, bridging both imperfect and perfect happiness. It is the
ultimate participation in this life of perfect happiness, and also the single most decisive
point as to whether one will attain perfect happiness, and if so, to what degree.602 ‘The
intellect… will have a fuller participation in the Light of Glory who has more charity;
because where there is the greater charity, there is the more desire; and desire in a certain
degree makes the one desiring apt and prepared to receive the object desire.’603
‘It is not by change of place that we come nearer to Him who is in every place, but
by the cultivation of pure desires and virtuous habits.’604 This in fact gets to the heart of
what must be understood if contemplation of God is to be properly seen as that which
happiness consists in, even in this earthly life.605 Augustine and Aquinas are both at pains
to mention that it is not simply attending Church services, or mechanically going through
the words of the ‘Our Father’ which bring someone closer to happiness. Although all of
these are necessary, they cannot substitute for a lack of character formation in the moral
(then intellectual) spheres of life, something regularly emphasised in recent Church
documents.606 It is only in as much as their own desires align with those of the First Will
that they participate more deeply in the Eternal Law, leading them eventually to the final
cause of both wills – God Himself.607 ‘An intellectual substance, through its own
operation, attains to God, not only by understanding, but also through an act of the will,
by desiring and loving Him and by taking delight in Him.’608
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‘In the conditions of the present life, Thomas values the will more highly than
reason, because the will can reach God directly while reason remains subjected to the
senses.’609 The reason is that although ‘love presupposes knowledge of the object loved…
nevertheless love is not measured by knowledge. We can love perfectly an object very
imperfectly known.’610 Therefore in regards to God, the ultimate object of love and
knowledge, charity makes it possible to have ‘a true but nonetheless imperfect enjoyment
of the last end even before reaching it.’611 Once again, we see this key aspect of Thomas’
teaching being highlighted by recent Popes in their moral theology: ‘Through that life,
those who faithfully obey all the precepts and demands of our Redeemer can enjoy even
in this life that happiness which is a foretaste and pledge of heaven’s eternal
happiness.’612 This stands in direct contrast to a Christianity which sees beatitude as
utterly independent and arbitrarily awarded by God, regardless of one’s earthly will and
state.
Supernatural imperfect happiness is necessarily greater than natural imperfect
happiness because ‘there is greater perfection in attaining God in any way at all, even
imperfectly, than in attaining other things perfectly.’613 This in fact mimics Thomas’
earlier observations in the realm of knowledge – that it is greater to know a little bit about
ultimate truths and causes, than a lot about sensible or contingent things. In the same way
then in the practical realm, one participates more in the Eternal Law, or comes closer to
his ultimate good, when he performs any actions aimed directly toward it, rather than
great ones not directed so. It is this which separates the atheist’s monthly donation to a
charity, from the simple peasant who consciously carries out his daily labours in the spirit
of bringing about the Kingdom of God.
This is the great truth which Josef Pieper so poetically describes when he says:
How splendid is water, a rose, a tree, an apple, a human face – such exclamations can
scarcely be spoken without giving tongue to an assent and affirmation which extends
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beyond the object praised and touches upon the origin of the universe... and that,
seeing this, he is happy.614
One can see here that in fact the person who contemplates the deepest reality of even the
most ordinary things, is in fact constantly verging on the mystical or contemplative in his
everyday experiences.
It is appropriate at this time to especially mention those people who historically
and presently are encountering the greatest difficulties, misfortunes, oppression or tragedy
in their lives. In these cases, persons are often challenged to re-examine what it is they
understand their lives, and in the greater context, being itself, to be ordered towards. The
reality (or lack thereof) which we call evil, explained in Christian theology by original
sin, prods the contemplative mind to go deeper in their understanding. For Christians, it
causes them to realise the great need of a Redeemer, as well as a return from illusionary
world views they may have sunk into. In fact, many people who have undergone great
suffering used these encounters with evil to reignite a greater love for truth about
humanity, the world and God, in both themselves and others.615
For Thomas, and the thousands of those we call Saints who have preceded and
proceeded him, this is the great secret of their happiness. In their case, they were able to
draw the connection between the immediate realities they were confronted with and its
deeper causes and principles:
Every light striking an object may lead up to the sun; every road opened is a corridor
to God… People have passed that way myriads of times and seen nothing; and one day
the man of genius notices the links between what we do not know and what is every
minute before our eyes.616
On realisation of the ultimate goodness of being, more specifically the
Unconditioned, Necessary Being revealed to them through the Person of Jesus, these
saints have achieved a level of happiness which was almost untouchable. One has only to
think of such examples as St. Maximilian Kolbe who, while being locked in a Nazi
prison, waiting to be murdered in the place of another man, was singing hymns of joy.
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Surely this could only be because he had realised the goodness of the Ultimate Cause and
Principal of reality – a realisation which left him desiring nothing else in this life.
Although Thomas was extremely realistic regarding the ability of great suffering
to influence ones attainment of imperfect happiness, it is important to realise that the most
detrimental effect evil can have on a person is to affect his ability to apprehend the truth,
goodness and beauty of reality. If external evil is able to penetrate the intellect and will,
then it most truly and definitely destroys happiness, even to the point of risking the
attainment of perfect happiness. In this case, it is not contemplation which should be
blamed, but rather a lack of contemplation.
However, taking all of this into account, faith is still an imperfect act of the
intellect. Since faith is an act of believing, ‘the intellect does not grasp the object to which
it gives assent.’617 The person does not grasp through intellectus the supernatural reality
he holds to be true, therefore a conscious act of the will is required.618 ‘People assent
through intellect to what surpasses human reason only because they will to do so.’619
Thomas describes faith as a knowledge more like hearing rather than seeing, since one
receives the faith through hearing, based on what another has seen.620 Therefore all faith,
although eventually rooted in someone’s knowledge, is received by the person who is
temporarily unable to directly apprehend the reality. However, as already spoken about,
happiness cannot be primarily an act of the will, nor is this a perfect operation of the
intellect.621 Therefore knowledge of God through faith is still not perfect happiness.
Hence in the example used above, Kolbe knew he had not yet reached his final goal.
Another reason why faith is not happiness is that it does not quench desire but
rather inflames it.622 The believer desires like a lover to be united with the object of his
love, which is an indication that he is still yet to achieve it. St John of the Cross, a fellow
Doctor of the Church with Thomas says that, ‘Lovers are said to have their heart stolen or
seized by the object of their love.’623 The lover, after glimpsing the beauty of the Beloved,
617
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can no longer rest with that little bit, but must be united perfectly to it. The person of faith
desires to see God, understanding that faith is only a necessary, imperfect and temporary
bridge to perfect possession of the Good. In contrast to the act of faith, in perfect
happiness God will be known not ‘by way of a proposition but by way of simple
understanding.’624 All the creeds, catechisms and journals will be instantly retired, just as
the healthy person puts aside his crutches after his leg has healed. Just as all of man’s
knowledge begins by an immediate grasp of first principles, so all his discursive thinking
will conclude in one perfect act of understanding.

A Natural Supernatural Clarification
It has been demonstrated throughout the entire work thus far that man’s natural
principles alone demand, but are unable to achieve solely, vision of the Divine Essence.
‘For even though by nature man is inclined to his ultimate end, he cannot reach it by
nature but only by grace, and this owing to the loftiness of that end.’625 At this point it is
worthy of addressing the potential problem of how mans natural end can be considered
beyond the reach of nature. Doesn’t a nature’s telos by definition demand to be
achievable by the being itself? Aquinas is fully aware of the questions that could be
raised, and begins his response as follows:
In one way, beatific vision or knowledge is beyond the nature of the rational soul in
the sense that the soul cannot reach it by its own power; but in another way it is in
accordance with its nature, in the sense that by its very nature the soul has a capacity
for it, being made in God’s image.626
Man is by his nature made in the image of God, meaning that ‘man is capable of
the Perfect Good… because his intellect can apprehend the universal and perfect good,
and because his will can desire it.’627 Since man’s natural principles are able to
comprehend universal being, by properly understanding what is meant by the term
capable, light will be shed on the apparent difficulty:
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When Thomas, like Augustine, speaks of the human creature’s being capax Dei it must
be remembered that capacitas here is understood as a purely passive receptivity, not
being “capable” in the modern sense of having the ability or competence to achieve
something but in the pre-modern sense of being open to something one can receive
only as a gift.628
In Thomas’ metaphysics, the term ‘potential’ is much richer than mere empirical
observation. ‘There are two ways an aptitude for a perfection and form can be in a
subject: one, because of a passive potentiality only… or two, because of a passive and an
active potentiality jointly.’629 The latter case refers to when an active aspect of a being,
moves a passive aspect of the same being from potentiality to actuality. For example,
when a body returns itself to health by overcoming the flu, or when a person who has the
virtue of justice, actually reaches for his wallet to pay for his drink. However, the first
case, that of a passive potentiality, is the one of particular interest to the topic at hand.
An example of passive potentiality is obediential potency. This is the ability to
have a habit or act, but without being able to acquire it by one’s own act.630 ‘In the human
soul, as in every creature, there is a double passive power: one in comparison with a
natural agent; the other in comparison with the first agent, which can reduce any creature
to a higher act than a natural agent can reduce it, and this is usually called obediential
power of a creature.’631 Examples of natural passive powers actualisable by other
creatures include the ability to read, write or swim, while examples of obediential
potencies which in light of mans great calling ‘can only be moved to act by the divine
power’ are the acquisition of grace, the infused virtues, Gifts of the Holy Spirit and the
Beatific Vision.632 ‘The happiness of being created, the existential goodness of things, the
participation in the life of God, the overcoming of death – all these… are pure gift.’633
The difference between the two senses of capacity is deeply tied into man’s
nature as a social creature. When a new born baby comes into the world, he has the
capacity to become the Prime Minister of Australia. Yet this does not mean that he can
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achieve this in an unaided fashion. In fact, without the help of others, he is unable to even
feed himself, let alone study politics. However, with the help of family and friends, he is
able to exercise his deeper metaphysical capacity which he has had since conception, in
order to achieve this honour. Non-rational animals are not capable either of becoming the
Prime Minister at birth, but more importantly, it is not metaphysically possible.634 Even
with all the assistance and human training imaginable, it is not within their capacity. If we
now return to the example of perfect happiness, ‘nature… did give man free will, with
which he can turn to God, that He may make him happy. For what we do by means of our
friends, is done, in a sense, by ourselves.’635 Wang elaborates that ‘it is a part of our
nature not only to seek happiness but also to have the ability to ask for what we cannot
find through our own efforts.’636
‘The nature that can attain perfect good, although it needs help from without in
order to attain it, is of more noble condition than a nature which cannot attain perfect
good, but attains some imperfect good, although it need no help from without in order to
attain it.’637 Therefore that which a being is capable of, with the help of others, should
rightly be considered a natural capacity of that being.638 In fact, the only being which one
can expect to achieve beatitude in utter isolation is the Divine Essence itself which is
Beatitude by nature.639 ‘All other essences can only attain their completion… by
accomplishing the transition from potency to act.’640 Hence, ‘this fulfilment can come
only from a gift of God: the offer of a share in the Divine Goodness... a possibility opened
up to man exclusively by grace.’641
Thomas holds then, that the ‘human natural desire can come to rest in nothing but
God alone,’ which is not contradicted by the fact they are incapable of fulfilling it on their
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own.642 In that sense, Thomas’ philosophical conclusion is that ‘human nature has no
ultimately satisfying natural end and that unless a supernatural end (the vision of God) is
possible and can be achieved, men are creatures made “in vain.”’643 This leads us to the
conclusion that ‘for the attaining of beatitude two things are required, nature and
grace.’644 ‘Mere nature needs the Christian confession for its own perfect development,
and that in its turn Christianity needs a distinct nature that it is to perfect and to save.’645
This in fact is the Christian paradox: that ‘the soul is naturally open to face-toface communion with God which can only be granted supernaturally… nature is
predisposed for grace, the world is naturally waiting for the gospel.’646 However, the
point that this is a ‘Christian’ paradox deserves more attention. Although the ‘natural
desire to see God is implicitly contained in the necessary desire for the perfect good or
happiness that structures the will… this inclination must be carefully distinguished from
the explicit or elicited desire to know God that only follows upon antecedent
metaphysical knowledge.’647 Therefore although man is aware of his calling to happiness,
this is distinguishable from his ability to be aware that his happiness consists in attaining
perfect being, which is further distinguishable from his awareness that he is called to
participate in the Triune Communion through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, made
possible by the life, death and resurrection of Christ. In the latter case, it is only revelation
which makes this knowledge possible.
This leads to the next logical conclusion regarding the relationship between man’s
nature and any external assistance he receives from the Divine. Whatever assistance is
received cannot bring about a substantial change, since then the very being in question
would no longer be considered properly human. But ‘the reason and will are naturally
directed to God, inasmuch as He is the beginning and end of nature.’648 ‘If man did not
love God naturally, nature would have been created evil, natural love would be
perverse… and it would not be perfected but destroyed by charity.’649 Also, ‘the gift of
the beatific vision would change the person in his or her essence in that the infinity of the
642
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gazed-upon object would abolish the supposed limitation of the cognitive power.’650
Therefore ‘grace… is an accidental act of esse changing a human’s manner of being by
imparting a likeness through participation in divine nature.’651 Grace then, gives humanity
a better manner of existence by adding things over and above it’s first perfection,
substantial existence, in the same way that the natural virtues, both intellectual and moral,
do not make a new being or destroy the old, but rather perfect the existing one.652 The
example par excellence of this is the Hypostatic union of the Divine and human natures of
Christ. ‘Just as Christ’s all holy and blameless ensouled flesh was not destroyed by being
divinised but remained in its own limit and category, so also his human will has not been
destroyed by being divinised, but rather was preserved.’653 In the case of grace infiltrating
human nature then ‘we are not absorbed… the two beings (God and creature) are brought
into a lasting relation that destroys neither.’654
If nature was in fact to be destroyed or lost through grace or the Beatific Vision,
how could it be described as the same person, with his identity, character and faculties
who is beatified? The necessary consequence of incompatibility between the natural and
supernatural is a Nirvana-like situation where all self-identity is lost into Divinity, the
Beatified state having nothing to do with the earthly man’s character, habits and
personality, but rather bringing it all to a destructive end. In that case, any sense of
imperfect happiness through participation must be discarded, and the final difference
between moral realism and divine command theory obliterated – a situation unfortunately
common to modern ethics as highlighted in the Introduction.

Conclusion
It has been demonstrated in this chapter that perfect happiness in this life is not
possible for epistemological and ontological reasons. Yet nevertheless a true participation
in perfect happiness can be had in this life to various degrees, since it is the same
participation in being which is fulfilled in the life to come. Since the Eternal Law is that
which guides the creature to its ultimate end, it was chosen as the appropriate lens to
650
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measure various degrees of happiness. Three degrees of imperfect participation in the
Eternal Law was recognised: firstly, the lowest form of participation which any creature
necessarily engages through having substantial being, and continuing to have their first
principals as the foundation of their activity. Secondly, that imperfect happiness which is
appropriate to mans natural powers perfected through the acquired intellectual and moral
virtues. Finally, the highest form of imperfect happiness was found in the life of grace,
where through the theological virtues one is able to contemplate truths and perform
actions immediately directed to God Himself.
The chapter was concluded with a brief look at how mans supernatural ultimate
end is not incompatible with his natural capacities, but rather fulfils them. Through
discussing Thomas’ concept of passive potentiality it was seen that even though a
creature may need external (or Divine) assistance to achieve something, it should still be
considered part of the capacity of that creature in a broader sense of the term. Ultimately
it was enforced that grace perfects nature, which seems to be awaiting it, rather than being
completely foreign or violent toward it.
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Antecedents, Concomitants and
Consequences of Happiness
At this stage in Aquinas’ understanding of happiness, some may be surprised at
the near absence of many things the average person would associate with such a concept.
What about other things such as love, peace and friendship? This is the very material
which this chapter incorporates. Up until this chapter, the search has been for the essence
of happiness. That is, the very thing which when had brings happiness and, regardless of
how much one has apart from it, if it is missing, what remains is not happiness. However,
as with other things, there are other aspects of happiness which are not part of its essence.
For example, one might say that the essence of a phone is the ability to make and receive
calls. This does not preclude the device from being able to send text messages, play
music, games and take photos. While these all contribute to making a device more
attractive, they remain accidental to the nature of a phone. If one had a device which only
played games, music, took photos and could send messages, we would refrain from
calling it a phone.
In exactly the same way, Thomas explains that something may belong to
happiness in three ways: essentially, antecedently and consequently.655 What Thomas
believes to be essential to happiness has been discussed in Chapters One and Three. Much
of what is antecedental to perfect happiness was discussed in chapter Four, yet will also
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appear regularly in this chapter as appropriate. It remains then to delve into the
concomitants and consequences of perfect happiness.656

Happiness & The Body
Imperfect Happiness
It has been demonstrated in the above that what is essential for man’s happiness,
union with the Uncreated Good, cannot happen directly via the senses, therefore it must
be an operation of the intellect. However, the senses have an important antecedental role
to happiness. This takes two particular forms: firstly, their crucial role in the acquiring of
knowledge by the intellect, and secondly, their direct involvement in executing the
demands of practical reason.
In regards to the first way, ‘an operation of the intellect in this life cannot be
without a phantasm, which is only in a bodily organ.’657 This is not to say that the
intellect needs a bodily organ to carry out its proper act, but that in this life it is in need of
‘phantasms, wherein it looks on the intelligible truth.’658 These phantasms or images are
gathered through the activity of the senses and brain, providing the intellect with more
data to process. Therefore, although the intellect can carry out its proper act with minimal
phantasms, having more data allows it to engage in a wider apprehension of being. By
doing so, one increases his degree of imperfect happiness, and also further encounters the
Author of Being through analysing more of His effects. Man can truly be described as ‘an
intelligence served by organs.’659 ‘Man must first of all have a healthy body in order to
contemplate, because the sensitive powers he uses in contemplation are weakened by
sickness; the mind is diverted from attention to contemplation.’660 Therefore, one should
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not neglect the health of his body, lest it hinder his ability to think clearly in the short
term, as well as demand more time and energy due to health issues in the future.
In the second of the ways the body is antecedental to happiness, Thomas points
out the body’s role in the acquisition (and exercise) of the moral virtues. ‘Good
disposition of the body is necessary for happiness,’ since (it) consists ‘in an operation of
perfect virtue; and it is clear that man can be hindered, by indisposition of the body, from
every operation of virtue.’661 Since virtue constitutes such a significant component of
imperfect happiness, the person must be able to carry out the acts which would allow
them to form a virtuous habit, and then even after the habit is formed, continue to carry
out the acts themselves. One can see here the root of the great agony of those who do
suffer from physical and mental handicaps – they are unable to develop (if the handicap is
from an early age) or manifest their virtue (if the handicap were to come later). They
more or less perceive the good to be done, but experience a disjointing between their
apprehension and their ability to pursue it. From the child with Downs Syndrome to the
elderly man who has become bedridden, their ability to increase their degree of imperfect
happiness has been hindered. For those of a vicious character, the fact that they are unable
to carry out their evil act is actually to their benefit, but for the virtuous it is a source of
genuine pain.662 By this short glimpse at the negative, one is able to see how those who
do have full use of their body have both a capacity and responsibility to pursue greater
degrees of imperfect happiness.
Perfect Happiness
Since Thomas sees happiness as materially consisting in the Beatific vision, he
does not see the body as concomitantly or consequently necessary, since it is an
intellectual apprehension of Perfect Being. In this way he also allows the souls of the
saints to already be perfectly happy before the general resurrection. But nevertheless,
since the nature of man is that of an intellectual animal, he ‘would have been made in
vain, if he were unable to obtain the end for which he was made’ qua intellectual
661
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animal.663 As seen above, one aspect of the Ultimate End of all creatures is to resemble
Perfect Being is the way fitting for its essence, and since ‘the soul united to a glorified
body is more like God than when separated therefrom,’ it has more perfect being as man
when experiencing perfect happiness in the body.664 ‘Man the composite is a more
complete and noble being than the human soul which, although more noble than the body,
is but a part of a man.’665 Since one of the characteristics of the soul is to be the form of
the body, it is perfected further by actually being so.666 Therefore Aquinas sees the body
as not part of the nature of happiness (which is attained also by the angels), but rather
appropriate according to the nature of a happy man.
In this case, the body benefits from the exalting and perfecting of its form, the
soul: ‘the disposition of the body is to be proportioned to that of the soul. But the soul is
incorruptible. Hence, the body restored to the soul will be incorruptible,’ without
deformity or deficiency.667 Much of what Aquinas says in this area is an incorporation of
the work of Augustine, his revered predecessor.668 It is the senses which will benefit from
the perfect union with the Uncreated already achieved by the intellect in Heaven. ‘In
perfect happiness the entire man is perfected, in the lower part of his nature, by an
overflow from the higher (consequentially). But in the imperfect happiness of this life, it
is otherwise; we advance from the perfection of the lower part to the perfection of the
higher part (antecedently).’669 As seen above in the antecedents (or imperfect stages) of
happiness, bodily dispositions were crucial in order that the soul may receive and perform
its various goods. However, in perfect happiness, ‘the soul and body appear to be related
in a different order… In the resurrection, the body is adapted to the pre-existing soul…
the life which man acquires by resurrection will be perpetual according to the condition of
the incorruptible soul.’670 Therefore in contrast to the order of generation, where lower
goods must be attained in order to achieve higher ones (for example, the ability to think
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clearly is largely dependant on basic development and sustenance of the body), in the
resurrected state, since the Ultimate Good has already been attained, all other goods (in
this case, bodily) are received as ‘flowing down’ from the soul.671
In the body’s perfect subjection to the soul, and the soul’s perfect subjection to
God, something of an order of being can be seen in Aquinas’ thought. ‘The human body
and all it contains will be perfectly subject to the rational soul, even as the soul will be
perfectly subject to God.’672 It should be remembered that none of these relationships of
subjection are completely new, but rather are simply perfected in beatitude. Since man is
a rational animal, the soul provides the very form of his matter ‘lest it be dissolved by the
contrariety of the elements’, and is also his principle of acting and moving.673 The
difference in the resurrected body is that there is ‘nothing in it to resist the will of the
spirit’ so that the soul will have perfect dominion over it – both in regard to its
constitution and act.674
On an interesting theological side-note, it is worthwhile noting that it was the
corruption of the will, expressed through the consuming of the ‘tree of knowledge of
good and evil’ which led to the barring of man from eating of ‘the tree of life.’675 The
‘tree of life’ can be taken as representing immortality, or perfect dominion of the soul
over the body, so that deterioration and eventual separation does not occur. There is then
an intimate connection between the perfection of mans operation (soul as principle of act)
and his constitution (soul as form of the body). With the ‘tree of life’ removed from the
corrupted soul, death enters into history.676 Regarding happiness then, God, by allowing
death to occur, ensured strict limitations to the evil any one person can carry out, and also
offered the chance of avoiding an eternally hellish state (although the possibility of this
state is not completely removed). With the complete rectitude of man’s will in the
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perfection of charity, he can then receive perfect and eternal dominion over the body – in
other words, once again ‘eat from the tree of life.’677
Since then man will experience perfect happiness in the body, ‘a bodily place,
viz., the empyrean heaven, will be appointed to the Blessed, not as a need of happiness,
but by reason of a certain fitness and adornment.’678 In order to demonstrate Thomas’
point, one would do well to consider the way a man looks upon his wife on the night of
his wedding - in an ecstatic awe for the beauty of his beloved. How well could he recount
the colour or pattern of the expensive hotel carpet? Or the magnificent picture which was
hanging in the hallway? Nevertheless, although none of these things make up anything of
the essence of the groom’s happiness, they are the appropriate adornment for such a
beautiful occasion. In the same way then, the perfected physical environment will be for
those who have the Beatific Vision.
With the souls of the perfectly happy reunited to their bodies, one can then ask the
question, what will the beatified be doing in the body? Once again, we can see Aquinas’
work in this area reflecting that of Augustine’s.679 This question can be broken up into
two aspects. Firstly, what will be the role of the senses, since it has already been
discussed that the Beatific vision is not essentially seen with the eye?680 Secondly, what
physical activities will one be carrying out? After all, the Ultimate Good has already been
achieved, and isn’t that the primary motivation for all human acting?
Those experiencing perfect happiness will not be cut off from ‘the modification
essential to sense knowledge, for they will use their senses for pleasure in the measure in
which this is not incompatible with their state of incorruption.’681 ‘Incompatible’ in this
context refers to those pleasures which are gained from sexual activity and nourishment –
not that he has a problem with these pleasures in themselves, but rather he sees the
activities that cause them as perfectly fulfilled and therefore not carried out.682 That being
677
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said, all the senses of the blessed are still rewarded with that pleasure which consists in
their perfect operation.683
In order to understand the role of the senses in perfect happiness, Aquinas makes a
distinction which is well worth quoting at length:
‘A thing is perceptible to the senses of the body in two ways, directly and indirectly. A
thing is perceptible directly if it can act directly on the bodily senses (corporeally)…
An indirect object of sense is that which does not act on the sense… but is annexed to
those things that act on sense directly: for instance Socrates; the son of Diares; a friend
and the like which are the direct object of the intellect’s knowledge in the universal,
and in the particular are the object of the cogitative power in man.’684
Thomas reminds us of the distinction between what is seen by the physical eyes
themselves (particular things), and what is ‘seen’ by the intellect (universals,
relationships, causality, etc). Even though the Divine Essence is impossible to see as a
particular object of the eyes, yet it will be seen ‘as an object of indirect vision, because…
the bodily sight will see so great a glory of God in bodies, especially in the glorified
bodies and most of all in the body of Christ. Even as life is perceived in speech… it will
see God in His creatures seen corporeally.’685 Therefore although the eyes do not see God
directly, they very easily ‘see’ his work in the perfected world around them.
The distinction between direct and indirect perception, also allows Thomas to
show that ‘attention to perceiving sensibles, or to contemplating or doing anything else
will nowise hinder their contemplation of God, nor conversely.’686 To properly
understand Thomas here it is necessary to keep in mind the necessary relationship
between all created being and Uncreated Being. The Saints will be completely aware that
all contingent being participates and reflects Necessary Being. By consistently and easily
seeing God via indirect perception, they are constantly ‘refreshed by the beauty of the
variety of creatures, in which God’s wisdom will show forth with greater evidence.’687
Emphasis must however be drawn to the use of the word ‘refreshed.’ Since perfect
happiness has already been attained prior to the use of the resurrected senses, Aquinas
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cannot say that it somehow enhances or perfects their happiness. If a person knew nothing
else except God, ‘he would have a perfect intellect: nor is his intellect more perfect
through knowing something else besides Him, except in so far as it sees Him more
fully.’688 It is possible for the Blessed to ‘see God more fully’ since only the Divine
Essence by contemplating itself knows all things, whereas for created intellect there is
always a chance to appreciate and praise more the Divine Nature.689
In a way which touches on this paradox of both knowing God but still learning
how great He is, Wang says, ‘Perhaps it is possible to have all desire satisfied, and still to
act; to understand everything, and still to wonder; to have one’s life completed, and still
to live; to arrive, and still to keep moving...’690 This seems to be what Aquinas is trying to
touch on. It is not ridiculous to think that what the blessed will be looking at, using the
eye and central nervous system, will in fact be the humanity of Christ Himself - all his
particular accidents, such as hair colour, eye colour, height and weight, will be apparent
to the senses. It is not unlikely that what the physical ears will be hearing a dialogue
between Chesterton, Augustine and Socrates about their respective childhoods. Possibly,
the hands may be passing a football to legends of the past. Although the thought of these
things makes one metaphorically salivate, none of these things is what happiness is
essentially found in. Not even some (or all) who saw Jesus during His earthly ministry
could claim to have the Beatific vision by doing so, since it has primarily to do with the
intellect rather than the eyes. But neither are they completely irrelevant to the Beatific
Vision, since via indirect perception, seeing Christ’s wounds and hearing Peter recall
nights by the campfire with Jesus, God’s glory is displayed even further.

Happiness & Non-Ultimate Goods
Imperfect Happiness
External and bodily goods are necessary for imperfect happiness, not as belonging
to the essence of happiness, but by serving as instruments to happiness.691 The order of
necessity, as mentioned in Chapter One, may demand sleep, meals, house maintenance or
688
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even nappy changes take temporary but real prioritisation, in order for imperfect
happiness to be achieved. Yet it should always be remembered that external goods serve
those of the body, and the goods of the body are always ordered toward predisposing the
person to attain goods of the soul. External and bodily goods ‘are limited goods, that is,
good only to the extent that they promote the good of the soul which is found in the moral
and intellectual virtues.’692
Once again it must be reiterated, this is not to imply that for Thomas the body is a
mere tool, but rather it is the great dignity of the intellectual animal that its physicality is
so intertwined with the spiritual. Just as the Sacraments have necessary physical
components raised to a greater dignity than found elsewhere in nature, so in the acting
human person there are necessary physical components which have been raised to
participate in the spiritual life.

‘Contemplation, though it cannot be the exclusive activity of any human, is
objectively the best activity in which a human can engage.’693 However, ‘it is nonetheless
a mistake to think that the exercise of theoretical wisdom is in no way subject to practical
wisdom.’694 For example, to know what to do, even whether to contemplate and for how
long, is a work of the practical reason. Without moral virtues such as temperance and
justice, it is highly unlikely the ‘circumstances conducive to the acquisition of speculative
virtues’ will be obtained.695 Hence in the earthly life, the requirements of prudence can
never be neglected. As per the criteria of happiness being an entire rule of life, it is not
possible to love reason or God too much, but one can certainly love external and bodily
goods (even one’s own life) in a disordered way.696
Perfect Happiness
Since the Ultimate Good, God, has been attained in perfect happiness, nonultimate goods have an inverse relationship to the way they relate to imperfect happiness.
Rather than being necessary precursors and antecedents as they are to imperfect
happiness, in perfect happiness they flow from the happiness already achieved, as
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concomitants or consequences of the Beatific vision. This mimics the way the body
related to imperfect and perfect happiness as seen above.
Since in earthly life one can only attain finite goods, there is a necessary limitation
on the spectrum of goods one can acquire. Whereas in perfect happiness, since the Source
and Summit of Goodness has already being attained, every possible finite good is also
enjoyed by the Blessed. ‘After all, the created goods are nothing more than an imperfect
image of what God is in Himself, and in the order of charity everything is loved for God,
in God and through God.’697

Happiness & The Active Life
Imperfect Happiness
The traditional distinction between the contemplative and active life stems from
the distinction of the intellect into theoretical and practical functions.698 The
contemplative life is that in which the pursuit of truth can more explicitly and directly be
pursued, whereas the active life is that in which the ordering of practical affairs is
primary. When the word primary is used in this sense, it is important to not take it as
implying that truth is secondary. In all human activities ‘ens is prior to bonum and the
principle of contradiction is the absolutely first principle.’699 Theoretical and practical are
two uses of the one intellectual power, distinguishable by their different ends; the truth in
itself, and the truth ordered to activity. This why Thomas describes the practical intellect
as an extension of the speculative.700 Hence truth is never removed from the person’s
pursuit in the active life: ‘Morality is rooted in being and… the parameters of moral
choice are found in the structures of being.’701
Thomas explains that ‘in a restricted sense and in a particular case one should
prefer the active life on account of the needs of the present life.’702 Two basic reasons for
temporarily prioritising external activity can be discerned. The first is external to man and
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relates to the common good, while the second relates to the character and vocation of the
individual. These will be addressed in order.
Aquinas states that ‘amongst the activities of the moral virtues, political and
military actions stand out preeminent,’ yet as has already been established, ‘they are not
desirable for their own sakes’ but always ordered to other goods.703 More specifically,
since the ultimate end of man is contemplation of truth, it is that ‘to which the whole of
political life seems directed… Political life establishes and preserves peace, giving men
the opportunity of contemplating truth.’704 Thomas then sees the ends of the political life
fundamentally consisting in providing freedom from external disorder, so that the
ultimate end may be pursued.705
‘The moral laws are comprised of the ordering principles that a community must
embody if its members are to be able to act in concert while each also seeks his or her
good as an individual.’706 Jacques Maritain elaborates on Porters point when he
distinguishes direct and indirect goals for individual and political ethics: ‘Individual
ethics takes into account the subordinate ultimate end (terrestrial common good), but
directly aims at the absolute ultimate one (transcendent, eternal common good); whereas
political ethics takes into account the absolute ultimate end, but its direct aim is the
subordinate ultimate end.’707 Hence there is a distinction, yet also a complementarity,
between the goals of the active and contemplative life. Only in the political associations
of the city can one ‘establish and preserve that virtuous civil order that allows for
contemplation.’708
Maritain also roots this complementarity in a deep understanding of the common
good. ‘The common good… includes the sociological integration of all the civic
conscience, political virtues and sense of law and freedom, of all the activity, material
prosperity and spiritual riches… wisdom, moral rectitude, justice, friendship, happiness,
virtue.’709 As seen throughout the present work, many of these components are
antecedents of perfect happiness, and components of imperfect happiness. ‘The direct
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ordination of the human person to God transcends every created common good – both the
common good if the political society and the intrinsic common good of the universe.’710
The individuals drive toward the infinite truth, good and beauty are ‘objects of the
speculative intellect, not of the practical intellect, which is engaged in the community and
its good.’711 To frame this point in the language used thus far, the active life serves the
contemplative life.
When this is forgotten, practical activity begins to inhibit one’s happiness, since
on its own, the active life ‘becomes meaningless the moment it sees itself as an end in
itself… it is contemplation which preserves in human society the truth which is at one and
the same time useless and the yardstick of every possible use.’712 When work, as
popularly understood, is removed from its ordering toward contemplation, man inevitably
becomes a slave to things which are beneath him. In scriptural terminology this is
described by the prophets as ‘returning to Egypt.’713 In other words, man returns to a state
of slavery to that which is beneath him. Most often, since political and military actions
are preeminent in the active life, he becomes a slave to government and/or materialism.
Once man forgets that he is made for the seventh day, the day of rest and worship, his
happiness is immediately jeopardised. His very dignity as a creature willed for his own
good (in the form of the Beatific vision) is forgotten, and his worth or success is
measured in economic or utilitarian terms.714 It is only once seen in light of mans
vocation to truth and contemplation, that one can now see how the active life disposes one
towards happiness.
Maritain, one of the great Thomistic political philosophers of the twentieth
century, saw essentially two alternatives to how a people could understand the role (and
therefore goal) of their government.715 The first is the ‘moral realisation’ model, already
espoused above regarding its common good. The second is the ‘technical or artistic
realisation’ model, in which the focus is on the pursuit of things external to man. For a
government of the latter kind, education is deemed useful only as much as it serves the
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workplace, the moral character of individual citizens is not encouraged any further than
the civil laws, and economic and technological advancement are seen as the ultimate
measurements of civilisation.716 Since these seem to resemble the time we live in, it is not
difficult to see a ‘returning to Egypt’ taking place in the lives of many.
Therefore in conclusion, Thomas sees the temporary prioritisation of the active
life as valid, as long as all activities are ordered back toward contemplation, the ultimate
good of man himself. The second reason Thomas mentioned for prioritising external
activity, regard those internal to the person. It is noticeable that a person who is
prone to yield to his passions on account of his impulse to action is simply more apt
for the active life by reason of his restless spirit… Others on the contrary, have the
mind naturally pure and restful, so that they are apt for contemplation, and if they were
to apply themselves wholly to action, this would be detrimental to them.717
Thomas, in this passage reveals his truly pastoral nature. By realising that each
individual is naturally inclined (in the sense of the ‘natural virtues’ analysed above) to
different activities, it would be destructive for them to pursue a life significantly as odds
with this all at once. Hence, ones path to realising the goodness of being may involve
predominantly charitable works and the corporeal works of mercy, while others may be
naturally inclined to pursuing the same goal via reading, writing and the spiritual works
of mercy. Man’s character, in all its needs, contingency, moods and psychological
episodes, demands some kind of balance between contemplative and active activities
according to the individual’s current state.718 ‘The active life may be considered as
quieting and directing the internal passions of the soul, and from this point of view the
active life is a help to the contemplative.’719 Ultimately it requires prudence in order to
determine what is to be done at any moment:
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Action not only provides us with experience, (but also)… by its difficulties, reverses,
successes, by the boredom and weariness it forces us to overcome, by the
contradictions it unfailingly arouses; and by the fresh needs it gives rise to, it
stimulates us and retempers our powers… The good is the brother of the true: it will
help its brother. To be where we ought to be, to do what we ought to do, disposes us
for contemplation, and feeds it… On certain days it is only indirectly by way of moral
progress, that our intellect will gain… in other circumstances it will gain of itself
directly.720
Hence we see that the active life provides new experience and material for
reflection and allows development and exercise of the moral virtues, all which are
necessary in order to contemplate well. Sertillanges spends a considerable amount of his
treatise on the intellectual life, convincing his readers to treasure all their ‘conversations,
chance occurences, theatres, visits, strolls, the most ordinary books’ since they all provide
further data for our contemplative activity.721 However, ultimately the reason that the
contemplative and active lives have a profound complementarity is that
at bottom, everything is connected… Thoughts and activities, realities and their
reflections, all have one and the same Father. Philosophy, art, travel, domestic cares,
finance, poetry, and tennis can be allied with one another, and conflict only through
lack of harmony.722
This individual nature of the pursuit of happiness is best reflected in the Catholic
concept of vocation. Individual persons, based on their unique circumstances, capacities
and commitments, are called to engage their practical reason to decide how both to pursue
the ultimate good now and over a lifetime. It is worthwhile here to remember Aquinas’
distinction between esse and essentia: objectively speaking, for human nature, happiness
is contemplation itself, yet it may happen that particular persons may need to commit
more or less time to preparing and predisposing themselves to this activity. In other
words, there are multiple kinds of the imperfectly happy life, ordered to an ultimate,
unqualifiedly perfect happiness.723 Only conditionally can other activity come ahead of
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contemplation in necessary and particular moments. If a person were to neglect the role of
contemplation in his life, not ordering his activity to the contemplation of truth and not
seeking to improve his character disposition, then it would become a moral issue.724
Finally, a thing is said to precede another in two ways – either by nature or
generation. In regards to the order of nature, the contemplative precedes the active since
‘it moves and directs the active life’, however in the order of generation, the active life
comes first since ‘it disposes one to it.’725 Since the contemplation of truth provides the
ends for the active life, it is first in the order of dignity. However, in the lives of each
individual, we are keenly aware that much activity and labour, both internal and external,
is needed before we can contemplate well. Yet the contemplative and active lives have a
mutual benefit since,
well-ordered living is to move on to the contemplative from the active; but often the
soul usefully applies to the active what is drawn from the contemplative, such that
when the mind is kindled by the contemplative the active is more perfectly lived.726
For example, the man who is aware of his own ignorance or weaknesses through
reflection and contemplation will be much humbler in his dealings with others, leading
him to carry out his work in greater harmony with others. On the other hand, the
unreflective person is often is at the whim of underlying irrational thoughts or emotions,
often to the detriment of many areas of activity in his life. When he is asked why he did
or said a particular thing, it is not long before the sad answer, ‘I don’t know,’ is heard.
Perfect Happiness
As has already been mentioned, ‘in the future life of the blessed the occupation of
external actions will cease, and if there be any external actions at all, these will be
referred to contemplation as their end.’727 One should not interpret this as saying all
external actions will cease, since elsewhere Thomas elaborates, ‘when a man makes use
have to come in, but could rather choose to do activities which are of more intrinsic worth – for example,
spending time with children or reading a great book on holiday. Now although there is an immense variety
of jobs in society which individuals are engaged in, there is a profound likeness and similarity in how they
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of things pertaining to the active life, merely as dispositions to contemplation, such things
are comprised under the contemplative life.’728 That is, activity that has truth as its direct
goal is classed as contemplative. Therefore not all external activity ceases, but only that
which contributes to the regulating of the passions and external goods.
If one takes into account that in previous sections it was demonstrated that all our
conversations, strolls and seemingly mundane activities can be significant sources of
contemplation for the right minded, it may be reasonable to expect that such things will
continue in perfect happiness. Since no created intellect can perfectly comprehend the
Divine Essence (one would have to be infinite being to do so), there is a variance of
knowledge amongst the Blessed.729 This gap between what the created and Uncreated
Intellect can comprehend about the Divine Essence allows for ‘a unity of beatitude, which
unity is on the part of the object… (yet a) plurality of mansions corresponds to the
differences of beatitude on the part of the blessed.’730 Thomas’ use of the word
‘mansions’ is derived from Christ Himself.731 It is used to describe differences between
the perfectly happy. Although each subject is perfectly happy, there are degrees of
happiness in regard to the amount that one is united to God through charity. 732 There are
also accidental rewards which ‘add to the glory of beatitude’ according to the particular
circumstances and actions of the life the person lived.733 In particular, Aquinas sees
teachers, virgins and martyrs as achieving a special reward, since they achieved
‘exceptional victories’ in the virtuous life.734 Therefore one can imagine that even in the
state of perfect happiness, each person has something to share with the other, making
activities such as conversations still fruitful, as one even more deeply understands the
glory of God revealed through salvation history.
The practical aspect of the intellect is fulfilled through the enacting of truth, that
is, managing lower things, civic duties and all the moral virtues.735 It is these aspects of
the active life, ordered ‘to the other necessities of the corruptible life… (which) will come
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to a halt.’736 It is not that these activities are bad, but rather they are all fulfilled since
‘reason will be at its peak strength, having been so enlightened by the divine light, so that
it cannot swerve away from what is right.’737 Quoting Augustine, Thomas supports his
explanation of how the cardinal virtues are themselves fulfilled in perfect happiness: ‘the
role of justice will be to be subject to God the ruler, the role of prudence not to prefer or
equate any good to God, the role of courage to cleave to him without the slightest
wavering, and the role of temperance not to take pleasure in any harmful defect.’738

Happiness & Friendship
Imperfect Happiness
Friendship is a necessary for imperfect happiness, but not for the reason which the
average person might imagine – for example, not for their usefulness is getting favours,
cheap deals or pleasure in its sexual or gestational forms. For Thomas, following the
Aristotelian tradition, friends are crucial in our life for the development, carrying out and
maintenance of virtuous activity.739 This takes three primary forms: doing good for them,
delighting in seeing them do good and finally receiving help in other good works.740
‘Friendship is necessary for young men that the help of friends may restrain them
from sin… and useful to the old for assistance in their bodily infirmities… and in the very
prime of life… for the performance of good actions.’741 Although the role that friends
play in one’s life may vary, at each stage they are needed in order to live the good life. ‘A
life of goodness and happiness depends on having certain kinds of relationships… marked
by rich shared history, common ideals, and deep commitment and fidelity.’742 The
modern reader cannot help but notice that the relationships being described do not typify
Facebook friendships. One can see that with only the guise of having many friends,
sustained through shallow conversations about sport or weather, or even a morbid
curiosity to look at pictures of the other, one cannot expect to achieve the imperfect
happiness had even according to natural virtue.
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Without some depth and intimacy to a friendship, one misses out on the mutual
assistance each gives to the other in knowing the truth, and the practical component of
encouraging the other toward the good and avoiding evil.743 How often do friends help
one to see the truth about oneself, often when one is unwilling or unable to do so? It is
also the friend who is in the best position to tell the truth in charity, allowing the best
opportunity for the friend to accept what is said, leading to a potential healing of personal
wounds and weaknesses. Friends also allow one to persevere amidst moods,
circumstances and ideas which are conducive to despair in the virtuous life.
Yet it is not only the most intimate friendships which should be cherished for
imperfect happiness: ‘Do not forget that in association with others, even in ordinary
everyday meetings, there is something to be gleaned. Too much solitude would
impoverish you… The man who is too isolated grows timid, abstracted, a little odd.’744
Once again, there is a vital aspect to the everyday encounters, especially amidst the
variety of persons which one may not find within their close circles.745 These encounters
challenge one to express and understand new ideas, as well as develop the moral virtues
in the wide variety of encounters one comes across.
Perfect Happiness
Once again, we see an inverse relationship between a non-ultimate good and
imperfect happiness, and the same good with perfect happiness. In ones earthly, the
particular good precedes and makes possible imperfect happiness, whereas in the
heavenly life the particular good flows from the already attained perfect happiness.
Therefore according to perfect happiness, friendship with another than God is not
necessary, ‘Since man has the entire fullness of his perfection in God… friendship is, as
it were, concomitant with perfect Happiness’ rather than being part of its essence.’746
Once again, the friendship with others, or in theological terms, the Communion of Saints,
occurs as an overflowing of one’s union with the Ultimate Good.
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According to ‘man’s spiritual life in respect of his mind… there is fellowship
between us and both God and the angels, imperfectly indeed in this present state of life…
but perfected in Heaven.’747 The bond of this fellowship is nothing other than charity, ‘a
friendship involving love towards God and all rational beings capable of loving Him.’748
It is the supernatural virtue of charity, love of God for who He is, which exists in
common with all those experiencing perfect happiness.749
Thomas understanding of the foundation of the friendship between the Blessed,
reflects the views of Augustine: ‘For if they would turn to Him, they must of necessity
love Him as the supreme good, and love us too as partakers with them in so great a
blessing… so that we should fully enjoy Him, and that all who enjoy Him should enjoy
one another in Him.’750 This statement sums up well the link between the essence of
happiness, the Beatific vision, and its proper accident, loving all those who God loves.
‘The fellowship of friends is not required de necessitate for happiness in heaven… (but
rather) it befits this status.’751 This in fact is not far from friendship in one’s earthly life,
since, as mentioned above, all true friendship ‘is founded on virtue as an effect of it.’752
Without intellectual and moral virtue, it is difficult to imagine someone being able to
engage with another person in a non-toxic relationship. How much more then, since the
Blessed are perfected in virtue, should one expect them to consequently be friends with
all of humanity?

Happiness & Delight
Imperfect Happiness
Delight has an inherent relationship to happiness. This is demonstrated most
clearly by Aquinas in a particular passage, where he reminds the reader of the relationship
between the will and intellect:
Those things that are required for happiness must be gathered from the way in which
man is ordered to an end. Now man is ordered to an intelligible end partly through his
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intellect, and partly through his will: through his intellect, in so far as a certain
imperfect knowledge of the end pre-exists in the intellect: through the will, first by
love which is the will’s first movement towards anything, secondly, by a real relation
of the lover to the thing beloved… Therefore these three must concur in happiness; to
wit, vision, which is perfect knowledge of the intelligible end; comprehension, which
implies presence of the end; and delight or enjoyment, which implies repose of the
lover in the object beloved.753
Up to this point in the present work, emphasis has been placed on the vision and
comprehension aspects of happiness, since it is in this that the essence of happiness lies. It
is appropriate here to address the third aspect of happiness, enjoyment or delight, which is
its proper accident.754 Delight is a concomitant or consequential act of the will,
experienced with the attainment of the good.755 The desire for the good being fulfilled, the
person rests in a union of joy with it. Sertillanges sums up the two-fold relationship of the
will and happiness, by stating that ‘contemplation begins in love and ends in joy; it begins
in the love of the object and the love of knowledge as an act of life; it ends in the joy of
ideal possession and of the ecstasy it causes.’756
‘In Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy, it is not objectively possible to separate
pleasure from the ends of the natural inclinations, because pleasure is precisely the
subjective side of the objective satisfaction of a need or potentiality of the human
being.’757 Since pleasure is ‘concomitant’ with the achievement of ends, ‘there can be no
perfect activity without pleasure.’758 One can understand here how easily it is for pleasure
and happiness to be confused with each other, since they are so intimately related, yet it is
‘the nature of joy to be a secondary phenomenon.’759 The presence of delight is analogous
to the notion of receiving a reward for excellent work.760 The trophy itself is not the good
work, but a consequence of it. In the same way, another concomitant of happiness, peace,
is not the essence of man’s ultimate end, but is rather a proper accident of it.761 Activity
which is ‘experienced as enjoyable and rewarding, results when a person whose relevant
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goals are harmoniously integrated engages in activity… experienced as unhindered,
unselfconscious, and effortless.’762 In other words, the more efficient or naturally a person
achieves their end, the more enjoyable he finds it.
One can see the direct parallels between this description of enjoyable activity, and
the way in which a virtuous man carries out a good act. Hence there is an intimate
relationship between moral virtue (as antecedental to happiness) and the delight
experienced from doing the good. ‘Since everyone delights when he has obtained that
which he loves, so the contemplative life ends in delight, which is in the affections.’763
When the virtuous person realises the truth, beauty and goodness of being, it brings a
corresponding delight to the concupiscible appetite. Therefore one should not imagine the
truly contemplative person as the cold-hearted ‘objective’ old man in a sterile lab coat –
in fact that may represent more the intellectual work of the vicious man, who does not
delight in truth, but rather only acquires information for pragmatic reasons or material
gain. Just as without a rightly ordered will, one is unable to either attain or enjoy the
Ultimate Good, it is the same with imperfect happiness.
Since contemplation in this life is not just any activity of man, one should not
expect the pleasure associated with it to be like any other. ‘The same activity which we
said is most perfect is also most pleasant.’764 As has been demonstrated above, man’s
highest and proper operation is that of contemplation. Therefore one should expect that
the pleasure associated with successful contemplation is also the most pleasurable, and
this is so, since ‘unqualified pleasure for man is what is pleasant according to reason.’765
He does not tire permanently or temporarily from using reason as he does with bodily
pleasure. Nor does one suffer as a result of ‘excessive’ reasonable activity, as one does
from bodily pleasure.
Perfect Happiness
Since delight is nothing other than the appetite being at rest in the good, the
delight associated with resting in the Ultimate Good is the most perfect.766 ‘There will be
pleasure in activity as long as, on the one hand, the object (sensible or intelligible) and, on
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the other, the agent itself (which perceives by sense or contemplates by intellect) are well
conditioned.’767 Hence the Beatific Vision is the most pleasurable of all activities, since
the object of contemplation and the act of attainment, are both eternal and without decay.
The person can suffer neither from an excess of this good mentally or physically, and he
is completely free from fear of loss of the good itself or the faculty by which it is attained.
The desire for pleasure is utterly satisfied:
That good in which we shall take delight is greater than any sensible good, and more
intimate… Unless, perhaps, someone wants to say that the beatitude of the angels is
imperfect because the angels lack the pleasures of the brutes – which is completely
absurd.768
Many are familiar with the joy experienced with the arrival of good news. Whether it is
the news that a loved one has returned from far away, that one has done a good job on a
difficult project, or that one is loved by his spouse, children or friends. As mentioned
above, all of these are nothing other than particular realisations of the goodness of being
itself. How great then, will the joy be when absolutely perfect Being is revealed, and one
here’s the words, ‘Well done, good and faithful servant; you have been faithful over a
little, I will set you over much; enter into the joy of your master.’769

Conclusion
This final chapter discussed how imperfect and perfect happiness are related to
other goods which are not part of the essence of happiness. These included the goods of
the body, active life, friends, delight and other non-ultimate goods. It was generally found
that they all are necessary precursors to happiness, especially in its imperfect form.
However, since perfect happiness is already had in the Beatific vision, the person receives
these goods as concomitant or consequential.
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Conclusion
It has been demonstrated in the thesis that Aquinas proposes a complex yet deeply
integrated answer to the question of the nature of happiness. Happiness, as the ultimate
end of all our actions, has a particular framework or structure which can be analysed prior
to discussion of what it materially consists in. The nature of man’s ultimate end is that
which is a perfect operation which fulfils all desire, is desired for its own sake alone, selfsufficient, without defect, suitable for all persons and able to act as an entire rule of life.
A person could not be considered happy in the strictest sense of the word until this criteria
had been fulfilled.
Aquinas demonstrates that only the act of contemplating the Divine Essence can
be man’s perfect happiness. It is a rational animal’s highest operation in line with its
highest operation. It is the fulfilment of all desire since one beholds and is united with the
First Cause and Principle, Truth and Goodness itself – that which alone can satisfy a
universal appetite. Perfect Being is utterly self-sufficient so that if it alone is grasped, all
that is good has been attained. No additional good can be gained which is not essentially
present in Perfect Being Himself, which is free from all defect and desired for its own
sake alone. By realising that man’s happiness resides in this particular act and object, one
is able to make an entire rule of life, ordering one’s activities by the two pillars of love
and reason.
It is no wonder that Aquinas places his discussion on the nature of happiness at
the beginning of his ethical treatise in the Summa Theologica. It comes immediately after
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the metaphysical study in Part One, which asks the question what is, builds on that
answer in Part Two when he asks, what is most desirable? The study of ethics is nothing
other than the study of what is good, and the study of how that good can be attained –
both as act and object. In other words, how is one able to behold the reality of both
themselves, the universe, visible and invisible, and truly say, ‘Behold, it is very good.’770
In order to truly realise the goodness of being one has to actualise one’s own
capacities in the process. Hence the need to develop the moral, intellectual and
theological virtues in order to perfect one’s own esse. Education, friends, politics and
recreation all contribute their in their appropriate ways to this attainment. Yet this
perfection of one’s own being, although necessary, is insufficient for perfect happiness.
Being goes beyond the reality of the individual. Therefore, in order to truly grasp the
goodness of being, one must apprehend the truth and goodness at the source of all that is
around them.
In order to attain perfect happiness then, Thomas saw no other possibility than
seeing (not simply believing) that the cause and ground of all contingent and conditional
being, the eternal, necessary and infinite Reality, is most truly good and beautiful. It is
when the intellectual looks with love upon that unconditioned Reality that they are
perfectly happy. It is the eternal moment when that which is within the person is in the
most perfect relationship to all that is outside, when his intellect is perfectly united to the
first and final Truth, his will perfectly united to the first and final Good, so that there is no
searching left to be done, but there is an endless awe of how truly good it all is. St.
Thomas holds that man’s ultimate end is found where it all begins. It is only then that one
can truly apprehend how good Being is.
The work-at-hand began with a hypothetical story about an alien species studying
humanity. As part of their research they wished to know what humans mean by the term
happiness. One might further hypothesise their conclusion:
‘Humanity began its story in the Garden, an external environment perfectly
ordered to the person, with a perfectly integrated mind and body, perfectly ordered
toward love and knowledge of each other and God. Man when he searches within himself
could ask nothing more than this and it is only in realising this that he can find his rest.
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He desires to imitate the Source and truly say, “Behold, it is very good.”771 In their search
to be able to echo these words, some try to collect and consume as many particular goods
as possible, while their universal appetite drives them to keep searching. It is unclear how
these people hope to be able to say “It is all good”, while the ultimate Cause and End,
even of the particular goods they love, remains irrelevant or unknown to them. Others, in
their search, hold to “Seek first His Kingdom and His righteousness, and all these things
shall be yours as well.”772 This plan remains the most intelligible, if it will ever be
possible for them to say, ‘It is all good.’”
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